

DOMINION OF CANADA

REPORT

ON THE

CANADIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE TO THE CROWN COLONY OF HONG KONG

BY

Right Hon. Sir LYMAN P. DUFF, G.C.M.G.

ROYAL COMMISSIONER

PURSUANT TO

ORDER IN COUNCIL, P.C. 1160



OTTAWA

EDMOND CLOUTIER

PRINTER TO THE KING'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY

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CHIEF JUSTICE'S CHAMBERS,
SUPREME COURT,

OTTAWA, 4th June, 1942.

SIR,—

I am transmitting herewith my Report made pursuant to Order in Council, P.C. 1160, relating to the Hong Kong expedition. The Report is in two parts. There is a Report proper, which gives my principal conclusions and some ancillary matters, and the Appendix, which deals fully with the facts and discusses the evidence and the conclusions.

I have the honour to be,

Most sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) L. P. DUFF.

The Right Honourable
W. L. MACKENZIE KING, P.C., L.L.D.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa.

P.C. 4782

Certified to be a true copy of a Minute of a Meeting of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General on the 5th June, 1942.

The Committee of the Privy Council submit for Your Excellency's information the accompanying report of the Right Honourable Sir Lyman Poore Duff, G.C.M.G., made pursuant to the provisions of Order in Council P.C. 1160 of February 12, 1942, appointing him a Commissioner under Part 1 of the Inquiries Act to enquire into the circumstances surrounding the dispatch of a Canadian Expeditionary Force to the Crown Colony of Hong Kong.

Csp. 3

A. D. P. HEENEY,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

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REPORT

BY THE

ROYAL COMMISSIONER

PURSUANT TO

ORDER IN COUNCIL, P.C. 1160

YOUR EXCELLENCY:—

The Order of Your Excellency, P.C. 1160, authorizing this Inquiry is attached to this Report. By it, I am directed to inquire into the organization, authorization and despatch of the Canadian Expeditionary Force to Hong Kong in October, 1941. I am instructed particularly to examine the selection and composition of that force, the training of its personnel, the provision and maintenance of its supplies, equipment and ammunition and the provision of transportation therefor. The Order in Council states that the purpose of the investigation is to determine whether there occurred any dereliction of duty or error in judgment by those whose duty it was to arrange for the authorization, organization and despatch of the force that resulted in detriment or injury to the expedition or its members. My duty is to determine whether there occurred any dereliction of duty or error in judgment "on the part of any of the personnel or of any of the departments of the Government whose duty it was to arrange for the authorization, organization and despatch of the Expeditionary Force" and whether, if such dereliction or error occurred, there resulted detriment or injury to the expedition or the troops comprising it. If it is found that such dereliction of duty or error in judgment occurred, it is my duty to fix the responsibility therefor.

In this, my Report proper, I am stating my principal conclusions touching these matters, together