

A SERIES OF BROADCAST DISCUSSIONS

# CANADIAN DEFENCE

WHAT WE HAVE TO DEFEND

BY

THE KELSEY CLUB  
OF WINNIPEG

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PRICE—25 CENTS

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PUBLISHED BY THE  
CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

1937



*THE first series of Kelsey Club broadcasts was experimental. Round Table discussions on Canadian foreign policy had, of course, been given over the radio before. The League of Nations Society in Canada previously presented such a series in co-operation with the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission. When the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was formed in the autumn of 1936, it was felt that a method of presenting broadcast discussions on Canadian and foreign affairs under more general auspices might be advantageous. To this suggestion the League of Nations Society agreed, and the Canadian Association for Adult Education, through its director, Mr. E. A. Corbett, also pledged co-operation. Winnipeg was selected as a suitable location for the first series of experimental broadcasts. A meeting of various groups and societies interested in adult education and international studies was accordingly called there in January by Mr. Corbett. As a result of this meeting, the Kelsey Club was organized. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation believes that the experiment was successful and it plans to use appropriately adapted methods for the discussion of other topics of general interest.*

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*Exigencies of space have made necessary the abbreviation of the first five addresses. Such abbreviations are indicated by asterisks.*



THE KELSEY CLUB  
OF WINNIPEG

# CANADIAN DEFENCE

## WHAT WE HAVE TO DEFEND

VARIOUS DEFENCE POLICIES

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A SERIES OF TEN BROADCAST DISCUSSIONS  
GIVEN OVER THE NATIONAL NETWORK OF  
THE CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION,  
FEBRUARY 28; MARCH 7, 14, 21, 28; APRIL 4, 11,  
18, 25, AND MAY 2, 1937, TOGETHER WITH  
SUMMARIES OF DISCUSSIONS.

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# THE KELSEY CLUB

## OF WINNIPEG

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THE KELSEY CLUB OF WINNIPEG comprises a group of Winnipeg citizens which meets weekly to discuss questions of interest to Canadians. It takes its name from Henry Kelsey, believed to be the first white man to cross the Canadian prairies and to see thereon the buffalo and musk-ox. As Kelsey was an explorer and an observer, so the Kelsey Club delights in exploring and observing, seeking ways to the solution of Canadian problems, by frank discussion and interchange of views. It is understood that the leader of each discussion speaks as an individual and that the views he or she expresses are not necessarily those of the Kelsey Club or of any other group or organization.

Questions not infrequently are calculated to elucidate a point under discussion rather than to reflect the opinions of the interrogators.

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### EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

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*Organizing Secretary:* MARCUS HYMAN, K.C.

*Recording Secretary:* W. H. DARRACOTT.

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1937

I. J. W. DAFOE, LL.D.

“The Dominion of Canada”

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DR. J. W. DAFOE: It is a little like carrying coals to Newcastle to talk to a group like this about the possessions of Canada which are worth defending and which it is our duty to defend should the need arise. You know as much as I do about all these things. Nevertheless it has been thought that there might be some advantage in having the discussion prefaced by a few remarks about the characteristics of this country which make it precious to its people.

I might say a word about the title—“What We Have To Defend,” which has been given to the discussions in which we are to engage. This, you will note, is not a question but an invitation to a discussion of facts. There is nothing in it of challenge. To most people “defend” is a word with a particular connotation; but it has, in fact, a wide range of meaning. To me it has in this connection a meaning which could also be expressed by such words as guard or maintain. This use of the word is well exemplified in English usage.

There is much which Canadians do well to be on guard to protect.

Moreover, the danger to these possessions is not wholly external to the country. A threat to them may come from short-term views, from a sectionalism that excluded national considerations, from the clash of special interests, from frictions which arise from honest diversities in point of view and from differing racial endowments and aptitudes.

Nor must we,—by we I mean this immediate circle and any who choose to associate themselves with us—nor must we slip into the attitude that our particular role is that of defender; perhaps, unless we watch ourselves, some of these things will need to be defended against us. This is a self-examination of ourselves in relation to our own country.



I shall begin in the time-honoured way with a word about our resources: "Boundless resources", is the accepted phrase. A country has no resources apart from its people; land however fertile is wilderness until it is cultivated; gold is rock and sand until it is mined. There is thus a partnership of the people in these resources; to employ a phrase much used in the United States, they are affected with a public interest. The partnership of the people of Canada in their natural resources is mostly a by-product of the normal operations of organized business, but there are evidences that this relationship will become more intimate. Excepting land, where freehold seems essential, the public are already retaining a large measure of control over their national endowment, permitting intervention if public interests are endangered. This tendency will become more marked. One of the things to be guarded is this interest of the whole people in the national estate. It is desirable that all Canadians should have a common interest in our great natural possessions; that they should feel that they have part and lot in the great Canadian venture.

Some years ago the British Trade Commissioner, noting the prosperity then prevailing in Canada, traced it to "the development of natural resources." How true that is the events of the past few years have shown. When our production based on national resources stopped because the world no longer offered markets, depression descended on the country; and the connection between the present revival and the renewal of activities in the mines, the forests and on the farms, due to enlarging outside demand, has now been so clearly established that it is hardly likely that this relationship will ever again be doubted. These conditions tie us in with the world economy and thus make world peace and world prosperity a Canadian interest to be defended to the extent that this may be possible and by such means as are available.

Canadians do not fully realize how mutual is the dependence of the world on Canada and of Canada upon the world. This country is becoming an indispensable source of supply in the world economy.

Canada is one of the half-dozen countries of large area which are natural storehouses for the needs of mankind. And alone of these countries it is a land of limited population and power in a predatory world—a thought-provoking circumstance. It is only necessary to employ a few words to suggest to the imagination the sources of strength which Canada has within her bounds and the position they insure this country in the world to-day and still more in the world of to-morrow: minerals, timber, fisheries, water-power, farm products.

To these can be added another natural endowment of which the Canadian people are barely conscious. This is Canada's geographical position, as the top-half of the North-American continent, facing the two oceans in which the great currents of trade and power flow, in a strong strategical position in relation to the transportation and trade developments of to-morrow.

To support this theory Wheat can be used as an illustration. Canadians once proudly claimed their country as the granary of the world—a claim justified not so much by the volume of our production as by the percentage of our yield that was available for export. Nearly half the wheat coming on the world market was from the Canadian prairies. Though our grain-growers have suffered shocking losses from the disasters of the past few years they still sell their product, though in diminished quantities, in practically every country in the world that buys wheat. The world trade in wheat has been in an inverted position during these years of panic; but there are signs of a return to what was once the normal state of affairs—the nations of the world turning to Canada, with expectant confidence for needed supplies. The world of to-morrow, if it is to have bread, will need the wheatfields of Canada.

In the advantages suggested as resulting from our actual and potential wealth and from the strength of our position all the people of Canada should share; and this they do, to a very considerable extent, by reason of the growing integration of our national economy. Real benefits, when any are going, cannot be limited to a class or a section,

though a mistaken impression about this is common. Striking proof of this was furnished during the years of prosperity by tracing the effects of the production of grain in Western Canada.

The primary factor in Canada's progress during those years was the contribution made by the handful of grain-growers. The whole Canadian people were partners with the western farmer; and it not infrequently happened that the partners who took no risk got most of the benefit. The grain harvest started a chain of employment which affected every business in the country, big or little; but it might happen that after the wheat was garnered, transported, graded, milled and exported, it left no residue of profit in the pockets of the grower. When this occurred the consequences were at once reflected in a Dominion-wide check to prosperity as has been so completely demonstrated in this depression. The partnership between agricultural prosperity in the West and business prosperity throughout Canada is now recognized; and the safeguarding in every legitimate way of the interests of the producing partner as a contributor to the national weal ought to be a prime consideration of national policy. Here is a national interest to be defended.

I have put these material considerations first because people have to live by bread; but they do not live by bread alone. I turn now to considerations less ponderable.

We Canadians are fortunate in being subject to conditions that we are perhaps inclined to regard as constituting a national weakness. We are not a compact, homogeneous people with the fixed attitudes of mind which derive from a common race and religion; and we are therefore constrained to practice virtues that are at present somewhat disregarded. A hundred years ago Lord Durham, making a diagnosis of Canadian troubles, said that he found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state. We have the two nations still—indeed—with additions but we have found a way to merge these divergent elements, without undue capitulation on either side, into not an organic but a co-operative entity. Broadly speaking, the agencies by



which this has been achieved have been the federation of the Canadian provinces and the development of a flexible and efficient system of government. When to our racial divergencies we add sectional variations in economic interests, we begin to understand the magnitude of our national problem. But, if we can raise our minds to the necessary elevation, we can see that this problem, set for us by destiny, imposes upon us for its successful solution a salutary discipline. We must, in these matters in which there are clashes of interest and feeling, seek for the common denominator; and in the process we find it necessary to be tolerant, considerate, patient, putting aside the immediate expedient for the longer vision. These are virtues not easy to practise in times like these when elemental and irrational feelings try to break bounds; and the maintaining of them becomes the duty and concern of patriotic Canadians. Our statesmen must always seek the broad ground upon which all Canadians of good intent can meet; it is only upon these terms that we can continue to enjoy the advantages present and potential, of living in this spacious land of promise and fulfilment.

The system of free government that makes these things possible is the most essential of all our possessions.

Bryce, in his "Modern Democracies" said that Canada is an "actual democracy", that is, our democracy is real and not sham as in the countries where it has been swept out by the tides of reaction. "In Canada," he said, "better perhaps than in any country the working of the English system (of government) can be judged in its application to the facts of a new and swiftly growing country, thoroughly democratic in its ideas and its institutions."

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Not only was Canada the first country in which the British system was put to the test in a complete democracy; it was also the first country in which this system, which developed in a unitary state was applied to a federation. Under both tests it has proved its worth largely because it could be adapted to meet our particular conditions;

and in the hands of the people of Canada, if they have the wisdom to use it wisely, it can be used to solve progressively our complex and stubborn national problems. If there are difficulties that though removable are not being removed; if there are things to be done that are not being done; if there are obstacles to national unity that are not being dealt with, the fault is with ourselves and not with the machinery of government. This is a priceless possession to be cherished and defended.

Our structure of government, our system of law, our social organization, rest upon the freedom of the individual. Twenty years ago in any discussion about Canada's sacred possessions no one would have thought it necessary to mention liberty as one of them; any more than one would remark that we live because we have air to breathe. But as we look about the world and note what is going on in countries which once seemed to be as free as Canada, we have reason to know that those rights of man are not to be taken as part of the unchangeable order of things. They were won by blood and tears and they will have to be maintained by alert and resolute men. Leaving out the remote possibility of conquest, our danger in this respect comes from within. It is very slight; it will shrink into nothingness if it is understood that the right of the Canadian citizen to do all those things in the future which he had done without challenge in the past will be defended to the last extremity.

It is not necessary to indulge in hyperbole in describing the Canada to which we give our devotion and which we will, when necessary, defend. In comparing it with the ideal country of our imaginings it has many shortcomings; but in actual contrast it need not, in the values of life guaranteed for its citizens, fear comparison. Its worth can be stated in terms of its possessions—material, moral, physical and spiritual—which are so precious to its people that they stand on guard for them against the indefinable but real menaces of a world in chaos; and against dangers that may lurk nearer home.

## SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 28TH

MRS. R. F. MCWILLIAMS thought that in recent years the world had not particularly wanted our Canadian goods and it had been developing means whereby it could do without them.

DR. DAFOE pointed out that he had already dealt with wheat and that with regard to minerals, Sir Thomas Holland told the British Association some years ago, that he prophesied a predominance for the areas dowered with mineral resources. One only had to recognize the fact that the pre-Cambrian Shield was wholly Canadian, with the exception of a five per cent tip in the United States and that from that tip the Americans had extracted one and a half billion tons of iron ore and five million tons of refined copper, to see that it was no exaggeration to say that Canada would become an indispensable source of supply in the world economy.

MR. ALISTAIR STEWART said that he was wondering whether the unitary system was capable of application in Canada, in view of the existence of the nine provinces and their insistence on provincial rights.

DR. DAFOE felt that a unitary state in the Dominion of Canada would prove unworkable. He believed that the federal power might in some respects be enlarged, this he thought was one of our most pressing national problems.

MR. MARCUS HYMAN asked what advantages lay in having a diversity of racial origins in our population.

DR. DAFOE pointed out that this was an academic question. We had the diversity and it was going to continue. The odd ideas afloat about racial superiority should make us thankful that such speculations were not practicable here; such theories in Canada must ultimately collide with realities.

MR. HENRI LACERTE thought that the contributions made by the diverse races enriched the common life and that any mutual distrusts and dislikes which might exist would be eliminated by living together in a spirit of tolerance and mutual regard.

In reply to a question by Mrs. McWilliams, Dr. Dafoe discussed more fully his views with regard to Canada's geographical position. He thought that Canada would be the highway for all air travel in the Northern hemisphere by reason of the fact that the great circle routes placed Canada in a most favourable position. The Mercator



projection had done a great disservice to Canada, but a glance at a globe would correct the wrong impression made by this geographer.

MR. W. H. DARRACOTT said that he had found young people asking themselves "What is the use of Liberty?". In Canada they enjoyed liberty and suffered unemployment but elsewhere they saw countries without liberty but with a degree of economic security.

DR. DAFOE thought that liberty could not be exchanged for economic security; such an exchange would only result in a symbolical mess of pottage which would not last long. He believed the democratic countries would outlast their Fascist rivals, and could not believe that any young intelligent Canadian would agree to surrender his political liberty.

MR. DARRACOTT pointed out that the realities of the situation must be faced, and that there were young Fascists and young Communists in this country who would be willing to make the exchange.

DR. DAFOE agreed that that was so, but pointed out that such people expected, in a new régime, to be among those in authority and not of the vast number who would have to submit to the orders of someone else.

MR. LAWRENCE PALK suggested that there was a duty on us to prohibit the export of raw material which could be used for war purposes.

DR. DAFOE agreed in principle, but pointed out that a great deal of the so-called "war material" could be shipped abroad for ostensibly commercial purposes; to be re-applied for war purposes later on. It was a most difficult matter to give effect to such restrictions.

PROFESSOR R. O. MACFARLANE raised the question of rampant provincialism as a stumbling block in the path of broad Canadian interests; and pointed to the sporadic rise of secession talk in Quebec, Alberta, and the Maritime Provinces.

DR. DAFOE drew the speaker's attention to the secession talk in Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia. He thought this was only the creaking of the federal machine which sometimes indicated the need of a little oil. In his opinion the threat of secession would not get beyond the point where the alternatives to confederation were considered.

## II. MR. MARCUS HYMAN, K.C., M.L.A.

### "The British Heritage: Political and Legal"

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MR. HYMAN: Last week, Dr. Dafoe spoke to us on the Dominion of Canada. In sketching the background for our discussions on Canada's defence, we must not forget that, though Canadians, we enjoy membership in a larger association. Canada, in the attainment of constitutional autonomy, is at one with her sister Dominions; and with them, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the Irish Free State and India, and under the leadership of, but without any subordination to, Great Britain, constitute the British Commonwealth of Nations; and all the Dominions, together with their respective dependencies, colonies, protectorates, protected states, and mandated territories, constitute the British Empire.

\* \* \* \*

At the Imperial Conference of 1926 formal definition was given to the status already attained by the Dominions through extreme decentralization, in the modern British Empire. It was then declared that:—

"The Dominions are autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations."

Before the war, foreign policy and defence was determined by Great Britain for the whole Empire; but now, as a patent deduction from this declaration, the Dominions have the choice of either determining their respective policies, independently of one another, or, by consultation and co-operation, aiming at a general identity of purpose.

\* \* \* \*

The English constitution, which lies at the root of all the constitutionalism of the Empire, was a creature of

gradual development, and it happily escaped definition in any form of fundamental legislation, which would have made it difficult to alter.

\* \* \* \*

Within the Empire, without any legal bonds, we have a group of nations which are predisposed towards a loyal performance as between one another, of the duties which each has in law towards all other members of a wider organization—the League of Nations. They have a bias in one another's favour, instead of fear and suspicion of each other.

The false worship of nationalism prevents states from advancing in co-operation. They fear that it means a surrender of autonomy, yet in the Commonwealth we have a living example of co-operation increasing with autonomy.

\* \* \* \*

What has experience shown since Confederation with regard to Imperial Defence? During the early colonial existence material conditions rendered the idea of Imperial defence out of the question. Imperial forces were not infrequently maintained in order to protect the colonies from internal risks. The difficulties in New Zealand with the Maoris necessitated the use of British troops, and, as was to be expected, the interests of the British Exchequer in maintaining the troops could not be harmonized easily with New Zealand control when conflict of policy arose. In 1865 a resolution of the House of Commons raised the question of the payment by local government of Imperial troops provided, where local defence alone was their probable duty; with the result that Imperial troops were rapidly withdrawn.

MR. ALISTAIR STEWART: At whose request? New Zealand's?

MR. HYMAN: No, Mr. Stewart; at the insistence of the British taxpayer.

MR. STEWART: Yes, but wait a minute. What about Canada in 1870, when General Wolseley brought British troops right to this very spot overland to quell the Red River Rebellion?



MR. HYMAN: Yes, of course. The change was a gradual one, and remember that by 1885 it was about complete, since in that year, in the Northwest Rebellion, only Canadian troops were used.

Still less could regular military aid be expected from the colonies to the Empire, though Canadian voyageurs and a New South Wales contingent served during the abortive attempt to meet the Dervish advance in the Sudan in the latter '70's, and in the South African War large bodies of volunteers from Australia, New Zealand and Canada responded to the need of the Empire. Experience, however, showed the inefficiency in improvising co-operation between Imperial and Colonial forces.

At the Colonial Conference of 1902 the impossibility of devising a system of securing military aid to Imperial forces in the event of war was fully recognized; so, too, at the Conference of 1907; but the latter resulted in the establishment of the Imperial General Staff, organized at the War Office in 1909, the functions of which were fully considered at the Military Conference of the same year and the Imperial Conference of 1911.

It was there recognized that while no idea of subordinating the Dominion forces to Imperial control could be entertained, much might be gained by standardizing military matters, such as the formation of units, the pattern of weapons, training, and methods of transport, in order to make possible their merger in a homogeneous army in the event of war.

To bring this about it was proposed that Dominion officers be attached to the General Staff, that British officers be loaned to the Dominion, to establish branches of the Imperial General Staff, which might correspond with that body and concert plans for defence.

In 1911 the necessity for the formation of a Committee of Imperial Defence was recognized. This was established, and it produced a War Book of Regulations which was adopted by Canada.

As for the co-ordination of Naval forces, this, throughout, had a more Imperial aspect. In 1865 an Imperial Act

authorized the maintenance by colonies of local forces for coastal and harbour defence. At the Colonial Conference of 1867, Australia undertook an annual contribution to the Imperial navy. This was renewed in 1902, but was dropped when Australia undertook to maintain a local flotilla for its own defence.

During the European crisis of 1909, New Zealand presented a Dreadnought to the Empire, and at the London Naval Conference in the same year, three naval units were assigned to the Pacific, one in the East Indies (which was British), one in the China Seas (British with New Zealand contribution), and the Australian unit at Australia's expense. Canada was to begin the construction of a flotilla on the same principles as Australia.

The existence of these independent units and its reconciliation with the International unity of the Empire and co-operation in war was adjusted at the Imperial Conference of 1911 by the acceptance of two principles: (1) In peace the Dominion forces were to be under Dominion control, and (2) Care was to be taken to secure similarity of training and discipline with the Imperial army.

We come now to the Great War. The Imperial Government entered into it upon its own responsibility, but once the die was cast the Dominions hastened to express willingness to afford aid.

PROF. T. O. MACFARLANE: Yes, but each on its own terms. Don't forget that.

MR. HYMAN: I do not forget, yet I must remind you that the Australian naval forces were immediately placed under the control of the Admiralty—that large bodies of troops were raised under the command of a British commander in the field—that as the Dominion troops grew, recognition was accorded to their national character—that the Canadian Army Corps retained that formation under a Canadian Commander—that his opinions had more serious weight with the British Command than could have had any British Corps Commander—that the Dominion forces were almost wholly volunteers—that South Africa

had to cope with a rebellion which General Botha put down and then turned to reduce German South-West Africa—that the Imperial Conference of 1915, you remember, was postponed—that as the war prolonged the Dominions and India met the British in conference and that an Imperial War Cabinet was formed. This was not a cabinet properly speaking, since it had no executive officers, and each Government had to give its own orders; but none the less it was of great value. The Dominions had willingly handed over their forces to Imperial control and the whole Empire met in council to discuss the matters over which these forces were being employed.

After the War the British Empire Peace Delegation included separate representation for each of the Dominions.

The close co-operation within the Empire for war purposes resulted in a closer feeling of unity of the Empire. This led the Round Table group to an energetic campaign, attempting to adopt some form of Imperial federation, but it was an unqualified failure, like every other similar attempt. The Dominions are quite clear that no surrender of autonomy is possible, even for the sake of securing a formal, as opposed to a real, voice in determining Imperial policy.

Since Confederation, Canada's mind has been occupied with the rise and realization of autonomy, a process, so far as the Empire is concerned, divergent in nature. On the other hand, since the War, the creation of the League of Nations has centered attention on an attempt to establish co-operation between all peoples.

May I close with this? The concurrence of these two processes has tended to stress, in the case of the Empire, our rights, and in the case of the League, our duties, but we must not forget that our connections with the other peoples of the Empire are still, and must long remain, infinitely greater and more intimate than our associations with the nations of the world, in or out of the League.

## SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

MR. STEWART drew attention to the many unemployed and the millions of people there were living on a disgracefully low standard of living in the wonderful Empire Mr. Hyman described.

MR. HYMAN explained that while the words "Imperialist" and "Empire" might imply subordination or oppression, yet the term "The British Empire" was the only one which described the Commonwealth of British Nations and their dependencies: it had only a historical significance. It was true that when judged by present ethical standards the history of the growth of every state or empire, including the British Empire, embraced misery, cruelty and bloodshed; but that on the whole the successive extensions of the Empire were made without violence to the moral concepts existing from time to time. He deplored and resented the unnecessary existence of unemployment and wretched living conditions, but these were economic problems which he believed to be capable of solution within our present institutions. His attachment to the Imperial connection implied neither a desire to dictate nor to be dictated to, neither to exploit nor to be exploited.

PROF. MACFARLANE resented the suggestion that the Commonwealth of Nations remained under the leadership of Great Britain. Leadership implied subordination and Canada was following no one; not even Great Britain.

MR. HYMAN could not see that there was any ground for Canadians to have an inferiority complex which might be characteristic of adolescence. The Chairman of the Kelsey Club caused no feeling of inferiority in any of its members. He had been appointed leader, and the club members loyally accepted his formal direction. It was not because Canada was inferior, but because it was equal with Britain, that it recognized the leadership of Britain in numbers, experience and attainment. Great Britain was merely the first among equals.

MR. TREVOR LLOYD questioned the statement that co-operation increased with autonomy, and cited as instances Mr. Lloyd George's call for help against the Turks in 1922, at which time Canada had expressed her unwillingness to participate; and the trade barriers which existed between different parts of the Empire. He suggested that there was nothing brotherly about customs duties.

MR. HYMAN recalled the effect of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's action in handing over the government of



South Africa to Britain's erstwhile enemies. Ireland was apparently entering a period of rest and would probably become more kindly disposed to the Imperial connection as time went on. Austria prior to the war was a highly centralized state, controlled from Vienna. The war had exploded it into fragments, but the loosely knit British Empire had forged new bonds of co-operation and mutual assistance. He reminded Mr. Lloyd that Britain and everybody else had paid scant attention to Mr. Lloyd George's call for help against Turkey.

As far as the tariff walls about Canada and Great Britain were concerned, he believed they were merely the symptoms of the economic nationalism which was infesting the world. As the fever abated, he looked forward to a return of sanity within, as well as without, the Empire.

PROF. E. K. BROWN remarked that the speaker had ignored the rather violent discussion on Sir Robert Borden's Navy Bill of 1913; indicating that even before the war Canada was not in harmony over the question of Imperial Defence.

MR. HYMAN considered this to have been a matter purely of internal politics. A high-minded Grit Senate had taken delight in putting Sir Robert Borden in his proper place.

MRS. JESSIE MACLENNAN asked if the speaker thought the British Empire could exist outside the framework of the League of Nations.

MR. HYMAN believed that the faith which existed at the end of the Great War, and which found expression in the League of Nations, had considerably abated; but that nations were learning to co-operate with one another in the subordinate activities of the League. The world was suffering from fear and suspicion, but, as Professor Sir Alfred Zimmern had well pointed out, the greater part of the world was a peace world, consisting of governments who desired peace in order that their peoples could enjoy well-being and liberty. The desirability and ultimate possibilities of the League were no warrant for entire and immediate reliance on its promise of collective security. Whatever might be said of the League, however, the obvious fact was that the British Empire did exist.

MR. HENRI LACERTE asked if in view of the failure of all efforts at centralized control, there was any possibility of unified action in the event of another war.

MR. HYMAN considered that if and when the Empire found itself in danger, Canada and the other dominions

would answer the Empire's need; but it was possible that another major catastrophe might lead to disruption of the Empire.

PROF. MACFARLANE asked where Canada would stand in the event of a clash between Great Britain and the League.

MR. HYMAN dismissed this as an academic question. He did not think that such theoretical possibilities would disturb the peace of mind of the Canadian people. Parliament enjoyed full sovereignty; it had the right to, and undoubtedly would, consider each situation as it arose, on its merits.

MARCH 14, 1937

### III. PROFESSOR E. K. BROWN

#### "Our Cultural Heritage"

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PROF. BROWN: The England of which Mr. Hyman spoke last Sunday is a practical England. The achievements in law and government which he set forth are the achievements of a supremely practical people. On the continent of Europe it is mainly by such achievements that English genius is recognized: in Europe the fame of England is based on such considerations as the evolution of parliamentary democracy, the development and administration of law, and the expansion of power through the medium of the Empire. "England's greatness," said the late Professor Dibelius, of Berlin, "does not rest with its thinking minority but with the great mass of men of instinctive action and powerful will." And Professor Cazamian, of Paris, speaks to the same effect when he says that Germany began by being aware of its objectives, and then set out to achieve them, whereas England achieved its objectives and then became aware of their nature. The England of which I have been asked to speak tonight is one whose genius has been very little recognized on the continent: even in the Anglo-Saxon countries, even in England itself, I doubt whether the value of English culture has been adequately appreciated.

About the very phrase "English Culture" indeed there is something unreal: it seems to strike a false note. The French and the Germans speak readily, and almost incessantly of their national cultures: most Englishmen would blush and feel silly if they were asked to describe the national culture of England. For, unlike France and Germany, England has never made of her culture a part of the main course of her national life.

MR. PALK: What about the poets laureate?

PROF. BROWN: Well, Mr. Palk, most of them have not been very good poets. Has anyone here ever heard of

Nahum Tate? (No, no.) Has anyone here ever heard of William Whitehead? (No.) Well, they were laureates, and rather typical ones at that. Most of the laureates who have been good poets have not been very good laureates. Official English poetry is usually bad poetry.

The study of English culture is primarily the study of the achievements of somewhat isolated men and women of genius. To only one art has England steadily made contributions of the very first order—the art of literature; and to literature, her greatest contributions have been in poetry rather than in prose. It is with English poetry, then, that I shall chiefly deal in the attempt to illustrate the special qualities of English culture.

I would ask you to note, in the great English poets, first of all, their high originality, and the accompanying sense of pride or isolation. The greatest of all Englishmen is almost entirely unknown: there is scarcely an indication that his achievements were adequately estimated by anyone in his own lifetime: apart from the circle of his fellow-actors, we do not know who his friends were: we do not even know enough about him to prove to heretics who attribute his plays to one or another of his contemporaries that they are in error. The work of this isolated man going along a road of his own finding is the greatest single element in English culture. It was not decisively assisted by any tradition, and it has not formed any tradition in which later writers could work.

The second of our poets was very much a part of the life of his time. Milton was deeply involved in the politics and religion of his age: in so far as the politics and the religion of seventeenth century Puritanism constitute a tradition, he is a part of that tradition. But he too is isolated. It is of the old Milton, blind and lonely, with a mind entirely out of touch with the new graces and pleasures of the Sons of Belial of the Restoration, that English criticism likes best to speak, divining that the truest picture of the poet is that which isolates him from his fellows.



The other great poets of England are, most of them, far removed from the modes of thought and life prevailing in the ages in which they wrote.

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In more recent times the great artists have been just as remote from the national life as Milton and Shakespeare. It is almost impossible to set Wordsworth or Keats in any vital relation to the social standards of the Regency. The great Romantic poets, with the exception of Byron, do not seem to have lived under the same skies or to have gone to and fro in the same streets as those which knew Pitt and the Duke of Wellington. Passing for a moment into the world of painting, I wish to remind you that, in view of his great apologist, Ruskin, all that was weak in Turner's landscape was the fault of the society into which he had been born, all that was strong the reward for his secession from that society for his attempt to reach back towards an ideal of painting which no one in the Victorian age was capable of fully realizing.

On the margin of the national life, then, we find a series of great men, living largely to themselves and creating without the stimulus of a society "permeated by fresh thought, intelligent and alive" or the lesser but valuable stimulus of the "complete culture and unfettered thinking of a large body of" Englishmen. I have no wish to deny that the remoteness of the men of genius from the main course of national life has had deplorable consequences both for the men of genius and the national life.

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A discerning French critic, Andre Chevrillon, remarks that it is the particular glory of English literature that, beyond any other, from the early days of the Anglo-Saxons down to our own age, it has concerned itself with the greatest problems of human character and destiny and with the most profound reaches of human nature.

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Preoccupation with such profound matters as these is naturally allied with an insistence on morality. Nothing

is more characteristic of the English than that insistence. Some students of English culture ascribe this note to the strong Puritan tradition, and in particular to the period in which the Puritans ruled the land. Such a view has not been established; and when we consider the insistence on morality in the periods before the rule of the Puritans, we must, I think, repudiate it.

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MR. LAWRENCE PALK thought that the Puritans had played a large part in giving us our most valued liberties and finest institutions.

PROF. BROWN: So far as democratic institutions are concerned, I am not qualified to attempt to answer. I haven't the requisite knowledge. Perhaps Professor MacFarlane might attempt to answer that.

PROF. R. O. MACFARLANE: The Puritans were not such enthusiastic believers in liberty and freedom as is popularly supposed. When they were under-dog they spoke glibly of these virtues; but when they came into power both liberty and freedom were reserved for the Godly—a status not readily attained by anyone not a Puritan. Nevertheless, the fact that the Puritans agitated for these principles, even if they did not fulfil expectations when in authority, did tend to leave a valuable residue.

PROF. BROWN: And I have no hesitation in saying that in the sphere of culture, the Puritans have been a calamity. They didn't conceive of culture adequately; they were suspicious of it. When Arnold said that Shakespeare and Virgil couldn't have endured the company and conversation of the Pilgrim Fathers, he gave a verdict on the Puritans with respect to culture which I am prepared to accept.

The deepest quality of English culture is its individualism; and at this level it is in full agreement with the main forces in the national life. The English preoccupation with liberty is a preoccupation with the welfare of the individual person; just as the empirical technique in English politics derives from a sense of the importance of coping with individual situations. The structure of English law and government has not been reared by theorists, system-builders, masters of synthesis. Nor has the struc-

ture of English literature and culture. I happened recently on a sentence in which Professor Stoll, of the University of Minnesota, speaks of the conduct of the murder scene in Macbeth. He said, "It is not an abstract, logical, structural, but an immediate and imaginative method"; and that observation applies to the method of all the most characteristic writers of England. Precedents, programmes, logic, traditions, count for little; sudden outbursts of intense, spontaneous emotion, sudden intuitions of the nature of beauty and of life itself; an almost instinctive sense of what should be said and how it should be said: these count for much—almost for all. English drama and fiction abound in vivid truthful representations of individual characters. "What interests the Englishman," says Dibelius, "is the story of personalities."

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To conclude, such, as far as I am able to perceive them, are the central elements in English culture. That culture is our heritage. We cannot enter into possession of it for the asking: few undertakings are more labourious than the assimilation of a culture. By the intelligent and persistent efforts of a large number of Canadians, we have already entered into possession of some parts of our cultural heritage, especially, I think, in education and scholarship. Doubtless there are some parts which we shall have to abandon; there are some parts of English culture which cannot be transplanted into the cultural life of a country necessarily so different from England as Canada is, and must always be. What I wish to emphasize, however, is that there is a very substantial part of the culture of England, which we could naturalize and ought to naturalize in Canada.

Enough of English culture has already taken a firm root in Canada that we may wisely regard our heritage as valuable to the point that it is worth defence from any threat to our national identity, whether from within or from without.

## SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

DR. JOHN MACKAY asked if a great Canadian literature might be formed if Canada assimilated fully the heritage of English Culture.

PROF. BROWN thought that this could come about indirectly, in that the formation of a sensitive community would assist in the development of a national literature and that the assimilation of English culture would play a large part in such a development.

DR. MACKAY asked if the absorption of English culture would itself produce a great poet or novelist, and suggested that the central thing in a really great Canadian literature and culture would have to be essentially Canadian and not an imitation.

PROF. BROWN thought that the English culture would merely give the appropriate background, and pointed to the fact that many of Canada's best writers were eager students of English literature. He did not think, however, that their strongest qualities had much to do with the culture they assimilated. The way to a great Canadian literature and culture, in his opinion, lay in grouping about Canadian centres of emotion and interest elements borrowed from the United States and taken from England. Just how this could be done was difficult to say, but he thought that zeal in assimilation and clarification of our own personality as a nation were sufficient at the present stage.

MR. D. R. P. COATS suggested that French culture might have great value for us, as it contained elements not found in English culture.

PROF. BROWN agreed with this view and thought that French and English culture might be regarded as equally important parts of the Canadian Heritage.

MRS. JESSIE MACLENNAN gathered from what had been said, that English literature was not a good transcription of English life.

PROF. BROWN pointed out that while the literature of thought and biographies were obviously transcriptions of national life, such a limitation was not necessary in the imaginative arts, whose function was to reflect the taste of the time rather than the life of the time.

MRS. R. F. MCWILLIAMS asked if in other English-speaking countries the national culture was similarly separated from the national life.

PROF. BROWN thought that the United States was the only other English-speaking country which had developed



a really mature national culture. The influence of New England, where, at one time, life and culture were brought very close together, had waned, and, during the last fifty years, such a separation as he had indicated had existed in the United States, as in England.

MR. MARCUS HYMAN reminded the speaker that he had omitted the greatest factor in our cultural heritage—he referred to our Authorized Version of the Bible.

PROF. BROWN agreed and deplored that so much writing was being done to-day by those who did not seem to be steeped in the King James' version.

MR. HYMAN thought that the many intellectual movements in England showed that the culture and the national life had not been such separate entities as had been suggested.

PROF. BROWN considered that if one could see these intellectual movements in their right perspective, such a conclusion would not be drawn. He pointed to the utilitarian movement, in which there was much that appealed to the national character, but there was no unity among the followers of that philosophy and the influence of the movement was not wide-spread.

MR. G. V. FERGUSON wondered if the taking over of elements from American culture might not anger those who thought English culture was a rich enough heritage.

PROF. BROWN had no doubts about the riches of the English heritage, but reminded Mr. Ferguson that in many ways, the American writers expressed a life closer to our Canadian life than was the English life.

MR. FERGUSON thought that the speaker's dictum that the Puritans had been a calamity for English culture was a harsh judgment; and reminded the speaker that he had referred with admiration to Milton, himself a great Puritan poet.

PROF. BROWN admitted that the judgment was harsh; but declined to modify it. The Puritans had done some good things for English culture—they had given it the Pilgrim's Progress, and a body of good poetry, but that on balance the count was heavily against them. They had distorted English standards. He did not wish his hearers to confuse Puritanism with the religious motive in general, which had played so large a part in the development of English culture.

MR. STEWART asked if Burns would have been the same force apart from his environment as Beethoven apparently could have been.

PROF. BROWN replied that Scottish literature in general and Burns' work in particular, was much closer to life than the work of English contemporaries.

MR. DARRACOTT commented that the reference to Ruskin's criticism of Turner's painting seemed to illustrate the point most of the members had been trying to make against the speaker. He could see a difference between a rebellion of the spirit and complete detachment and isolation. Turner's landscapes might have been the result of the depressing effect of the English climate, but the important fact seemed to be that Turner *did secede* from the society into which he had been born, from which it would follow that he was originally *of* it.

PROF. BROWN agreed that he was originally *of* it, and also that there was a difference between the mind which simply isolated itself and the mind which rebelled. But from the present point of view, the difference did not matter, both types of minds were cut off from the main stream of the national life and did not have much to do with determining its course.

#### IV. MR. HENRI LACERTE

##### "The French-Canadian Point of View"

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MR. LACERTE: The need for singling out the French point of view in our present discussion arises, I assume, out of two considerations: first, the advantage of discovering whether there is agreement between the two Canadian nations on any topic of national import and, second, the benefit of elucidating the motives of their respective attitudes. As the agreement is obvious on "What We Have to Defend" I shall stress the reasons for the French-Canadian point of view.

The French of Canada are a racial group, altogether distinct from that of their fatherland. Indeed, they have been so since before Canada became a British colony, and for two centuries and over. Even under the French regime, there were in Canada two ethnical groups differentiated by a clearly pronounced individuality. The name "Canadien" was commonly used to distinguish the colonial from the metropolitan Frenchman.

MR. MARCUS HYMAN: Do you mean to say that there are no ties at all between Frenchmen and French-Canadians? No ties of blood, of culture?

MR. LACERTE: Certainly not, Mr. Hyman. Undoubtedly the French-Canadians and the Frenchmen are bound by the ties of a common ancestry and of a common language: the French-Canadian culture is an offspring of the French culture. This creates intellectual or spiritual ties with France which, from a cultural point of view, keep the two French races intimately bound together. But politically they have nothing in common. When a French-Canadian travels in France he is as much a foreigner as is a German or an Englishman. He is not a Frenchman.

MRS. R. F. MCWILLIAMS: What happens when a French-Canadian visits England?

MR. LACERTE: He visits the British Parliament. In England he is not a foreigner, he is only a stranger. He is

a British subject, and a British subject by birth. But he is not an Englishman. He is a Canadian.

The cleavage asserted itself in the form of an energetic opposition of the native-born to immigrants, who, remarkable as it may seem, were considered strangers. The opposition, as one would expect, was manifest among traders and even among the noblemen and members of the clergy. The words of Bougainville, who was in Canada at the time of the conquest, illustrate the intensity of that opposition. He wrote: "It seems as if we were two different nations—even enemies."

MR. ALISTAIR STEWART: *Who* were enemies?

MR. LACERTE: Of course, the colonial French and those from the mother-country. It would seem, though, that Bougainville overdrew his picture. The "Canadiens" answered willingly the call of Montcalm to defend Canada against England. But still, it was their own country they were defending.

Nationalism implies aspirations to political independence. And in that respect the French-Canadians' attitude of mind and point of view is completely "dis-Europeanized", if I may coin a word. They think of Canadian constitutional or political problems in Canadian terms. They look at world crises and evolutions, at international trade and political movements, conscious indeed of the interdependence of countries and nations, but with a Canadian eye. Their reactions are Canadian. The promoting of Canadian interests are the only considerations which in their opinion Canadian statesmen ought to take into account when elaborating and framing Canadian policies. This French-Canadian attitude dates back also to the French regime. It can be traced to the efforts of the Canadian noblesse to provide the Canadian Militia with Canadian officers and to nationalize the local administration. In due time, there were Canadian military officers, a Canadian majority on the Superior Council, two Canadian Lieutenant-Governors, and an achievement some Canadians of to-day might perhaps envy, the Governor-General himself was a Canadian. Furthermore, and here is a fact which speaks eloquently, in



1747, the principle was agreed upon between representatives of both the British and French colonies of North America, of "an eternal alliance between the two colonies, independently of all disagreement which may arise between the two Crowns."

Another fact worth while remembering now, is that politically the French-Canadian's frame of mind was not altered by his becoming a British subject. Their main pre-occupation consisted in securing from the victor an adequate assurance that their religious and civil liberties would be respected and protected: they were told that the conditions of capitulation embodied that assurance. Then, sad happenings in France which had an adverse effect on the country's economic life, the memory of Bigot's defalcations concurred in creating an atmosphere of resignation. The remark of one of Montcalm's orderlies that the "Canadiens" of Quebec worried but little about who was to be their *new* master, may well express their feelings. At any rate they were monarchically minded and they gave their allegiance to their New King and were loyal to him.

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On two occasions they contributed, under French officers, to save Canada from American invasions when, in the words of the Hon. Thomas Chapais, "they gave to the English armies the unheard-of glory of a French victory."

MR. TREVOR LLOYD: Were they content then, with a state of colonial dependency?

MR. LACERTE: No, the conquest did not stamp out their eagerness for political independence. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was indeed a cruel disappointment and a cause of unrest for the French-Catholics of Canada. The disappointment, though, led them to the realization that Canada as a British Colony, could and would ultimately be endowed with British constitutional institutions. The French-Canadians from then on were constitutional. After a short period of adaptation for fifty years they became staunch supporters and advocates of political reforms and

of the British constitutional form of government. Destined to be forced on them a momentous political struggle.

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Historians may and will differ: but the contention is deeply rooted in the mind of the French-Canadian that the Canadian responsible government and Confederation are the essentially French-Canadian achievements. Not that the great leaders were without support from representatives of the English Canadians: in fact, a characteristic of their unyielding attitude all through that momentous era was the satisfaction they derived from the warm and sincere sympathy of English Canadians and even of British statesmen. But the truth is, that at all stages of the struggle the opposition to political reforms and to popular liberties was always from the bureaucratic party, where the French-Canadians were not welcome. From the French-Canadian point of view, Papineau, Lafontaine, and Cartier are the fathers of our rights and liberties.

PROF. R. O. MACFARLANE: Do I imply from your remarks that you consider the contributions of the French-Canadians whom you have named to have been greater than such men as Robert Baldwin, Alexander Gait, George Brown, and even Sir John A. Macdonald?

MR. LACERTE: Well, to begin with, to try and minimize the merits of any of the men who fought for our public institutions would be unworthy of a Canadian. As to a comparative appreciation of the contribution of each, it may only be a question of difference in point of view.

French-Canadian leaders, it must not be forgotten, had at every stage of the long constitutional struggle, a double interest at stake: first, the interest of their country for which they justly demanded a British form of government and, second, the interest of their own people, who, they insisted, were constitutionally and legally entitled to enjoy the same civil liberties, both national and religious, as the rest of the population. Had they not convinced the French-Canadian that they and their national liberties were protected, they would never have had the popular support that kept them in office and made them available to other

Canadian statesmen for the great constitutional achievements we are all proud of to-day. French-Canadian leaders, in other words, had difficulties that other Canadian leaders did not have to overcome.

Now, applying those standards of comparison to Papineau, Lafontaine and Cartier, as compared with the colleagues they each had in their respective endeavours, I will state my point of view.

Papineau in his own time had no competitor for the leadership of the Lower Canada Reformist party. He was the outstanding man of his period.

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Lafontaine had been one of the most able and staunch supporters of Papineau's constitutional doctrine, and, therefore, had to share in his former leader's discredit. The Union Act was, not only a denial of free and responsible government but, also and for the first time, a manifest act of repression against the French-Canadians. But without the French-Canadians' support no government could stay in office, no government could implement its policies. Lafontaine, therefore, had to rally his French-Canadian following to accept an Act which, in the House of Lords, had been described as "the most unfair bill ever presented before the British Parliament". And he did it. So, in 1848, Lord Elgin to draw the administration of the colony out of a hopeless impasse, sent for Lafontaine to organize, with Baldwin, the first Canadian responsible Government and the most objectionable clauses of the Union Act were at once repealed.

I contend now, that among the Fathers of Confederation, and judging by their respective as well as by their joint co-operation with their colleagues, there are two men standing out for special recognition. They are George Brown and Georges Etienne Cartier. Without the Brown-Cartier alliance, Confederation would not have been possible. Now, we must remember that the Fathers of Confederation were all human. Cartier and Brown had been keen opponents; the point of view that Brown had

adopted in Canadian politics had thrown a chasm between the two men. But, both were great enough to overcome their feelings of mutual aversion when the interests of their country demanded such an heroic act of self-restraint. And again, Cartier's contribution to Confederation did not commence in 1864. Confederation is the second step that Canada traced towards the autonomy she enjoys to-day; it is the result of the attainments I have already referred to. Cartier too, had been of the Papineau party. He, as a lieutenant of Lafontaine, had contributed his share to the struggle which had culminated in the organization of the second Lafontaine-Baldwin ministry. He had relieved Lafontaine as French-Canadian leader. Here, I rest on John Boyd's opinion of Cartier's part in the Confederation movement which is in the following words:—

“From the very outset Cartier insisted that Confederation should be established on the federal principle, and the triumph of that idea, which assured the success of Confederation, was due to him.”

These are some of the reasons why I say, not that the respective merits of our great political leaders of the past are unequal, but that their respective contributions to Canadian liberties are different.

Well, I have outlined, rapidly enough, I hope, a few facts which, I assume, should be helpful in seeking to understand the French-Canadian attitude on matters of public interest.

The French of Canada have always been and still are purely and simply Canadian. The French-Canadian never had and will never have but one country in the whole world and that is Canada: not a part only, but the whole of Canada: three-quarters of a million French-Canadians now live in the several provinces of the Dominion outside of Quebec.

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MR. G. V. FERGUSON: When did immigration into New France from Old France stop?

MR. LACERTE: Well, from the very beginning of the colony in 1608, to its surrender to England, the astound-



ingly small number of 10,126 settlers had come from the Old to the New France. This immigration, for all practical purposes, ceased completely in 1760.

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Now, just a little true story and I have done. It was last year, shortly after the death of the late King George V. I was at the home of a little French girl at St. Boniface. She was six and a half years of age. She presented me with a large box in which she was keeping nearly every picture of the King our papers had lately published. I had to see them all and listen to her very naive comments. And then she went away, and her mother told me that the day she had learned of the death of the King, she had cried. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, how did that little French girl ever get that way.

## SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

In reply to an enquiry by Dr. J. MacKay as to French-Canadian culture, Mr. Lacerte said that the French-Canadian culture was one of his possessions which he meant to preserve. While its source was the culture of France, it was, and must remain, Canadian; and because it was the expression of the French and the French-Canadian cultures, the French language must be preserved for all French-Canadians.

PROF. E. K. BROWN expressed an interest in French-Canadian literature.

MR. LACERTE admitted that French-Canadian literary works were rather scarce although some valuable contributions to history, economics and philosophy had been produced by French-Canadians. He thought that French-Canadian literature, while still in its infancy was out of the cradle and that the prospects for the future were very bright.

MR. STEWART asked how substantial was the influence of the separatists in French Canada.

MR. LACERTE believed that French-Canadians to-day felt that the organization of their economic life had hitherto been neglected, due first, to political partisanship; and second, to inefficiency and inadequacy of education in Quebec. Some writers had thought that the difficulty lay

in Confederation itself, but such a view, he thought, was the only radical or revolutionary attitude which had any importance.

MR. FERGUSON asked how strong such a point of view was in French Canada.

MR. LACERTE replied that in the minds of some of its most able exponents, the French-Canadian people had not given Confederation a fair trial, believing that before any constitutional change was advocated, education should be improved.

He pointed out that in those same circles, a still more reactionary attitude had asserted itself. It was the attitude which could best be described by the old French saying: "Find out on which side of the boat the fish are before you cast your line." This attitude had been exposed last fall in a book written by a former rector of St. Boniface College, entitled: "Is It the End of Confederation", which had received the approval of many leaders of French-Canadian thought. The speaker remarked that it was too early yet in the season to go fishing.

MR. M. HYMAN gathered from what the speaker had said that the French-Canadian was essentially conservative, and wondered what caused the difference between him and other peoples of the world, who seemed to be setting up new standards of social, political and economic values. Was it the influence of the Church, the historical fact of the conquest or merely contentment with things as they are?

MR. LACERTE thought that the French-Canadian appreciated spiritual values as some other people did not; and the French-Canadian had special interests to protect; and because he was constitutionally minded and had remembered the price he had paid for political liberty, he was cautious about accepting innovations. In that respect, of course, he was very British. But that was not to say that all new movements and ideas were not being keenly examined and considered. As far as change was concerned, locally the scene was constantly changing; but that there were no organic changes taking place.

MR. PALK speculated on the possibility of the ultimate assimilation of the French-Canadians with the British in Canada.

MR. LACERTE did not believe in such a possibility, and even if it were possible it might do harm to Confederation. He thought it was impossible to make a good Englishman

of a Frenchman. He believed that the two Canadian nations, each progressing along the lines of their respective cultures, would continuously come closer together, but would never meet.

MRS. JESSIE MACLENNAN asked if the Church had been the unifying member in French Canada.

MR. LACERTE thought that the Church had saved the French-Canadians in the early years of the British regime, and that it had always been an important factor in the preservation of French-Canadian traditions.

PROF. MACFARLANE pointed out that the basis of the civil law in Quebec was French, and wondered to what extent that had been a factor in maintaining French-Canadian solidarity.

MR. LACERTE said that civil laws were the product of a civilization; that they were experimental in their nature and represented a gradual process of development, and that they certainly helped the French-Canadians to preserve their identity as a people.

PROF. BROWN suggested that their fidelity to the French language had been another factor in their success in preserving their identity.

MR. LACERTE agreed to this and stated that the French civil laws would not have been as effective if the language, which was their official expression, had not been retained.

SUNDAY, MARCH 28, 1937

MRS. R. F. McWILLIAMS

“The Woman’s Point of View”

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MRS. McWILLIAMS: Much interest and some dissension has been shown among women members of this club and some of my friends who knew that this discussion was being planned. Dissension and much discussion because it should be considered by a club predominantly of men that there is a woman’s viewpoint. This, they said, is what is always happening to woman. She is always being asked to present the woman’s viewpoint. Why the woman’s viewpoint they ask? Women are persons and citizens, and being so have the same reactions as men. Impatiently they have said to me: “We shall never get anywhere while women like you go around talking of the way in which women look at the town pump or the League of Nations.” One or two of the more militant have even suggested that I should decline this opportunity of sharing in the discussions of the Kelsey Club on what we in Canada have to defend that I should rather contribute to the progress of women by obeying the injunction of St. Paul to remain silent.

Much the larger group of women with whom I have talked have shown keen interest. Interest in what? In seeking the answer to what, if anything, are the possessions peculiar to the women of Canada which they would desire to defend should their continuance be threatened. When I say “peculiar possessions” I mean, of course, those possessions which Canadian women may have in addition to, or different from the possessions held dear by Canadian men and women alike.

Well, as you will have observed, I am not keeping silent, thus indicating on which side of the dispute I am to be found.

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What I am now going to say is a composite of my own judgment and that of several women with whom I have



discussed the question, some of whom are here this evening. We are all women who have come to the West—from Britain, from Europe, from other parts of Canada. With us all, the brilliant lights, the bracing winds, the wide spaces of the west have had their way, and we are now westerners,—prairie westerners.

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We would want to say too, and say it quite firmly, that we are not willing to be differentiated from the men who belong to the Kelsey Club—or any other men—in the value we place on the special possessions of Canada which have already been spoken of in our discussions.

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But there is more, and it is that more that I would now present to you. This is more real—very real—but it belongs in the realm of those intangibles which being put into words sometimes seem more or less than they are—or different.

If I had to use one word to describe this “more”, that word would be Freedom; and at once some of you would protest: are not women free all over the world even unto the Orient? So I hasten to add that I mean freedom in the special guise in which Canadian women are now coming to enjoy it. We feel that in no other country, except perhaps in the Scandinavian countries, do the women have quite the same degree of what perhaps you will let me call equal equality with men as is now possible in Canada.

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I believe that we are coming to have in Canada a freedom which permits men and women to work together as personalities—as intellects—finding their roles of leaders and followers according to their capacities and not because they are men or women. As one writer expresses it, we have a sense of equality with men based on a relationship in which aspects of sex are completely forgotten.

MR. HYMAN: I suggest that a reasonable approach to the women's question is fundamentally this: Women are different, they always will be different, and the difference

is desirable, but that is no excuse for any disabilities whatsoever.

MRS. MCWILLIAMS: Well, that is exactly what I have been saying.

I have been at some pains to discuss this problem of the women's viewpoint with other women, and have found somewhat to my own surprise, that there is agreement among women of many different attitudes and occupations that this special type of freedom is now being developed in Canada; that it is a possession so dear that women would defend it with all their powers against any nation which offered a threat against our national atmosphere in which, as we believe, that precious freedom will grow and blossom luxuriantly. The philosophies of the Nazi and Fascist states will remain abhorrent to the women leaders of Canada, old or young. It is not in that way, but in the Canadian way that they believe we shall presently create that greater type of nation which can come only, as you will surely all agree—when men and women are both contributing freely and equally of their common gifts to the common good.

Other things have come to women as this freedom for them has been developing in Canada; others will come as it becomes more and more a certain element in our national life. Perhaps the very first was the breaking down of those social grooves in which, it appears, people of the older countries still live. Even in Britain it still seems true that one is more or less expected to be content in that estate into which one was born. This, however, is equally true of men and women, but it means more to women because women have always found it more difficult to cross the social barriers. This is true of other countries also—perhaps it is a phase of pioneering life under the British political system.

MRS. DYMA: What do Canadian born women know of social grooves or of the bitterness of living in them. It is we from central Europe who bring long memories with us, who know.

MRS. MCWILLIAMS: Does the freedom of Canadian women mean more to you, Mrs. Dyma?

MRS. DYMA: Sometimes I think you Canadian women don't know at all how happy and fortunate you are.

MRS. MCWILLIAMS: Well, tell us what it looks like to you.

MRS. B. DYMA: Oh, I can still remember what Canada looked like to me when I came to it—a great big beautiful country, so fresh and so green. The immensity of it and the freedom of speech after my harrowing experiences in the old world, were simply intoxicating. It seemed to me if anyone in the world, certainly in Canada, wanted to fly as high as one wanted to, that literally there was no end to one's ambition, if one had the will-power. After fifteen years of living in Canada I still believe that to be true, and for my little sons it certainly is true.

MRS. MCWILLIAMS: What you have just said brings me to another thing which Canadian women, wherever born, will always be eager to defend; that is, that the freedom which has been—which is to be theirs, shall also be the possession of their children—of all children.

In one of our other discussions, some member asked whether jobs for our young people were not to be preferred to freedom. He probably had in his mind the German system, or the Italian system, or the Communist system. Well, in the first place, jobs are not so all prevalent in those countries as some people would like to make us believe. No one mourns more than I do over the frustrations that have met our young people in these years of depression.

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But the public conscience of enlightened Canadians is all against it, and what that conscience is against will change.

PROF. BROWN: It's a slow business.

MRS. MCWILLIAMS: Perhaps, but so is all human progress. You bring me to another reason why women cherish the freedom they have in Canada—that is for what it lets them, or their leaders, achieve. Women are natural crusaders.

The opportunity to crusade under conditions of freedom and equality, is a possession women will not easily surrender. Their vision of the new country to be built not

by themselves, of course, but by men and women working together, is too real to be given up lightly. The fact that we are still in the pioneering stage in Canada makes it seem possible almost to move mountains.

There is one thing more I must add to give the true picture of what I have found among women as they have talked of this problem of what we should be ready to defend. In one voice they declare their abhorrence of war, and this declaration precedes all discussion. I do not think that they are unlike men in this, but they are more intense as is natural from the role which they have played from the beginning of time. But also they have been emphatic—and this includes those who describe themselves as all but absolute pacifists—that this freedom of Canadian women being threatened by a nation which has shown that it would destroy that freedom, there could only be one result—Canadian women would defend their freedom with all their power.

The unanimity is completely broken when the possibility of this threat coming to us is discussed. Some protest just as ardently as Professor MacFarlane or Mr. Lacerte that this fear is nothing but a bogey man put up to induce certain action. Nothing, they say, can effectively threaten Canada. Others, looking out over the world, noting the land-hunger of some peoples, seeing what has happened to women whose opportunity seemed greater than ours has yet become, take precisely the opposite view.

## SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

MRS. JESSIE MACLENNAN asked if the speaker thought the women of Canada would willingly sacrifice their husbands and sons in another European war.

MRS. MCWILLIAMS saw a distinction between a war in Europe fought over local issues and a war fought on European soil over fundamental issues involving our liberties. She thought that in the latter case women would make such a surrender.

MRS. MCWILLIAMS then invited Madame P. A. Talbot to speak for the French-Canadian women.



MME. TALBOT said: "Permettez Mme. McWilliams que je concentre un peu mes idées, avant de répondre à une si vaste question . . . oh yes . . . The French Canadian woman values her liberty very highly, but seldom abuses her freedom.

"She attends almost exclusively to the education of her children at home, and follows them with keen interest during their school stage. She will spare no sacrifice to safeguard their Catholic and French learning.

"She devotes much of her spare time to benevolent works, and some to intellectual and cultural activities.

"She takes great delight, in the preservation and the teaching to her children the French-Canadian folk-songs, as a French-Canadian is naturally a born and gay singer. He even shows audacity as the two recent presentations of French grand-operas have shown. She also loves dramatic art, and has taken lately much pride in the efforts of "The Dramatic Festival." She tries to revive and perpetuate in Western Canada, the French-Canadian handicraft, and will follow with great interest the French-Canadian handicraft exhibit this year at the Paris International Exhibition."

DR. JOHN MACKAY expressed surprise at the statement that men recognized the equality of women.

MRS. MCWILLIAMS admitted that her distinction should have been more precise. The rational mind of Canadian men recognized the equality but it was still true that their instinctive sense of superiority led them in another direction. The attitude of the youth of to-day showed that the rational mind is beginning to win out.

MR. HENRI LACERTE remarked on the handicaps, such as lower salaries, under which women worked.

MR. MARCUS HYMAN thought that the trouble lay in the treating of human beings as commodities. When people were paid for their services instead of as commodities their pay would be equal.

MRS. MCWILLIAMS then invited Miss Esther Thompson to speak of the position of Scandinavian women.

MISS ESTHER THOMPSON: "I thank you, Mrs. McWilliams, for referring to the Scandinavian countries. I have been thinking over what you said. Your observation, in the broad sense, is quite correct. There are, of course some differences. Two of them have just occurred to me. Scandinavian men, for example have their dignity, and women have their duties. The men show no aptitude what-

soever for getting their own breakfast, or putting the children to bed, while the modern as well as the conventional wife continues to care for and minister to her husband and the interesting thing is that they both like it that way. There is another difference: if Mrs. McWilliams had been in one of these countries when she was elected a member of the City Council of Winnipeg, she would not be, as she is now, the only woman in that body, but she would have been welcomed on her arrival at the City Hall by at least half a dozen women aldermen.

Scandinavian women tend to employ seriously rather than enjoy, their equality."

MR. TREVOR LLOYD thought that women were perhaps too willing to sacrifice their husbands and sons even in defence of democracy.

MRS. MCWILLIAMS replied that "willing" was the wrong word: to a woman her son's life was dearer than her own.

MR. D. R. P. COATS suggested that while the speaker might have reflected the Western spirit in saying that Canadians were breaking down social grooves yet we seem to be busy building up all the snobbery and social flub-dub that a pioneer society would lose.

MRS. MCWILLIAMS felt that to be true only on the surface and that while in some circles there was an attempt to imitate the social customs of the old country the real tendency was away from the old style conventional life.

SUNDAY, APRIL 4, 1937

PROFESSOR R. O. MacFARLANE

"Canadian Defence Policy: The Isolationist View"

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PROF. R. O. MACFARLANE: This evening I wish to outline some of the reasons why I think Canadian defence policy should be frankly isolationist. That is to say, that Canada should endeavour to keep out of European politics; that we should endeavour to keep the peace as far as possible; and if war should break out in Europe we should declare our neutrality and do our best to preserve it.

Foreign policy is a new thing for Canada and Canadians. It is only since the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, or at the earliest since the Balfour Declaration of 1926, that there has been any need for a foreign policy in Canada. Prior to that time all foreign affairs of the Empire were conducted from Westminster. In a sense, in this subject we are still like a small boy making his first marks in a new copy-book. We are still undecided whether we should imitate the copper-plate or develop our own style.

This discussion is based on three premises. (1) That a state has the right to make its own foreign policy, so long as that policy does not antagonize other states to the extent of provoking attack. (2) That Canada in the shaping of any foreign policy must seek to remain at peace with the United States. (3) That foreign policy should be based on enlightened self-interest. That is, we are discussing a foreign policy for *Canada*, and its primary purpose should be to protect the interests, political, economic, social and spiritual, of the people of Canada. Such policy is not designed primarily for the British Empire, nor is it designed to secure the welfare of mankind in general, at the expense of Canadian interests. It is based on the homely philosophy of minding our own business. We have quite enough to do to look after our own affairs in this country, and possibly other people can

look after theirs as well as we can do it for them. This is not to be antagonistic either to the interests of the British Empire, the League of Nations, or mankind at large. It is merely to say that policy must be shaped with Canadian conditions always in mind.

It might be suggested that in evaluating a foreign policy three separate tests might be applied. First the influence of such a policy, and its consequences, on internal conditions in Canada. Second, its value relative to other possible lines of policy. Third, its intrinsic worth. We in Canada have been prone to forget the first two tests and to stake our judgment entirely on the last. It might well be argued that the first two are just as important, and in any case they should not be overlooked.

What conditions in Canada, what phases of Canadian life, are likely to be most vitally affected by the line of foreign policy that we decide to follow?

First: Our inexperience in foreign affairs. We have a complete absence of tradition in this respect; a very small, and as yet relatively inexperienced, diplomatic service; and above all a public opinion to which our government must be sensitive, and which is more apt to be swayed by sentiment than by a thorough knowledge of international politics.

Second: We are a country large in area but small in population. This fact might invite the consideration of states seeking a refuge for surplus population.

PROF. E. K. BROWN: Do you mean that Canada might be attacked in order to find refuge for surplus population?

PROF. MACFARLANE: Possibly. But the habitable area of Canada is not as great as is popularly supposed, and consequently this danger is not so great as might appear on the surface.

Our small and widely dispersed population has inevitably given rise to a strong sectional feeling. What pleases one section of the country by no means pleases all the others. Any foreign policy must be considered in terms of the reaction of each and every section.



Third: The nature of our population. We are by no means a homogeneous people, nor are we by any means dominantly Anglo-Saxon, nor do statistics hold any great hope of our ever becoming either. We have a large British element in our population to be sure, but a substantial portion of it is still living in a colony of Great Britain rather than in an autonomous state. Their ideas of foreign policy are determined just as much, if not more, by the interests of Great Britain as they are by those of Canada.

Fourth: Canada is a federation. Local and provincial loyalties are still strong, especially in Quebec, and they are not unknown in every one of the provinces. Our whole state is a compromise of local and national interests. We must be careful that in the choice of a foreign policy, the fulfilment of the one we choose does not wreck our national establishment.

Fifth: We are an exporting nation. Our economic existence depends upon our ability to sell our raw products, such as wheat, cattle, nickel and other metals, wood products and fish. If we cannot maintain the sale of these commodities, our standards of living must decline, or we might not even be able to exist at all. Our foreign policy must consider the source of our bread and butter.

MRS. JESSIE MACLENNAN: Can any country consider its bread and butter by living unto itself?

PROF. MACFARLANE: I do not think it is necessary to interfere in the politics of other nations in order to do business with them. I certainly am not suggesting that we isolate ourselves from the markets of the world. Political isolation does not mean commercial isolation. For example, consider the relations of Great Britain and the Argentine.

Sixth: There is a strong imperial tradition in Canada. The Empire is still much more than a geographic expression. There are still large numbers of people in Canada who feel that we have no interest in foreign affairs apart from that of the Empire. They wish either to follow the lead of London without question, or what is worse, because it is less practical, they want to tell London how to direct its

foreign policy. Unfortunately for this view, he who plays the piper has the right to call the tune, and our contribution to the music could hardly be described as magnificent.

Seventh: Canada is a North American nation. Geographically we are isolated from every Great Power except one. Consequently, because of our geographic position, our interests in foreign affairs have a good deal in common with our powerful neighbour.

MRS. MACLENNAN: Do you mean that we should follow the lead of the United States?

PROF. MACFARLANE: No, Mrs. MacLennan, I do not think that we should follow blindly the lead of the United States, but rather I would point out that the interests of Canada and of her southern neighbour inevitably have much in common. In addition, we are subjected to strong social and economic influences from the United States, in newspapers, magazines, radio and movies.

In determining our foreign policy, then, we must constantly keep in mind just how these various internal factors that have been outlined will be affected. We must not allow sentimentality and ill-conceived humanitarian ideas which we have neither the will nor the capacity to support to the limit in case of necessity, to cause us to lose sight of the consequences to Canada internally.

All parties are agreed, I think, that Canadian policy should be directed primarily towards preserving peace.

PROF. E. K. BROWN: Why the unanimity?

PROF. MACFARLANE: Well, Professor Brown, there are several good reasons why this should be so. Peace is necessary for our own security since we are a small state. It is necessary for our best trade interests. There is a danger that we might be drawn into conflict by circumstances over which we had very little control. And finally scarcely any conceivable war in which we were involved would be worth the price we would have to pay for it.

While almost everyone in Canada is agreed on what should be the aim of our foreign policy, there is a wide variance of opinion as to how this end should be attained. I shall try to show, how in my opinion, an isolationist

policy offers a better opportunity of preserving the peace than does pacifism, imperialism, or collectivism.

MR. TREVOR LLOYD: How could any line of policy be more pacific than pacifism?

PROF. MACFARLANE: One can only say that this is Utopian. I should like to be able to agree with you, but I cannot. To keep the peace, both parties to a dispute must be pacifist. In other words, such a policy would depend for its success on other peoples as well as ourselves being pacific, which, I fear, requires not only a vivid imagination, but also a good pair of blinders at the moment. To accept this policy is to abandon our concept of the state, and also, and this would be much more difficult to attain, to persuade all other people in the world to do the same.

MR. MARCUS HYMAN: Why do you think that Isolationism offers a better safeguard for peace than an Imperial policy?

PROF. MACFARLANE: Great Britain's interests are much more closely involved in Europe than are ours: for example, in the Mediterranean. If you accept this policy, it means that every time Great Britain becomes involved in a dispute, we are dragged in, whether it is any concern of ours or not. I do not mean to say that Canada should under no circumstances render Great Britain all the support of which she is capable. I can think of many circumstances in which Great Britain would be, in foreign policy, a frontier of Canada. What I am trying to get at is this: control over our foreign policy should be Canadian; there should be no automatic support of Great Britain; every issue should be decided on its merits by the Government of Canada.

The real difficulty on this score is that there is no longer adequate common interests between the various parts of the Empire to attain unity in foreign policy. This means that any policy for the whole Empire must be a compromise, and a compromise in which those sections of the Empire which are strongest fare best. One seriously doubts if even all the Imperialists in Canada are willing to pay the price of their policy. Would they be prepared to join in

an expeditionary force to protect the Soudan if it were attacked? Would they be prepared even to assist Australia under similar circumstances? Or would their support be like that afforded to the League of Nations, pious resolutions of moral purpose, backed up by telling the Great Powers what they should do about it? Even if such a policy were practical among the Anglo-Saxon sections of Canada, it could never be carried among the other races, who now comprise almost fifty per cent. of our population. An Imperial war, in which no real Canadian interest was at stake, might well mean civil war in Canada, a war which might destroy the Dominion. We came closer to this emergency in 1917, than most Canadians realize, and much water has flowed down the St. Lawrence since then. An Imperial foreign policy is contrary to our whole constitutional development. It would of necessity mean control from London. Since foreign policy cannot be completely isolated from domestic affairs, our autonomous development might be endangered. Finally, a strong British Empire may look like a good guarantee for peace to the eye of the Anglo-Saxon. It may not look nearly so good to the German, Russian, Italian or Japanese, and the final obsequies have not yet been held on the balance of power.

MRS. MACLENNAN: Surely you do not suggest that isolation is a surer road to peace, especially in the long view, than is support of the League of Nations?

PROF. MACFARLANE: I must reply to this question as I did to the one on pacifism by Mr. LLOYD. I should like to be able to agree with you, but I cannot. I heartily agree that the idea of the League of Nations is a very worthy one. I also agree that it has done a very great service for mankind. But unlike some supporters of the League, I have never expected it to do the impossible, not in the first twenty years of its existence, at least. It is because the League cannot do the impossible, especially in its relations with the Great Powers, that I am forced into my present position. In the sphere of international law our legal development has outrun our political, just as it did in England in the fifteenth century.



DR. JOHN MACKAY: Would you mind repeating that?

PROF. MACFARLANE: In the sphere of international law our legal development has outrun our political, just as it did in England in the fifteenth century. Under the Lancastrian kings, many of the powers and privileges of Parliament, such as freedom of debate, freedom from arrest, were recognized in law. But there was no political development adequate to sustain such law, and it lapsed in practice, for over a century until politics had time to catch up with the development of the law.

What I am concerned about is what protection can the League give us? Personally I think, just as much as we would be prepared to offer to any other member of the League if it were attacked—and that is not very much, as certain states have already discovered. When the League was much stronger than it is to-day, or probably I should say when Germany, Japan and Italy were much weaker than they are to-day, the government and the public would not accept the obligations as well as the privileges of membership. How can we expect a change of feeling toward a somewhat battle-scarred League? The idea of the collectivists is good, their motives are impeccable, but experience has shown that they are not talking practical politics at the moment. This may be regrettable, but that does not alter the fact.

I have been endeavouring to show the advantage of the isolationist policy in terms of its influence on internal politics in Canada, and in terms of comparison with other possible lines of policy. I now come to the positive reasons why I uphold this position.

Isolationism rests, as suggested at the outset, on the very homely philosophy of minding our own business, a difficult thing to ask of many Canadians in the sphere of foreign affairs. We should make no promises to Great Britain, or to anybody else, except those which we are prepared to carry out and which we are sure we can implement. We must keep out of European politics about which we know little or nothing. The half-truths on which so many of

our opinions are based in this field are sinking sands on which to erect any structure of policy.

Neither Great Britain nor the United States can afford, from the point of view of their own interests, to let us be attacked by any Great Power. We should capitalize on our geographic position. It compensates us for many of the disabilities we have had to overcome in building up a national state.

MR. ALISTAIR STEWART: That may be enlightened self-interest: but it sounds awfully like unenlightened selfishness to me.

PROF. MACFARLANE: Aren't you overlooking one of the premises from which we started? That the policy I am discussing is for Canada, not for mankind at the expense of Canadian interests. Few people, I think, who realize the difficulties that have had to be overcome in building a national state here, would say that this policy was selfish. It is simply putting our own house in order before we start on somebody else's. Any policy that envisages trouble with either of the two Great Powers with whom we are most closely associated, Great Britain or the United States, is both absurd and ridiculous.

If a war breaks out in Europe, in which our interests are not involved, it should be our single-minded purpose to keep out of it. Our economic interests might suffer, but they need not perish, because somebody will control the sea, and that somebody is almost certain to want large quantities of our goods. In addition, there is always an exit for exports through the United States.

MRS. R. F. MCWILLIAMS: Don't you think that is a very selfish view?

PROF. MACFARLANE: No more selfish than buying in the lowest and selling in the highest market. Just good business when it is done honestly.

Such a policy necessitates, for practical reasons as well as for those of national self-respect, reasonable defences. It does not require large expenditures on an army, but rather on types of naval craft, and on an air force. From the point of view of defence, if we rule out the possibility

of attack from the south, against which we could do very little in any case, Canada is virtually an island. No one is likely, at least until there is a substantial improvement in aircraft, to attack us from the north. Therefore an enemy must come either over the Atlantic or over the Pacific. If this analysis is sound, why should we continue to emphasize the army rather than the navy or the air force? One reason is tradition. We have always done so; but that is not an objection which can hold out indefinitely.

What specifically do we require by way of defences? First, an adequate naval base on each coast. This we should equip, man, and prepare to defend ourselves. If we are going to expect the co-operation of Great Britain or the United States in protecting our coast, then we must have a quid pro quo to offer them, and be ready to render what effective assistance we can. We must pull our own weight. Then we must have the requisite mine layers and mine sweepers, and the auxiliary craft either to close up, or open up, the entrance to our ports. There is no suggestion here that we go in for capital ships, but would require some destroyers.

Our air force should be adequate to effect some sort of coast patrol, at least in vulnerable quarters, and strong enough to drive off the attacks of isolated enemy raiders. As with our naval forces we should be prepared to co-operate effectively with Great Britain or the United States in defending our coasts. Aircraft, and pilots, are probably about the most effective assistance we can render to either of these Great Powers, in the defence of our national interests. Such expenditures on defence are well within our financial resources.

Many countries in the past have preserved their neutrality under just as difficult circumstances as we are likely to encounter; for example, Holland and Switzerland. There is no reason why Canada cannot do the same if she only has the will to do so. In case we should fail, or in case of conflict in which our interests were definitely involved, we should be prepared to pay our way in defending ourselves.

MR. G. V. FERGUSON: But suppose we cannot afford to pay our way in defending ourselves?

PROF. MACFARLANE: National defence in this day and age is expensive. A comparison of our defence budget and also of our taxation structure would not lead one to believe that in comparison with the taxpayers of Great Britain or of other countries, Canada is yet overburdened, nor is she likely to become so in the near future.

If the end we seek is really to keep the peace, isolation seems a reasonable course to follow. But if we want to reform the world, or glorify the empire, there will no doubt, through other lines of policy, be ample opportunity for those so inclined to spill much Canadian blood in the process.

I submit that in the light of internal factors which will be influenced by our foreign policy, and in comparison with alternative foreign policies, and on its own merits, assuming that our aim is to keep the peace, our policy should be one of isolation and then neutrality if a war in which our interests are not directly involved should break out elsewhere. Because peace was indivisible, once or twice in the last four hundred years, that is no reason to assume that it will always be indivisible in the future. This, in my opinion, is neither anti-British nor anti-social, but merely simple common sense. If war breaks out somewhere, we regret it, but we cannot prevent it by joining one side of the contestants. Therefore let us say so honestly before the crisis arises. If Great Britain's interests and our interests should not prove to be identical, that is even more regrettable. We have a great British heritage to be grateful for in this country, but we are a national state, and we have obligations to the future as well as to the past. We cannot play with policies, whose execution might wreck the Dominion itself. Canadian interests in the last analysis must take precedence over Imperial ones. And we expect that Great Britain, Australia and South Africa will take the same view of their interests. Canadian foreign policy must, in my opinion, be designed for Canada, and Canadian interests can be served best by pursuing a policy of isolation.



## SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

MR. ALISTAIR STEWART asked if the sentimentality and ill-conceived humanitarian ideas to which the speaker had referred would ever be got rid of.

PROF. MACFARLANE thought that these would always be with us, but that they would exercise less influence on public opinion as time went on. Idealism would become tempered with realism.

MRS. JESSIE MACLENNAN asked if the speaker thought that Canada should revoke its membership in the League of Nations.

PROF. MACFARLANE did not think, as long as the members of the League did not take their political obligations more literally than they did at present, that there was any reason why Canada should not continue its membership. There were services which the League was well suited to perform, such as the control of the drug and white slave traffics, operation of the International Labour Office and so on; in addition to which the League as at present constituted had provided a foundation on which a more effective organization might grow.

MR. LAWRENCE PALK asked under what circumstances it might be proper for Canada to declare war, and what should Canada's position be if Australia were attacked by Japan.

PROF. MACFARLANE replied that if Canada were attacked or threatened or if some vital Canadian interest was endangered, it might be necessary for Canada to declare a state of war; but that each issue should be decided by the government of Canada on the basis of whether or not it vitally affected Canadian interests.

With reference to the possibility of conflict between Australia and Japan, it would depend on the principle involved. If it were a race war or an invasion, then Canadian interests would be affected and Canada should fight. However, if by a trade or other policy Australia provoked Japan that would be another matter.

MR. HENRI LACERTE suggested that the speaker was giving away his isolationist position by arranging for what amounted to alliances with Britain and the United States.

PROF. MACFARLANE pointed out that it was just as important to defend vital interests elsewhere as to wait until Canada was attacked. His standard was national interest rather than geographic area.

MR. ALISTAIR STEWART suggested that in view of our foreign trade, amounting to over a billion dollars annually, it was impossible for us to mind our own business entirely. Trade and peace were both vital interests to us.

PROF. MACFARLANE agreed and said that it was because he valued both trade and peace that he did not believe in crusades which destroyed trade and broke the peace. Neutral countries were always able to carry on trade and this was not true of belligerents. How becoming embroiled in European politics was going to keep us out of war was beyond his comprehension.

MR. STEWART suggested that the United States and Britain would not assist in the defence of Canada without a quid pro quo.

PROF. MACFARLANE replied that these nations were to differing extents defending themselves when they defended us. Canada's share would be naval bases and air support.

MR. TREVOR LLOYD thought that the very presence of those naval bases might lead to foreign attack.

PROF. MACFARLANE saw some danger of this happening but he thought the risk was slight, and would be more than offset by the advantages of such naval bases.

MR. LLOYD thought that it followed from this that Canada would not be isolationist if United States and Great Britain were involved.

PROF. MACFARLANE said that such a state of affairs would have involved Canadian interests at the outset, and he had never argued for isolation at the expense of Canadian interests.

MR. LLOYD suggested that armed neutrality might be more dangerous than complete disarmament.

PROF. MACFARLANE was of the opinion that armed forces would be essential to enforce our rights as a neutral, and that to paraphrase an old couplet—" 'Twere better to have been neutral and failed, than never to have been neutral at all."

SUNDAY, APRIL 11, 1937

MR. R. F. McWILLIAMS, K.C.

**"The Imperialist's Point of View"**

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MR. R. F. McWILLIAMS: You have invited me to discuss this evening the problem of Canadian Defence and to present the case for one of the possible courses which Canada might pursue, the course frequently but quite inaccurately called Imperialism. A more accurate description would be a British Empire policy. In previous meetings you have discussed what we have to defend and I start, therefore, from the assumption that Canada has institutions and ideals and material interests which our people will not willingly give up. We will defend them by whatever means we believe will be most effective.

My position is partly positive and partly negative. It is negative in the sense that in my view each one of the other possible solutions of our problems falls to the ground when subjected to the acid tests of the world that is, instead of a world of hopes and wishes. It is positive in the sense that I believe that in the building up and strengthening of the British Empire lies the only effective means of defending what we all want to defend in the conditions of the world that is, and that will be, for a long time to come.

There are four possible courses that Canada might follow—a policy of isolation, which was considered last week; a policy of reliance on collective security through the League of Nations; a policy of pacifism, and a policy of reliance on the existing and well-tested organization of an Empire of which we always have been and always will be a part. An examination of each of the first three courses has led me to the conclusion that the pacifist solution is both visionary and futile; that the collectivist solution is desirable but impracticable; that the isolationist solution is both impracticable and undesirable.

The subject of defence implies that we have relations with the other nations of the world which might under some

circumstances lead to friction and possibly war. It is the first essential of any consideration of such a subject that we should have a clear idea of the character of the world in which we are actually living. When we survey the world with our eyes open to realities we are soon driven to the conclusion that we are no longer living in a world dominated by the conception of freedom, but in a world dominated by the conception of power. Let us get it through our heads that several of the strongest nations of our time are governed by ideas utterly at variance with all the principles of government and individual right in which we believe. The dissatisfied nations are determined to secure for themselves what they claim to be their share of the wealth and power of the world and they have in each case organized themselves under dictatorships in the belief that by that means they will create the power to take what they claim. It is in the light of such conditions and not in the light of some ideal but non-existent conditions that Canada must consider her course.

What Canadians desire to defend may be grouped under two heads. In the first place, we have political institutions and laws which guarantee to every man and woman a measure of civil and religious liberty unsurpassed in any country and equalled by few. In the second place we have material possessions which we have created or developed at a tremendous cost and thereby added immensely to the wealth of the world. Are either of these kinds of possessions threatened in the world as it is in our time.

Of the seven great nations of the world three are under the control of Fascist or military dictatorships, one under a Communist dictatorship and only three remain faithful to those principles of Liberalism which we all thought would come to be universally accepted.

MR. LAWRENCE PALK: What countries are you referring to?

MR. MCWILLIAMS: The Fascist and military countries are Germany, Italy and Japan; the Communist, Russia; and the liberal countries Great Britain, France and the United States. More and more the world is lining up in



support of or opposition to one or other of these fundamental principles of government. What the application of Fascist ideas may mean to weaker countries we have seen in Ethiopia and Manchuria. What such ideas in their crudest and most extreme form may mean we can see from what they have meant within Germany. When the totalitarian state demands not only the surrender of all civil liberty but also the surrender of all religious liberty and when it seeks to elevate to the status of a religion the paganism of barbarians one gets some idea of what it would mean to us if such ideas were permitted to secure a dominant position in the world.

In the field of material possessions a similar situation exists. The Fascist nations are also the dissatisfied nations. They are the nations which have arrived late on the international scene and found all the choicest parts of the world occupied. They demand their share of wealth and the power that they think comes from the possession of colonies.

MR. TREVOR LLOYD: But you could hardly blame them, could you.

MR. MCWILLIAMS: One could not if they were content to secure wealth from such sources by peaceable trade, but they insist that they must have territories under their own political and financial control. Japan has, therefore, seized Manchuria and is eager to secure control of all North China. Italy has seized Ethiopia and aspires to be the patron of Islam. Germany openly declares her desire to seize the Ukraine, which would involve the seizure of the countries that lie in the way, and also demands the return of her pre-war colonies. But it is obvious that those colonies would be of little or no economic value to her, after 25 years of exploitation before the war those colonies supplied only one-half of one per cent of her raw materials or markets and only a negligible outlet for population. If German demands are to be satisfied it can only be by the cession to her of at least control over areas of adequate resources and suitable climate. Such areas are to be found only in two places—the British self-governing Dominions and the southern South American republics. Of them all

Canada is obviously the most desirable from a German point of view.

Are we prepared to hand over to German control and submit to German dictation as to what we shall do with our nickel, our wheat, asbestos, timber, copper, etc. You may say that Germany would never attempt to make such a claim. But that is to overlook completely the whole theory of government that now prevails in the Third Reich. When a powerful nation is ruled by the doctrine that Might makes Right the rest of us have to base our calculations as to what may happen on the doctrine of force, not on the doctrine of freedom. And if such a conflict did come what a helpless position we would be in if we stood alone. What possibility is there of our being able to establish coast defences strong enough to meet the attacks of a first-class naval power. A German naval and air force could seize the island of Cape Breton and from that base command every one of our eastern ports, and even if they did not bother to seize the cities they could completely bottle up the trade without which, as Professor MacFarlane said last week, we might not even be able to exist at all.

MR. PALK: Couldn't we ship through the United States?

MR. MCWILLIAMS: Not so easily as you might think at first glance. Unless the United States were deliberately helping us and thus making herself a party to the war, she would not permit us to flood her markets. She might let us ship through her ports, but then our goods would become contraband and liable to seizure even in American ships. Further, even if we in the central areas could get our goods out all our ports and shipping would be ruined.

Or suppose trouble arose on the Pacific coast. Suppose an outburst of anti-Japanese feeling in British Columbia should result in the death of Japanese citizens residing in our country, and Japan were to demand redress to her satisfaction, and in a form which went beyond what we would accept. We refuse, Japan insists; we continue to refuse; Japan resorts to force. What possibility would there be of us, standing alone, defending ourselves against a naval power as strong as Japan. And even if we could

defend our territory, what would happen to the trade on which our Western cities live.

PROF. R. O. MACFARLANE: How could Great Britain in practice be of any help to us in defending our Pacific Coast against Japan?

MR. MCWILLIAMS: For Japan to tackle a war with Canada alone would be one thing; to take on the whole British Empire, with its unlimited resources and wealth, would be quite a different thing. Besides, no Japanese fleet dare leave home waters while a British fleet was at Singapore.

The cold truth is that the day of small nations is over. We know what happened to Belgium when she stood in the way. Holland and Denmark escaped invasion solely because they were more useful to Germany as neutrals. We know the dire peril in which Czechoslovakia stands at this very time. Even Switzerland, the most peaceable of countries, is being forced to fortify her German frontier lest she share the fate of Belgium.

My conclusion therefore is, that in a world such as actually exists at the present time, the only safety of small nations such as ours lies in association with other powers of like interests and like ideas. In union is strength, in disunion danger. If we want to protect either our institutions or our territory we must have partners with whom we can make common cause and give mutual support.

Fortunately for us we have just such an association of nations at hand. We always have been and I am quite sure we always will be a part of the British Empire or Commonwealth, whichever you wish to call it. We have common institutions of government, common ideas of liberty and toleration, a common system of law and administration of justice, a common heritage of culture and a general agreement as to the proper relations both between government and citizen and between nation and nation.

MR. G. V. FERGUSON: Don't those conditions hold true also of the United States?

MR. MCWILLIAMS: Undoubtedly they do, and every one of us would welcome the adhesion of the United States to the Empire. We have recently had a striking illustration

of the essential community of ideas there is among the nations of the Empire in the unanimity of their action in respect to the abdication of King Edward.

We have everything to gain by standing together in defence of common interests and rights and in seeking to make our united strength effective. From the basis of the united Empire we could extend the defensive association to take in all the other free nations—France, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, the South American republics and above all the United States. But if we cannot agree within our own family, what hope is there of being able to bring together the much wider association.

MR. FERGUSON: If you can do that with the British Empire as a starting point, you have got what is left of the League of Nations. Why disown collective security as a possibility as you did earlier in your talk and now propose to recreate the League by a different process? Why not try to bring the League alive at the present moment?

MR. MCWILLIAMS: There would be two vital differences. In the first place you would have an alliance for the sake and specific purpose of defending the fundamental rights we all want to defend and not a League to manage the world. You could expect the United States to enter such an alliance. In the second place you would have an armed League with the members pledged to join in resisting any aggressor. The League has failed because it was too big a jump to take at one time. We might hope to arrive at an effective world league by starting with the known and the practicable and expanding the circle.

What form such united Empire should take is a matter of very secondary consequence if we are once seized of the necessity for union and agreed upon the aim. The form will be determined as everything in our constitutional growth has been determined, by practical considerations in the light of the circumstances. The measure of union will be determined by the need for it, and, if I am correct in my estimate of the world situation, the need for it will



increase rapidly. In the immediate future we need a permanent standing council on Defence and a permanent consultative Committee on matters of foreign policy. It is true that there is already constant consultation by correspondence between the Mother country and the Dominions, but I think experience has shown that round the table discussion is much preferable. When any of us have a problem to consider among friends we get round a table and thresh it out. When we are dealing with people at arms length we do it by correspondence.

As time goes on we will develop our means of united action. Eventually there will be something in the nature of an Empire Parliament, but that cannot come until there is an approach to equality of numbers and strength as between the Dominions and Great Britain.

PROF. E. K. BROWN: But that would be to throw away all the autonomy which we have so long struggled to secure.

MR. MCWILLIAMS: Not at all. There is all the difference between the relation of a father to his sons during their minority and a partnership freely entered into by the sons after their majority.

PROF. BROWN: I suggest that would have the effect of dragging us into Britain's European troubles and wars?

MR. MCWILLIAMS: I am glad you asked that question. It is a very prevalent idea with a minimum of foundation. Let us examine just what the facts are.

There are two kinds of war with which our generation may have to reckon. Firstly wars over disputed territories or of aggrandisement against a neighbour or based on a racial plea. For example, the recent wars in Manchuria, Ethiopia and Paraguay. Secondly those that are at bottom conflicts of kinds and principles of government and which aim at establishing a type of political faith or national ideology as the ruling power in the world. Spain presents us now with a conflict of ideologies and threatens to draw in all Europe.

With the first type of war the British Empire has no concern. We desire no territory from anybody and we

do not propose to go to war to settle territorial disputes between other countries. There were many pacifists and collectivists and even isolationists who censured Britain for not taking on the job of world policeman for the protection of weak nations or the punishment of Japan or Italy. But Britain made it quite clear that she did not intend to sacrifice her men in order to settle such disputes, except in co-operation with other powers of sufficient strength to make intervention effective. In taking that course Britain was pursuing exactly the course she has always followed. The century from Waterloo to 1914 was as full of wars and threatened war as the present time, but in the whole hundred years Britain was engaged in only one war with a European power, and even our idealists of to-day would hardly condemn her for joining France and Italy in preventing the conquest of Constantinople by Czarist Russia.

MR. MARCUS HYMAN: Nevertheless, Lord Salisbury said that in that war we backed the wrong horse.

MR. MCWILLIAMS: Which amounts to saying that if more recent British opinion had then prevailed we would not have been involved in even one European war. In the light of that record is it not clear that the talk of our becoming involved in purely European wars through our connection with Britain is just the raising of a bogey which has no foundation in fact.

The truth is that Great Britain will never again engage in a merely European war. She will defend herself and the adjacent free nations, France, Belgium and Holland, and perhaps the Scandinavian countries against any attempt to establish a Fascist domination of Europe and consequently of the world. She will defend herself and them and join with other Christian countries, Protestant and Catholic alike, against the paganism which seems more and more to be dominating Germany. When the time comes she will be ready to defend herself and them and Germany against a Communist attempt at world revolution. In other words she will continue to be what she has been for 400 years, the centre of all alliances for the defence of freedom, national and individual.

## SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

PROF. R. O. MACFARLANE asked if Canada should do more than she had already done in matters of defence.

MR. MCWILLIAMS felt, as an individual, that Canada should do more than defend her own shores. Her overseas trade, on which her economic life depended, needed protection also. But if he were Prime Minister he would feel that his Government had gone as far as public opinion warranted. When the people were better informed, they would insist on Canada carrying her fair share of the load to the best of her financial ability.

PROF. MACFARLANE remarked that such proposals sounded like old-fashioned, sentimental Imperialism.

To this, Mr. McWilliams replied that he had not used one word of sentiment. He was a Canadian of Irish stock, and a Liberal, and as such accepted Professor MacFarlane's contention that the question must be decided on the basis of Canada's best interest. As a Canadian, he wished Canada to defend herself effectively and to play her part worthily, and he thought this could best be done by following the course he had outlined.

MR. HENRI LACERTE asked if it was thought that the French-Canadians would consent to such a policy.

MR. MCWILLIAMS thought that the French-Canadians would be just as ready as the Anglo-Saxons to defend free institutions and civil and religious liberty.

MR. LACERTE pointed out that the whole Catholic section of the population was set on fighting Communism.

MR. MCWILLIAMS agreed, but stated that in his opinion the immediate danger came, not from Communism, but from paganism and totalitarianism of Germany. When the Catholics realized that situation they would be a unit in demanding effective action to resist attack from that quarter.

PROF. E. K. BROWN asked if the twenty per cent of our people who were of other European stock would readily consent to such an alliance with England.

MR. MCWILLIAMS considered that the liberty they had discovered in Canada and their recognition of England as the land of freedom would make such a consent readily obtainable.

PROF. MACFARLANE believed that Canada, in retaining the right to make its own decisions, would not be co-

operating in Imperial foreign policy; and besides, what assurance had Canada that there was a common policy.

MR. MCWILLIAMS rejoined that it would be just as much making our own decisions if we came to an agreement in advance with other Empire nations on a common policy of defence, as if we waited until it was too late. As to the existence of a common policy, in times of common danger friends got together and agreed on plans for mutual defence.

MR. G. V. FERGUSON suggested that previous experience might indicate that such faith was not very well founded. The Dominions had always been reluctant to accept definite Imperial commitments.

MR. MCWILLIAMS agreed, but pointed out that that was also the traditional policy of Great Britain herself.

MR. FERGUSON thought such a common policy was a dream, for geographic as well as political and economic reasons.

MR. MCWILLIAMS remarked that it was a dream we must make come true or we would not long rest easily in our beds.

MR. MARCUS HYMAN said that peace in Europe was indivisible and if war started in Europe, Canada would be in it.

MR. MCWILLIAMS did not agree that peace in Europe was indivisible. Of the six important European wars in the nineteenth century, Britain was engaged in only one. He instanced the possibility of a German attack on Czechoslovakia and considered that Canada's entry into war over such an issue would depend on whether or not Nazi domination of Europe was involved. Possibly we would do as the United States did in the last war—come in for the decisive action.

MR. HYMAN asked if public opinion in Canada would support the Government at the forthcoming Imperial Conference in making such alliances on the assumption of Empire responsibilities.

MR. MCWILLIAMS repeated his previous statement that such commitments would have to wait on public opinion.

MR. LAWRENCE PALK said it really meant that Canada's frontier was placed at any point where our heritage of liberty was threatened.

MRS. JESSIE MACLENNAN asked why Britain didn't defend Spain and Ethiopia.



MR. MCWILLIAMS said that in these cases the issue was that of aggression by a strong military organization against a weak but free nation. The safety of Britain was not involved, and an Empire alliance would be purely defensive. In his opinion neither Britain nor the Empire was strong enough to police the world. If the United States would join us, we could put an end to war.

MR. STEWART observed that we should try to make the League of Nations practicable.

MR. MCWILLIAMS wondered whether the people of Canada would be willing for their Government to enter into an agreement with all other League members to submit all differences to the League, to accept its decisions and to join in enforcing such judgments against any State which refused to submit. If the nations of the Empire could not agree on such a policy, how much less chance was there of agreement in a League of differing races and ideas.

MR. STEWART asked where Empire policy would be formulated.

MR. MCWILLIAMS replied that it would be formulated where the policy of any business partnership was formulated—at a meeting of the partners.

MR. TREVOR LLOYD asked if conditions in outlying parts of the Colonial Empire and in India were such that Canada could conscientiously defend them.

MR. MCWILLIAMS thought British rule of dependencies was so far ahead of anything the world had known that Canadians should be proud of it. So far as India was concerned, any mistake there lay in giving the Indian people a Constitution far in advance of their political capacities.

SUNDAY, APRIL 18, 1937

MR. G. V. FERGUSON

“Collective Security”

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MR. G. V. FERGUSON: I have listened with interest and attention to our discussions for the last two Sundays of how best Canada is to defend herself and by what policy. We have heard Professor MacFarlane discuss isolationism, and Mr. McWilliams the imperialist point of view, both, it seems to me, barren and unfruitful doctrines which are bound, in the last resort, to drag us not into one more war but into a succession of wars.

My task this evening is to discuss collective security as a policy on which to base our defence. I am well aware of the fact that collective security is, in the minds of everyone, and rightly so, identical with the League of Nations within the framework of its Covenant. I am well aware too that, all up and down the land, men cry that the League is dead. I know that within this club there is a feeling that tonight we are flogging a dead horse. But I do not think so.

PROF. R. O. MACFARLANE: It must be the gypsy in you then. How can you think the League is anything but dead in view of the events of the past six years, the defection of Japan and Germany and failure of the League in Ethiopia?

MR. FERGUSON: I expected a question rather like that, though I didn't expect to be called a gypsy. More likely it's the Scotch in me, as my argument will show. But in immediate answer it may be enough to cite the fact that influential and practical men and women in British public affairs agree with me. Let me quote a declaration which I think I have here, issued this year in England and signed by such diverse names as those of the Archbishop of Canterbury; Sir Archibald Sinclair, leader of the Liberal party; David Lloyd George, a former prime minister; C. R. Attlee, leader of the Labour party; Winston Churchill, a die-hard Tory; Lord Lytton and the Duchess of Atholl,

both right-wing Conservatives. These men and women speak as follows:—

"We declare that war can be averted and a stable peace permanently maintained if the nations which are members of the League will now make plain their determination to fulfil their obligations under the Covenant and to take any measures required for the prevention or repression of aggression, including if necessary military action."

Many men have willed the League should die; but the League still lives and it can be brought into vitality, even at this last hour, if man wills it to do so. And why should they not, when it is so clear, so obvious that only within the framework of the League can the world and Canada find peace and find it at relatively small cost?

The League of Nations was brought into being for that purpose, and the instrument forged in Paris was, broadly speaking, adequate to meet the end sought. That is to say, the machinery devised can, if used wholeheartedly, wipe out aggressive war. Of that there can be, I think, little doubt. It embodies the new theory which the war of 1914 brought forth. Prior to 1914, it was no crime to go to war, even as an aggressor. Once war was declared, international law contented itself (in the words of one commentator) with defining the right and duties of belligerents and neutrals . . . With the establishment of the League, however, the law of nations was placed on a firmer basis, by providing machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes, for the prevention of aggression and for the steps to be taken to discipline any transgressors of the rules laid down either in the Covenant itself or by the League councils and assemblies dealing with each case as it came up. That is to say, collective pressure was to be brought to bear; and so great would that pressure be that the mere fact that it remained as a threat would enable every nation, separately, to enjoy "collective security". The world was invited to make use of the League. It failed to do so. But it remains the only possible means whereby we can avert the staggering cost of re-armament and the ultimate dreadful price of blood and treasure involved in another war.

That is why collective security remains an alternative worth discussing tonight.

Looking back at the tragic fifteen years which lie between the high hopes of 1920 and the world's failure to check the Italian adventure in Ethiopia, it is possible to-day to see why the machine did not work. This very fact makes it possible to open the way now to success. There is no time this evening to analyse the reasons for failure.

MR. ALISTAIR STEWART: But it's important to try to get at them, isn't it?

MR. FERGUSON: Well, broadly speaking, it is enough to say that the nations principally involved—France and Britain—lacked confidence in the new and untried weapon of collective security. The statesmen of those countries determined to go behind the League's back to form fresh alliances; and while these were always screened by the blessed phrase that they were "within the framework of the League", they helped to wreck it. Besides this there was a marked tendency to try and crawl out from under any general commitment to preserve the world's peace. By repeated interpretations they so glossed the Covenant as to make it evident that each would only throw its weight behind the League in certain specific cases; and these cases on examination proved to involve only those commitments which, even without a League, each nation would have to defend in its own particular interest.

Lastly, there was a fear, widely expressed, that the League machinery would drag the world into wars which otherwise could be avoided. Many people, many Canadians included, thought the League should have its teeth drawn and be converted into a pleasant international debating society in which endless platitudes of an uplifting nature could be poured out for the general edification of the world's future cannon fodder.

The combined result of these ideas is now apparent. Treachery and betrayal have been followed by the rise of truculent dictatorships who have repeatedly flouted the League. This in turn has led to a terror-stricken cam-



paign for general re-armament in which Canada has joined, and another general war is again in sight.

Canada, in this somewhat ignominious history, has played an appropriately ignominious part.

MR. L. PALK: That's rather rough language to use about Canada.

MR. FERGUSON: Rough it may be, but thoroughly justified. Our delegates at Paris fought vigorously against the general commitments that lie at the base of the Covenant. In the early Assemblies we fought for the deletion of Article X; and failing that, for some watering-down of responsibility over it. We refused to join in a projected debate over the distribution of raw materials. We rejected the protocol of 1925 designed to stiffen up the League's anti-war organization; and in 1935 we retreated in a panic from supporting the proposal for oil sanctions, and earned thereby the forthright approval of Mussolini.

This sorry history is based upon our isolationist, North-American doctrines; and to-day we can see that it has played its part in bringing us all nearer and nearer to the drums of war. It is important now to point out that the appearance of powerful predatory nations upon the international scene makes Canada vulnerable object of their longings. We have something that other people want; we are not a strong and powerful nation; and this combination of facts should scare us into the necessity of doing something. In a world of recurrent world wars the conquest of Canada by a combination of victorious and predatory nations is well within the range of possibility.

Two proposals have been made to the Club. The first is that of isolation made by Professor MacFarlane, who gives us the choice of dependence upon the United States or of withdrawing into our own shells, in the hope that war would pass us by and that we would have the golden chance to sell our goods at top prices to whatever belligerent was the top dog at the moment. The other is Mr. McWilliams' proposition that our safety lies in some correlated imperial policy, in which the Empire would stand shoulder to shoulder and show her teeth to all comers. This conception

of the lion and her cubs should have long since found its way into the ashcan.

His proposal is not, I fear, practical at all. As an effective scheme it seems to be projected into the future following a long course of education, but we have a condition on our hands *now* which may become emergent at any moment. Mr. McWilliams' scheme therefore means, at the moment, that Canada must put her resources of men at the disposal of the Imperial combine or really lose control of them. Decisive action would be forced by events in which Great Britain would play the predominant part, and this makes it certain that if war breaks out in Europe we shall be for it, for peace in Europe is indivisible.

MR. R. F. McWILLIAMS: Why are you so sure of that? I cited many nineteenth century cases in which war broke out in Europe without involving Great Britain at all.

MR. FERGUSON: Unfortunately for you, Mr. McWilliams, we are no longer living in the nineteenth century. Many eminent authorities could be cited in proof of my statement, but one may suffice, which I think I have here . . . . On February 19th of this year Mr. Baldwin told the House of Commons this: "If any war breaks out in Europe it is not going to be a localized war. It will run through Europe and will be the most terrible thing you can conceive."

Rather than accept Mr. McWilliams' proposal, I lean heavily to that of Professor MacFarlane. But even that involves difficulties. It is doubtful if, in the event of Great Britain going to war, any belligerent would regard Canada as neutral, no matter how violent our protestations might be.

MR. J. B. COYNE, K.C.: Would it help if Canada passed a Status Act similar to that passed by South Africa, with the full concurrence of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and thus make our independent position in time of war perfectly clear?

MR. FERGUSON: Perhaps it would, but I doubt if even a Status Act would be accepted by our possible enemies who see little else but the common Crown over the whole British Commonwealth. But, supposing it would give us the immunity, do you seriously think that the passage of such an

act is even theoretically possible in Canada to-day—can't you hear the Imperialists roar at the idea?

But suppose that, by some miracle we did stay out, our efforts to profit by war while staying out of it ourselves would get a jaundiced reception from the nations not in control of the sea; and should we unfortunately back the wrong horse, it would follow not only that we would never get paid, but that we would become the next object of attack . . . . Whether we take the Imperialist or the isolationist attitude, we are undoubtedly going to be dragged into war; and I go on the assumption that, failing the establishment of collective security, the next war will not be the war to end all war. We are indeed still fighting the last war. It never stopped.

The very fact that we are now re-arming ourselves means that our Government believes fighting will break out again. Otherwise why spend even a plugged nickel on defence. Hence, if it has to be, I suggest that the right kind of war to get into is a League war. Such a conflict has every advantage it is possible to achieve in so tragic a situation.

MR. T. LLOYD: How can there be advantages? There seems something almost cynical in that remark.

MR. FERGUSON: Not at all. It is merely a mixture of idealism and prudence. It is idealist because, for the first time, we would be fighting for the establishment of the reign of law against outlaw bandit nations. It is prudent because, under the Covenant our obligatory contribution would be only economic; and in most cases that can be imagined no other contribution would be needed. Our geographic position puts us in that happy position. But we would of course have to accept the possibility that a military contribution might be needed, too.

This prospect of course is what frightens our politicians. They see at the end of the road the awful possibility that Canadian soldiers would be fighting on foreign soil in a possibly distant cause. Logically that is involved and rightly so. It is not a prospect from which we should shrink, even if in reality it is very unlikely that such sacrifices would be asked of this country.

A League war would be a war fought in the certainty of victory. No nation, no two nations, could withstand the assault of a world in arms against them. Fifty nations, large and small, would contribute their forces and pool their resources. It would be moreover a war fought for the defined objectives of establishing the rule of law and the abolition of international anarchy. It would not be a war fought blindly for imperial or nationalist ends. The sacrifice, whatever it was, would be well worth while; for if one thing is more sure than another, it is that the first determined attack by the League of Nations upon an out-law nation would also be the last. The reign of law would become a firmly established fact. Thenceforward it is safe to predict that the nations of the world would seek arbitration of their quarrels, and as one Canadian commentator has said, "a bad arbitration is better than a good war."

This is not just the happy and distant dream that some people may suppose, granted only the will by the nations who have power to give effect to their will. Something concrete and immediate can be done almost at once. Canadian representatives in a month's time will be in conference with the other British nations in London. We will have the opportunity of saying at that time, very clearly and definitely, that Canada is prepared to accept the responsibilities and commitments of the Covenant of the League of Nations as the cheapest and most effective method for her own defence, for the maintenance of world peace and—may it be added—for the preservation of the British Commonwealth.

MRS. R. F. McWILLIAMS: Hold hard now. You criticised my husband for being visionary. But isn't this worse?

MR. FERGUSON: No, I don't think so. It is impossible to imagine a League of Nations which does not contain all the British peoples; and a League war would find the Commonwealth shoulder to shoulder in the League. But it is easy to imagine a war without a League in which the British nations would fly apart. Hence the League may well be the only means of preserving the Commonwealth.



Canada, at London, should therefore urge this course upon her sister nations and affirm before the world the necessity henceforward of accepting the Covenant in its entirety . . . . This is not the sentimentality of soft-headed people. It is firmly based upon the demand for cheap insurance against war; and no cheaper or better insurance policy was ever offered to this country.

Such a lead, were it given in London, could provide the fresh impetus which the League needs now, but should such a policy fail of adoption there is good ground for Canada to retreat, so far as she possibly can, from commitments of any kind. If the war that is coming is not to be a League war, let us stay out of it if we can. But if the League takes honest action, let us stand in the front rank instead of cheering from the grand-stand seats. It represents the only short-cut to safety that this troubled world can find.

## SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

In reply to a remark by Mr. D. R. P. Coats suggesting that the League was dead, Mr. Ferguson did not agree. He likened it to an automobile in good running order with nobody to operate it. What the League needed badly was for someone to take the driver's seat.

MR LAWRENCE PALK wondered if the signing of the Covenant had not made too big demands on Canada.

MR. FERGUSON pointed out that Canada had failed to measure up to the commitments that were necessary if the League were to work. Canada had objected to Article X, which guaranteed to all League members their existing territory and political independence. He called attention to Article XVI of the Covenant, which imposed a legal obligation upon all League members to join in an economic and financial boycott of an aggressor nation and also a moral obligation to bring military pressure where necessary to vindicate the Covenant. This in effect would mean that the Covenant-breaking state would become ipso facto at war with all allied states which had agreed to take effective measures.

MR. PALK asked how much actual force the League had behind it to-day.

MR. FERGUSON replied that fifty-two nations had brought economic pressure to bear against Italy in the Ethiopian

dispute and he thought that stronger leadership would have drawn in still more. He believed that Mussolini's wild rage when action was taken against him was a proof of the League's power.

MRS. JESSIE MACLENNAN wondered why, if the League was truly effective, nations had to spend huge sums on armaments.

MR. FERGUSON admitted that the League had lost the confidence of the world and that even if it regained that confidence, armaments would still be necessary for a long time to come; if it was desired to see the League on top, that position would have to be fought for.

PROF. E. K. BROWN asked what Canada, a minor power, could do to revive the League.

MR. FERGUSON considered that not much more could be done than to tell Great Britain, one of the League's natural leaders, that Canada was prepared to go along with her in fulfilling all her obligations under the Covenant.

PROF. R. O. MACFARLANE did not think that there was much chance of Canada doing that at present, and Mr. Ferguson agreed with him. He also agreed with what Professor MacFarlane had said in effect—that without a League, Canada must seek her salvation in Isolation—although he believed that to be a disastrous policy.

MR. MARCUS HYMAN pointed out that the speaker had avoided the fact that the League of Nations was really a League of Powers determined to preserve the status quo at all costs. In his opinion it was power politics masked with a false front of idealism.

MR. FERGUSON disagreed and suggested that Mr. Hyman read the Covenant which would destroy his case. There had been faults, but it was foolish to wait until a perfect League composed of perfect members, was operating in a perfect world before Canada accepted its responsibilities under the Covenant.

MRS. R. F. MCWILLIAMS asked why the war which the speaker had envisaged had not spread from Spain and why the League was not doing something there.

MR. FERGUSON thought that the League could have cleared up the Spanish situation long ago, but excuses were being used to keep the League out of the quarrel. It was regarded by the powers as a civil war, which, of course, took no account of so-called volunteers from Italy and Germany.

MR. HENRI LACERTE suggested that there was something fantastic in the argument that the British Empire could not survive without a League. He thought that the ties of blood and history would keep the Empire together.

MR. FERGUSON quoted Professor Arnold Toynbee, in his *Survey of International Affairs*, 1935, as saying: "I believe that the British Commonwealth of Nations cannot survive except within the framework of an effective international security of the kind intended in the Covenant of the League of Nations."

MR. ALISTAIR STEWART raised the point made by the speaker as to Canada not getting paid if she backed the wrong horse, and questioned whether she would get paid if she backed the right horse.

MR. FERGUSON thought that Canada in a business way had done pretty well out of the last war, but that some war creditors had not done so well, and he was inclined to agree that the more wars we had the less chance there was of getting much besides I.O.U.'s.

MR. W. H. DARRACOTT asked why the problem of the United States' non-participation in the League had been left out of consideration and considered that, had it not been for that defection, collective security might have been established by now.

MR. FERGUSON agreed but felt that placing the blame on Uncle Sam's shoulders was a pastime indulged in by lukewarm League supporters, but that, in his opinion, there was evidence to show that, even without the United States, the League could have mustered the necessary power to enforce security. There was, of course, every probability that in the event of a League war breaking out, the United States would stand on the side of the angels, even in face of the violent neutrality discussions now going on in that country.

MR. DARRACOTT drew the speaker's attention to Mr. Hyman's point that the weakness of the League lay in its determination to preserve and protect the existing order of things, which view Mr. Ferguson had denied, and asked what provisions there were in the Covenant relating to the possibility of change.

MR. FERGUSON pointed to Article XIX, of the Covenant which provided that the Assembly of the League may call attention to the need for revision of certain treaties and to any kind of condition which threatened peace. That was the starting point, and the fact that it was in the Covenant showed that the peace-makers at Paris were aware of their imperfections. If war was going to be banished, the underlying causes must be removed; but the world must creep before it can walk and walk before it can run, and the prime need now was to lay a foundation of fundamental security. When that had been accomplished, the causes of the disturbances could be tackled.



SUNDAY, APRIL 25, 1937

J. S. WOODSWORTH, M.P.

**"An Economic Security Peace Policy"**

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MR. WOODSWORTH: Few people in Canada to-day really want war, or attempt to justify or ennoble war. The majority want peace—some hasten to add, peace with security or with honour.

Those of us who believe that peace is most likely to be attained by the use of peaceful methods are sometimes ridiculed as visionaries or sentimentalists, or denounced as cowards or traitors. We might retort—but calling names or imputing motives gets us nowhere.

We are agreed on the end—peace; we differ as to the means by which we may win peace.

In a recent meeting of the Club, Professor MacFarlane urged that an isolationist policy offers a better opportunity of preserving peace than does pacifism, imperialism or collectivism. Possibly it was with this classification in mind that the sponsors of this series asked me to present the pacifist position.

In my reply I stated that frankly I did not like the word "pacifism". It has acquired many undesirable connotations. Further, it is too near in form to the word "passive." The peace policy which I advocate is not a "negative", "sit-down", or "do-nothing" policy, but a positive, constructive policy that to be successful requires as much energy and devotion as are called forth, shall we say, in a war crisis. The policy which I advocate might properly, I think, be called "A scientific peace policy", or—if you will—an "Economic Security Peace Policy."

Peace, through the League of Nations—"Collectivism", as Professor MacFarlane calls it—is, I agree, not possible under the present set-up, or with the ideals still held by the principal nations of the League. Nevertheless, before peace comes to the world there must be some international agency through which disputes may be adjudicated and the common



welfare promoted. The world to-day is fast becoming a unit, and no nation—not even Canada—can any longer live to itself.

Imperialism, as I see it, is simply capitalism extended into external affairs. The search for extended markets, for sources of raw materials, for new fields for investments, for colonies, becomes an inevitable menace to world peace. Under British imperialism exploitation may have been less severe than under the regime of nations that have not so well learned how to govern, but who can justify a condition under which the vast majority living under the British flag do not enjoy representative institutions? Why should Canadian boys be asked to risk their lives because of some trouble encountered by British imperialism near Suez or Singapore?

MR. R. F. MCWILLIAMS: But would you allow anyone to attack your mother?

MR. WOODSWORTH: The relationship of Great Britain to Canada is not that of a mother. Canada was for many years regarded simply as a colony to be retained as of possible service to the Empire. Further, only one-half of our population is British by racial origin, and that half, I would suggest, in so far as it carries on the British tradition, insists on autonomy.

Further, so far as we can see, there is no immediate danger of Britain being attacked. If she is attacked it will be through her own interference in other folks' business. Mr. Baldwin asserts that the frontier of Great Britain is the Rhine. It might as easily be said that it is along the shores of the Mediterranean or along the Afghan border, or in one of half a dozen African colonies or the waterfront at Hong Kong. Is any attack in any one of the scores of countries in which there are British interests to be considered an attack on the Motherland?

Again, we confuse ourselves by using the name "England." Which England is the Motherland? The England of history and tradition and language, or the England of the great industrial and financial promoters? Joseph Chamberlain was one of the first to admit the

fundamental basis of modern British imperialism. He said:

"All the great offices of state are occupied with commercial affairs . . . the Foreign Office and Colonial Office are chiefly engaged in finding new markets and defending old ones. The War Office and the Admiralty are mostly engaged in preparation for the defence of these markets and for the protection of commerce . . . Commerce is the greatest of all public interests."

Perhaps Chamberlain was right. Now I ask, will Canadian textile manufacturers subscribe to the doctrine that their interests must be sacrificed to those of the big Manchester interests, and I wonder whether textile employees, alike in Manchester or in Valleyfield, Quebec, are at all sure that their interests are identical with those of their employers. We should "break down" this composite word "England", and when any policy is proposed we should know just what interests are sponsoring that policy.

Prof. MacFarlane calls himself an "isolationist" though perhaps he does not make it quite clear that his "isolationist" policy is not very closely bound up with our position on the North American continent, and our proximity to a powerful and friendly neighbour. Personally, however, I see no reason why we should not take advantage of our position and enjoy many of the immunities which it carries with it.

MR. G. V. FERGUSON: Is this not what Mr. Mackenzie King calls "sponging" on the United States?

MR. WOODSWORTH: You may call it "sponging" if you like, but if my house is located in the vicinity of fire-proof buildings, why should I not enjoy the low insurance rates available to me?

We must recognize that if the United States wished to capture Canada she could easily do so. As a matter of fact, the United States already has about as much of Canada as she wants—mines, timber limits, factories, chain stores, and many other types of investment. This is a very effective modern method of conquest! a method against which big guns are unavailing. From the standpoint of those who believe in the exercise of physical force,

might I suggest that the United States in her own interests could not afford to permit a European or Asiatic conquest of Canada. If we accept this position, is our policy to be called "sponging"? If we do not accept it we must surely be prepared to stand against all comers, including the United States. Let us be practical. We could multiply our national defence expenditures by ten, and even then our forces would be wholly inadequate to such a task. The militarists may call us "impossible idealists". Surely they are "incurable romanticists."

After all, these various schemes—collectivism, imperialism, or so-called isolationism—all envisage the use of military force to maintain peace. Is there not a better way?

The last war was fought to end war. It has not ended war, but rather sown the seeds of fresh wars. Never was the international situation in such an unsettled condition. The last war was fought to make the world safe for democracy. Instead of that, we have dictatorships in Russia, in Italy, in Germany. Never was democracy in a more precarious condition. What hope is there that another war would be any more successful in bringing about peace?

Further, preparation for war is no insurance against war. Indeed preparation on the part of one nation almost inevitably provokes preparation on the part of its rivals. This latter means still more extensive preparation for the first nation; and so we go round in a vicious circle.

How is this to be broken? So far as Canada is concerned, surely not by our joining in what is conceded to be "a mad race for armaments."

DR. JOHN MCKAY: Isn't that the pacifist's position? You seem to believe that Canada should do nothing about it.

MR. WOODSWORTH: No, I do not suggest that Canada should do nothing about it, but I believe we must look at this whole matter from a completely new point of view.

We live in a scientific age. We have gradually learned that things do not just happen; that they are the result of certain definite, ascertainable causes. Take the question

of disease. In the old days when a community was smitten by the plague, the people formed processions, with their priests swinging censers and praying that the plague might be stayed. Nowadays if there is an outbreak of disease we send for a health officer. He carefully investigates, finds the cause of the trouble and sets about to remove this cause, by definite, constructive measures.

One of the best illustrations of the use of scientific methods is to be found in the digging of the Panama canal. The French first attempted this, and had to give it up—not because of inherent engineering difficulties but rather because of prevalence of yellow fever which carried off the workmen faster than they could be imported. Later the Americans undertook the task. In the meantime the scientists had been investigating yellow fever and found it was caused by the germ being carried by a certain kind of mosquito. The problem became comparatively simple. Get rid of the mosquito; prevent the mosquito from carrying infection, and you get rid of the yellow fever. Low-lying marshes were drained; coal-oil spread on the lakes; patients screened so that there could be no carrying of the disease from the sick to the well; and in a short time yellow fever had been practically abolished from the Canal Zone. The digging then proceeded without difficulty.

What about the plague of war? We still seem to be pretty much in the stage when we think of it as an act of God, visited upon us for our sins and content ourselves with praying: "Give peace in our time, O Lord." Surely we children of a scientific age can do better than this. War, like yellow fever, is the result of well-defined, ascertainable causes. It, like yellow fever, may be abolished if we can remove those causes.

PROF. E. K. BROWN: What in your view are the fundamental causes of war?

MR. WOODSWORTH: I would say that the causes of modern wars may be roughly divided into (1) psychological and (2) economic.

As to the psychological—nations have grown up very much apart, developing their own individual languages,



customs, religion, etc. Naturally they come to look upon the stranger as an enemy. In more recent years the commercial activities and quick transportation that have brought the nations more closely together, have not dispelled the old animosities—in some cases they have simply intensified them. Even we in Canada, somewhat removed from the racial jealousies and feuds of older lands, have still much distrust of foreigners, and we can bring out very readily our approbrious nicknames—Huns, Dagoes, Chinks, Japs, etc. It is easy to fan the flames of jealousy and hatred. Our main purpose in modern education ought to be, not to glorify our own particular race, but to teach the nations of the world how to dwell together in unity and peace.

MR. L. PALK: Is goodwill enough? What if we want peace and the other nations are set to destroy us?

MR. WOODSWORTH: No, goodwill is not enough. You must loosen your hand on your sword before you can clasp the hand of friendship. I want to speak of the economic causes. These I would divide into two:

First there is the outstanding fact that war to-day is a tremendously profitable business—at least for a few. Recent investigations clearly reveal the enormous profits made by these merchants of death. Those who make profits out of war to no small extent are responsible for war-scares which lead the nations to greater armaments—and there is always the danger of a loaded gun going off!

If we must have arms; if we must have war; surely, on behalf of the men who are called to enlist in the service of their own country; in the name of the neglected veterans of the last war, we plead that the Government should no longer allow anyone to make profits out of war.

But the main economic cause is, in my judgment, the competitive, profit-making system, generally known as capitalism. In these later years, capitalism as an economic system has shown its bankruptcy particularly along two lines: (1) it has led to an enormous volume of unemployment even in our own country where we have an abundance of natural resources, equipment for the development of

these resources and undoubted potential control over our financial system. Something is wrong somewhere. Even the man on the street is beginning to sense that. (2) Again, capitalism has shown its bankruptcy by the resort to war on an almost world scale and with apparently no hope of solution short of another world war with even more disastrous consequences. Socialism seems to me to be the only solution. Socialism seeks to provide the foundation on which permanent peace may be built.

MR. PALK: But in the meantime, what is Canada to do in a world of armed nations that have not adopted your socialistic solution?

MR. WOODSWORTH: Well, I do not hope that we can take socialism at one jump, but I do say that war has not proved a solution, and that we might well try the way of peace. Mr. Butler, Director, International Labour Office, Geneva, has this to say:

“War is not caused only or mainly by lust for territory or booty or prestige. It is also caused by low standards of living, by the feeling of economic insecurity, by the desire for moral or social emancipation . . . (there is) an indissoluble connection between peace and social justice . . . The roots are to be found in actual or threatened impoverishment, declining standards of life, insecurity for the future of themselves and their children . . . The remedy is not to be found, then, in political pacts or frontier rectifications or disarmament conferences alone. These methods have been tried and failed because they did not touch the real source of the trouble. So nowadays we are beginning to talk of the abolition of trade restrictions, the distribution of raw materials, stabilization of currencies, and international monetary agreement.”

So Mr. Butler. I would suggest these measures, not increased armaments—point the road to peace.

MR. ALISTAIR STEWART: What would you say Canada could do?

MR. WOODSWORTH: Mr. Butler has suggested a programme. May I offer a concrete suggestion as far as Canada is concerned. Canada, as a large exporter of raw materials, should declare her readiness to refuse to export

to any nation declared by the League of Nations to be an aggressor. Canada might even forego exclusive claims to raw materials. The old conception of "national sovereignty" is based on an outgrown economic and financial system and is incompatible with effective world organization. A narrow "patriotism" must give place to higher loyalties. If we are to have peace we must be prepared to pay the price of peace which, after all, is small in comparison with the price of war.

I wonder whether we do not concentrate our attention altogether too much on material forces. It is assumed that Napoleon's cynical dictum that God is on the side of the big battalions is true. As a matter of fact, nothing could be further from the truth, as is testified by the failure of powerful empires all down through the years. The fact that man has emerged from the slime, and that fighting instincts have gradually been replaced by co-operative practices, and, at least a search after justice, would indicate that there is something superior to brute force, or, if you will, to the force of navies and aeroplanes.

The writer of the Ephesians reminded his readers (Eph. 6, 12) that "our wrestling is not against flesh and blood but against the principalities, against the powers, against the world rulers of this darkness," and he urged that in this new warfare they should take up the whole armour of God,—truth, righteousness, peace, faith. It seems to me that in somewhat the same way we must seek not to match guns with guns, ships with ships, aeroplanes with aeroplanes, but rather to enter upon an altogether new type of programme.

MR. STEWART: But surely Canada by herself cannot undertake such a programme?

MR. WOODSWORTH: No, this is a world job, and further, I am not suggesting that our small nation should lead the world. But I do suggest that Canada is in a peculiarly favourable position to make a real contribution to the solution of the world problems of peace. Canada is, to a large extent, free from the old-world animosities. Canada is in no immediate danger from invasion. Canada is living



side by side with a friendly nation. Canada has the most intimate relations with the British Commonwealth of Nations. Why should not Canada be the first to risk a new policy?

MR. STEWART: You admit there is a risk?

MR. WOODSWORTH: Yes, all life, all progress, involves risk. But may I say that the risk involved in a scientific peace policy is nothing to the risk involved in the age-old futile policy of war.

## SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION

MR. PALK asked whether such an economic security peace policy had ever been tried, and if not, why should it be assumed to be workable.

MR. WOODSWORTH replied that such a conservative idea as "Nothing can work in the future unless it has worked in the past" would deny all progress. Feuds and vendettas had gradually been replaced by orderly arrangements and court decisions. Why could this not be extended to work on an international scale? The world had become organized in industry, commerce, transportation and finance, but the old political forms still hampered us. He thought the time was ripe for readjustments that would make possible an effective world organization.

MR. FERGUSON inquired whether the price Canada would have to pay for peace would involve the sacrifice of our political freedom, or of our material possessions.

MR. WOODSWORTH thought that the economic changes necessary for peace might affect adversely those now enjoying special privileges. In local affairs work-and-wages programmes, unemployment insurance and health services might mean increased public expenditure, but that was preferable to strikes or civil war. And so in international affairs, to stop the sale of war materials abroad might mean smaller profits to shareholders; lower tariff barriers might force manufacturers to accept lower profits or adopt more efficient methods, or go out of business; but he thought that private loss might be a saving to the country at large.

MR. D. R. P. COATS asked for an immediate programme while Canada was waiting for social justice.

MR. WOODSWORTH answered that social justice must be struggled for, and came in instalments. In his opinion, if



the \$35,000,000 to be spent this year on national defence were to be spent on building homes for the people, the result would be a much greater contribution to the security of Canada.

MRS. JESSIE MACLENNAN asked if it was the speaker's idea that the League of Nations could not accomplish anything until social justice had been attained.

MR. WOODSWORTH thought that a group of representatives of many nations sitting in deliberative assembly was itself an achievement. The greatest contributions of the League had been those measures that had looked toward a larger measure of social justice, but, unfortunately, the larger nations had refused to subordinate what they conceived to be their national interests to the furtherance of the common welfare.

MR. FERGUSON suggested that a League war, in which collective force were brought to bear against an outlaw, would be the most effective way of stopping aggressive warfare.

The situation was not so simple as that, said Mr. Woodsworth. There were the haves and the have-nots, the powerful and the weak, the Fascists and the Communists, and there were those nations whose loyalties were hopelessly divided. Out of such chaos, order was not likely to evolve by setting bigger armies to kill one another.

MR. PALK suggested that if Great Britain had elected to protect Ethiopia against Italian aggression, or to protect China against Japan, Canada should fight on the unselfish side.

MR. WOODSWORTH agreed that an international police force was preferable to a hundred national armies, and if he could see any possibility of Britain putting her navy under the control of Geneva he might be tempted to vote in favour of placing Canada's navy at the disposal of the League. But Britain did not take the unselfish course in the cases cited. Her own interests prevented her taking any action against the aggressor. In his opinion, had Japan been checked in Manchuquo, the Ethiopian trouble probably would not have occurred. The first people he would fight were the callous profiteers at home.

MR. TREVOR LLOYD asked if the speaker would favour using military force to prevent an invasion of the west coast by Japan.

MR. WOODSWORTH suggested that instead of considering such a highly improbable case, Canada should straighten

out any incipient causes of trouble between Japan and Canada. If the Japanese Canadian born people in British Columbia were given the right to vote, their loyalty need give us no concern.

MR. HYMAN asked how Mr. Woodsworth proposed to prevent a probable enemy from using, say, Canadian nickel against us or our allies?

MR. WOODSWORTH reminded Mr. Hyman that the Canadian Government had the power to licence the export, import or transport of materials that might be used for war purposes. Probably nothing short of international control would be effective.

MR. W. H. DARRACOTT asked if the prices of raw material would be fixed by such an international body.

MR. WOODSWORTH thought such an arrangement was inevitable.

MR. PALK asked what there would be to stop belligerents in control of the sea coming and getting all the nickel they wanted.

MR. WOODSWORTH suggested that we might recall our Pacific navy from the Coronation, which together with our Atlantic fleet might be effective. Speaking seriously, however, he did not think that a nation hard-pressed by war would take time off to capture Canada and operate its mines and railroads.

MR. FERGUSON returned to the question of international control over raw materials, and asked if that didn't mean support of the League, and ready submission to all the responsibilities and commitments of the Covenant?

MR. WOODSWORTH agreed, but stated that the League must be reconditioned and the Covenant revised. There had seemed some hope when the committee for the study of the problem of raw materials had met in Geneva six weeks ago but it now appeared that the British government was not prepared to make the necessary concessions.

MAY 2, 1937

MR. J. B. COYNE, K.C.  
PRESIDENT SIDNEY E. SMITH

“Contrasts and Conclusions”

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PRESIDENT SMITH: Mr. Coyne, I have been a silent member of the Club during these discussions on defence policy. I have listened to what has been said about the two phases of the topic—first: what Canada has to defend and second: how she should defend it, and I observed that a definite divergence of views developed with respect to defence policy.

MR. J. B. COYNE: Mr. Smith, don't you think that the unwary listener is apt on first impression to pay too much heed to the differences and to overlook how substantial is the agreement on many fundamental factors?

MR. SMITH: Mr. Chairman, I overlook Mr. Coyne's designation of me as the unwary listener. To return to our muttons, it seems to me that the most notable agreement among Professor MacFarlane, Mr. McWilliams, Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Woodsworth was to agree to disagree. What fundamental factors have you in mind?

MR. COYNE: It is clear, I think, Mr. Smith, that these men were as one in stating that Canada should defend her independence, democratic institutions, national economic interests and territorial integrity and yet that Canada desires peace above all.

MR. SMITH: You score a point there, Mr. Coyne.

MR. TREVOR LLOYD: If Mr. Woodsworth were here I think he would cheerfully forego any national economic policy which involves keeping every last acre of Canada at all costs, if by so doing we could get a warless world.

MR. SMITH: To return to points of agreement, I recall also that they all claimed to be realists and they professed to spurn sentiment. Even Mr. Woodsworth would not use the word “pacifist” in describing his position: he invoked instead that overworked word, “scientific”. What other common ground is there?

MR. COYNE: All of them stated, or implied, that the problem of defence should be solved by Canadians for Canada, with paramount regard for Canada's best interests.

MR. SMITH: That is true—in so far as it goes, but they did not agree on what are Canada's best interests or how those best interests should be defended. I remind you that this is the vital matter.

MR. COYNE: But listen. They agreed in general on Canada's best interests but did not elaborate details. They were all of the opinion that Canada can't profit from getting into war. Moreover, they could not contemplate the possibility of a war with the United States. There they were on firm ground.

MR. SMITH: I see that these men who approached the question from divergent angles were not so far apart on the main elements. There is a further point. At least the isolationist, Professor MacFarlane, and the imperialist, Mr. McWilliams, advocated that consideration of the external trade of Canada, a major exporting nation, must be a determining factor in formulating a defence policy. The idealists, Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Woodsworth, paid no attention to that. I am wondering if they would sacrifice that trade in order that their theories might prevail?

MR. FERGUSON: Sacrifice nothing! I can't speak for Mr. Woodsworth, but where on earth did you get that idea from anything I said? Collective security offers more chance for Canada to trade successfully in a war world than any other system. Any effective League would guarantee freedom of the seas to its members, which is more than Professor MacFarlane's isolationism would achieve—or Mr. McWilliam's imperialist theories either.

MR. SMITH: The crux, Mr. Ferguson, lies in your word "effective".

MR. COYNE: Now to turn to another point, Mr. Smith. All four men were of the opinion that Canada's vast area and small population and her rich natural resources, particularly minerals, might be coveted by predatory nations. This contingency makes the need of a defence policy more acute.

MR. SMITH: But examination shows that the amount of usable area, still unoccupied, is comparatively small. The covetousness of other nations may be largely due to our own boastful exuberance. Is there any immediate danger in this respect, Mr. McWilliams?

MR. MCWILLIAMS: Yes, there may be. But I do not agree with those faint-hearted people who think we have little left of unused resources. Measured by the standards of the crowded countries, I think we have room for at least three times our present population.



MR. COYNE: I concede to you, Mr. Smith, that there was a division of opinion as to the possibility of Canada's remaining neutral during a major war. Professor MacFarlane and Mr. McWilliams stated that it would be possible for Canada or a United Empire to stay out of a European conflict; on the other hand, Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Woodsworth took the contrary view.

MR. SMITH: I must say that I agree with Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Woodsworth. A shot that was fired in Sarajevo in 1914 was heard around the world. As Chesterton said, we are all in the same boat and we are all sea-sick. Professor MacFarlane and Mr. McWilliams are singularly blind in this respect.

PROF. MACFARLANE: May I suggest, Mr. Smith, that you are still fighting the last war. In the past four centuries there have been hundreds of wars and only two of them could be called general, and even in them there were neutrals. In the last war, there were small nations like Holland, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, and a great power, the United States, until April, 1917. That Canada can remain neutral is not certain, but I do maintain that we have a good chance to be so if we really want to.

MR. MCWILLIAMS: Neither do I admit blindness. It is a mistake to say the shot fired at Sarajevo started the War. There were numerous European conflicts in the previous century which the British Empire stayed out of.

MR. COYNE: You will recall that Professor MacFarlane stressed sectional, racial and religious differences in this country that tend to make it impossible for Canada to unite in adopting any definite foreign policy. Mr. McWilliams appeared in one part of his discussion to make the same point, but in another part he asserted that French Canadians and people of European stock in Canada would support a united Commonwealth policy.

MR. MCWILLIAMS: They would join in the defence of our institutions just as readily as the Anglo-Saxons, once they understood the issue at stake. True enough, few of us realize that our country may have to be defended on the Rhine or at some other distant point, if it is to be defended at all with any hope of success.

MR. SMITH: Perhaps, Mr. McWilliams. But I don't regard seriously the talk about these divisions and it may be dangerous to pay much attention to it. At any rate, civil war in Canada over these views is inconceivable, and

I deprecate that any member of this Club should even contemplate the wrecking of our national establishment on this score. I must admit, however, that differences of opinion may make that unanimity, which is desirable on defence policy, more difficult to achieve.

PROFESSOR MACFARLANE: I deprecate secessionist tendencies just as much as you do, Mr. Smith, but I don't believe that burying one's head like an ostrich will be an effective method of meeting them. You have heard of the old lady who went to the zoo to see the giraffe and exclaimed: "I don't believe it: no animal has a neck that long."

MR. COYNE: Mr. Smith, you mentioned that the four men dealt with the defence problem from different viewpoints: what did you advocate, Professor MacFarlane?

PROFESSOR MACFARLANE: I advocated that Canada should endeavour to stay out of European politics, to keep the peace as far as possible and that if war should break out in Europe, Canada should declare her neutrality and do her best to preserve it. This policy isn't designed to forward the interests of the British Empire, nor to secure the welfare of mankind in general, at the expense of Canadian interests.

MR. COYNE: Is this entirely practicable, Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH: It is your question; answer it.

MR. COYNE: The success of this policy would depend upon two factors: first, could we remain at peace in a general conflagration, and second, how far could Canada maintain her neutrality in such an event? The whole world is now one in a business and social sense. As you pointed out, a minor incident in Bosnia in July, 1914, brought the whole world into armed conflict and, despite an expressed and undoubtedly sincere desire to remain neutral, the people of the United States were drawn into the vortex. From early in the Great War, interference with her commerce and her nationals on the high seas brought the United States into serious disputes with both Great Britain and Germany. Could Canada hope to escape a similar situation where her powerful neighbour could not?

MR. SMITH: Professor MacFarlane recognized this danger. He stated that we should remain neutral until we can back the right horse. But if he can't produce a dope sheet that will pick the winning horse, his expression, "Twere better to have been neutral, and lost, than never to have been neutral at all" is delusive rhetoric.

PROFESSOR MACFARLANE: Well, I've never had much success with the ponies. But picking a winner in this case is relatively easy. There are two tests: first, can he take our goods off the docks at Montreal? second, can he pay for them? If he can do these two things, I would be quite prepared to pick him as the winner, and something tells me that no power other than Great Britain or the United States has any immediate chance of meeting this test.

MR. SMITH: Mr. Coyne, I want to ask a very serious question. Do you believe that Canada could maintain her neutrality in the event of a major war?

MR. COYNE: Well that is a difficult as well as a serious question. Various situations might arise. For instance, where would we stand as a neutral if Britain were a belligerent and her ships sought our harbours for protection, fuel or repairs? Or, if Germany were a belligerent and her ships similarly came to our ports? Or, if the United States were at war and sought our harbours or air landings? If the United States were engaged in a war on the Pacific, would we be able to protect our neutrality as against Japan or the United States? Would it be prudent for us to refuse to permit United States planes to fly over Canadian territory or ships to use Canadian ports? Moreover, could Canada maintain neutrality against Great Britain and remain within the Empire? These are questions which *will have to be* answered when they arise, and circumstances will govern. Were the United States not a belligerent, our neutral position in respect of supplies to combatants might be vitally affected by what action Congress may take.

MR. SMITH: There isn't any ground on which Canada is *compelled* to go to war except in resisting attack. There isn't another ground on which she *might* go to war except in support of Great Britain for maintenance of democracy, or for sentiment or material advantage in the Empire; or because she could not maintain her neutrality in a war between Japan and the United States.

MR. COYNE: The conclusion then is that Canada and the United States are so intimately connected as an economic, social and defence unit, that in case of war, an impossible situation would arise if Canada were on one side and the United States on the other. The latter is able and would be compelled to take control of this country. Even if it is conceivable that it didn't do so, the bulk of our trade, which is with the United States,



would cease and our domestic business would be hopelessly shattered. But, in addition, we would be able to do business nowhere else. Import of raw materials, cotton, rubber, petroleum, minerals, chemicals, and so on is essential to us. We couldn't carry on.

MR. SMITH: I suggest the basis of our policy is that we must be on the same side as the United States if we are both involved in war, irrespective of what position is taken by Great Britain or any other part of the Commonwealth: and that we must maintain our neutrality against any enemy of the United States, if she is involved and we are not.

MR. TREVOR LLOYD: Just a minute. Don't forget that thirty years ago when the Imperial forces were withdrawn from Esquimaux and Halifax, there was a definite agreement between our Government and the United Kingdom that these ports would always be available for the British fleet.

MR. COYNE: That agreement may have to be terminated. But, war between the United States and Great Britain is unthinkable. However, if it ever did happen, we would have to remain neutral or side with the United States.

MR. MARCUS HYMAN: What price, Professor MacFarlane would the United States exact if she defended us against a dangerous assailant?

PROFESSOR MACFARLANE: The United States, Mr. Hyman, has to defend Canada in order to defend herself. You know what the Munro Doctrine means. Only once has any power challenged that doctrine—France. She picked a favourable time for her Mexican venture—during the American Civil War. But, how long after the conclusion of that war was it before French troops were sent packing and their puppet Maximilian was in his grave? Personally, I don't think that the United States at any time would exact any price apart from what every Canadian worth his salt would be prepared to pay: first, the exertion of our every resource in our own defence; second, the fullest co-operation with the United States services during the war; and third, our continuance as a State friendly to the United States.

MR. SMITH: Yes, Professor MacFarlane. The United States is taking steps to protect its borders, and we can't leave an unprotected Canada as a back door entrance to the United States, for Germany, Japan, or any other hostile force. We would become a dependency of the



United States if we rely solely on that country for our defence, and we would thereby invite its people to consider that they have some corresponding rights in this country. If we value our independence and our national position in the world, and even our friendly relations with the United States, we can't allow this to occur. With the burden of the last war heavy on our backs and the present difficulties in the way of foreign attack, a moderate expenditure on coastal defence and the nucleus of an air force is all that we require at the present time.

MR. COYNE: Let us turn to another phase. If His Majesty, acting on the advice of His Government in Great Britain, declared war on a foreign power, could Canada, having a King in common with Great Britain and the rest of the Empire, and common Empire citizenship, properly or effectively declare her neutrality, Mr. Smith?

MR. SMITH: Our position as neutral or belligerent will be determined by the hostile country, not by doctrinaire views of Imperial jurists on the interpretations of the Commonwealth constitution or international law. International law will count for little in future wars. The law of the jungle will prevail.

MR. COYNE: Now, what of Mr. McWilliams' policy?

MR. SMITH: I quote from his statement: "A policy of reliance on the existing and well-tested organization of an Empire of which we have always been, and", he added fervently, "always will be a part." Do you think that Canada should bind herself to a British foreign policy in any event?

MR. COYNE: Are you speaking of a policy of Great Britain or a policy of the British Commonwealth? If the former, I am bound to observe that the far-flung interests of Great Britain cannot be always identical with the best interests of Canada. If you are referring to a policy of the British Commonwealth, I suggest this is something that is non-existent. One cannot say that there has been a common foreign policy for the Commonwealth since 1922. I recall at that time Lloyd George's Government suggested to the Dominions that they should participate in a military expedition against Turkey—the Chanak incident. Canada replied emphatically "No". In 1925, after the negotiation of the Locarno Pact, the Dominions refused to join Great Britain in assuming obligations under that treaty.

MR. SMITH: Yes, really Mr. McWilliams' plea for Canada to follow Great Britain in the sphere of international affairs

was predicated upon the consistent rightness of the Mother Country's policy.

MR. McWILLIAMS: I do not accept that version. I frequently criticize the course taken by British governments.

MR. COYNE: The rightness of the viewpoint of the British people is one thing and what course their Government pursues may be quite another. Canadians can't have failed to observe many disquieting features in recent British foreign policy. Time doesn't permit mention of even a few of the many instances of the uncertain course of the present British Cabinet in the past few years, often contrary to their pious professions.

MR. HYMAN: What about Manchuria?

PROF. MACFARLANE: And Abyssinia?

MR. G. V. FERGUSON: And Spain?

MR. LAWRENCE PALK: And there was the amazing admission of Mr. Baldwin in the House of Commons in November last of knowledge in 1933 of the extensive rearmament in Germany, and that he suppressed the information for party political advantage in the general election.

MR. TREVOR LLOYD: And the incident a few days ago of refusal of the British Government to give protection on the high seas to British ships bound for Bilbao until an outraged public compelled a change of policy.

MR. COYNE: These and many other things make us hesitate to follow implicitly official British policy, without our own mature and independent consideration of our own position and our own needs.

MR. SMITH: But, I think Mr. McWilliams recognized this, for he suggested *limited, co-operative* action through a permanent standing council on defence and a permanent consultative committee on matters of foreign policy and he contemplated ultimately even an Empire Parliament.

MR. COYNE: But will that suggestion work? Acts, statements, inaction and evasions of the present British cabinet on foreign affairs have created mistrust of its objectives and professions in many Canadians at least, and this mistrust, I believe, destroys any prospect of a united Commonwealth policy at present or any faith in the usefulness of such policy if made because Britain is the dominant partner. But anyway, don't you think Mr. McWilliams' proposal for councils or committees in which Dominion representatives would commit their countries to a course of action in advance is impracticable? Mr. King and Mr. Bennett both see eye to eye on this point.

MR. MCWILLIAMS: They will both be smoked out of that corner by "the force of circumstances".

MR. COYNE: So, having regard to history and the evolution of Dominion autonomy, there is no possibility of resurrecting the idea of an Empire Parliament in our lifetime, if at all.

MR. SMITH: You have not yet mentioned Mr. Ferguson's proposal for Canada's defence.

MR. FERGUSON: I said that Canada should endeavour to revitalize the League according to the tenor of the Covenant. I believe that Canada can obtain through the League the greatest security at a minimum cost to her.

MR. COYNE: Mr. Smith, what do you think of Mr. Ferguson's earlier comparison of the League to an automobile that needs only a driver?

MR. SMITH: I ask what nation will take the driver's seat? Up to date, Great Britain and France have refused to take the job.

MR. MCWILLIAMS: Isn't the real trouble with Mr. Ferguson's automobile that it hasn't any gasoline?

MR. SMITH: Yes, and Mr. Ferguson stated that the League could function as its founders hoped it would, granted the will by the member nations to give effect to the Covenant. That is the gasoline and the major members have refused to supply it *or* to drive the car.

MR. COYNE: There is the rub; the League has been scuttled by its members—and Mr. Ferguson pointed out that Canada played an ignominious role in this tragedy.

MR. SMITH: As a student of the history of English law Mr. Coyne, you will recall that disputes between individuals were originally a matter of private remedy or vengeance. Then, national courts of justice were established for the control and punishment of the unruly. This was a long course of development. Is there not a parallel here for the settlement of disputes among nations?

MR. COYNE: Yes, but there is this difference. A strong ruler imposed these courts upon his people. *Nations*, however, must consent to surrender *voluntarily* to the League some of their sovereignty, because otherwise there can't be any adequate central authority.

MR. SMITH: Do you believe that the nations are ready to make this surrender, and abide by the decisions of the League?



MR. COYNE: No, but Mr. Ferguson's ideal is worth striving for. No transgressing nation could confront a wide and effective combination of League powers.

MR. SMITH: Do you think it's possible to hope for an effective League without the United States, Japan, Germany and Italy?

MR. COYNE: I agree with Mr. Ferguson that the democracy of the United States would be on the side of the angels in the event of a concerted action by League powers. We must recognize that the fascist states are not willing to surrender voluntarily any tittle of sovereignty. They only understand the power of force. The League if it is to be revitalized must function at present without them.

MR. SMITH: What worries me is that Mr. Ferguson went the whole hog. He wants to retain the original Covenant or, in the alternative, to revert to isolation. But, the trouble is that the League failed, in part at least, because it was too big a jump to take at one time. Would Canadians be more favourable towards the League if commitments were made covering specified areas only, at any rate so far as military operations are concerned?

MR. COYNE: Perhaps they would favour such regional pacts, rather than world wide engagements. The League has suffered because idealists failed to take into account the number of those in official positions in France and England who were out of sympathy with the League idea. The power politics of the past could not, in these circumstances, be reversed in one generation. I feel that half a loaf is better than no bread.

MR. MCWILLIAMS: You're coming along fine, Mr. Coyne. The British half loaf is much better than the no bread of the League.

MR. FERGUSON: I'm getting a little angry at this palaver about the League's vague idealism. If I'm an idealist, so were the tough politicians in Paris who framed the Covenant. It was designed to prevent aggressive war, by men who had just been through a war. The League offers practical machinery—and the whole loaf, Mr. McWilliams. If we don't use the machinery—and use it soon—within two—three—five years at most—we will all go down the drain again. Don't catalogue me with Mr. Woodsworth. We can't wait for his Utopia.

MR. SMITH: The tough politicians at Paris, Mr. Ferguson, were instruments of idealism, largely in response to what their public asked for. The public was ignorant of the



difficulties we have mentioned and even the politicians underrated them. I believe that the League is a much more concrete proposal than the vision of Mr. Woodsworth. In comparison perhaps you will not object to be called a practical idealist, a wise bird, which does not lay an egg too big for the nest. Mr. Coyne, I had thought Mr. Woodsworth was a League supporter. What do you make of his proposal?

MR COYNE: That is a poser. While I understand the policies advocated by the other gentlemen, I had and still have difficulty in gathering a specific proposal from Mr. Woodsworth's remarks, though I readily comprehend his attitude towards the present economic system. He would eradicate capitalism, for he believes that capitalism with economic rivalry and industrial inequality and unrest are the main causes of war. He would take the profit out of war and he would prevent the export of raw materials to any nation declared by the League as an aggressor. He apparently favours a world court for the adjudication of international disputes and a reconstituted League.

MR. SMITH: Do you think that one nation can adopt at the present time a policy of disarmament?

MR COYNE: No. As in national affairs, so in international affairs, communal force must sometimes be invoked to restrain violence, caprice, folly and cupidity. And it will take more than a scientific peace policy to remake the heart of man. A good deal of Mr. Woodsworth's discussion was on the advantage which he claims for socialism nationally applied, a subject too large to discuss now.

MR. SMITH: It does seem to me that he didn't make any specific application of socialism to the solution of the international difficulties, though it is true he asserts that if all nations go socialist the causes of war automatically disappear.

MR. COYNE: But, I would like to ask if it's true that ownership and control of industry in all its branches by Governments within their own borders would obliterate international boundaries or eradicate international jealousies? The establishment of socialism in the Soviet Republic has not operated to draw the claws of the Russian bear.

MR. SMITH: In conclusion I would say, Mr. Coyne, that the leaders of the last four discussions all want to accomplish the same end—peace and welfare for Canada, but take different roads to reach the goal. Professor MacFarlane

and Mr. McWilliams have dealt with immediate and practical steps to meet conditions we now face. Canada by herself, and the British Commonwealth also, are established and going concerns.

MR. COYNE: Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Woodsworth, on the other hand, have dealt with long term policies, success of which depends essentially on educative processes and which require radical and deep-seated changes that would take a long time to bring results. It is not unfair to designate them as idealists, who work for wide humanitarian objectives. The League of Nations, supported by Mr. Ferguson, is the more practical of the two, for it is based on an international parallel of national development, and obvious necessities of the present world situation recommend it.

MR. SMITH: Surely a young virile nation like Canada, favourably situated as it is, may give leadership in striving for fulfilment of the ideals of a warless world. In the meantime, we must realize that we are living in a real world and keep our powder dry.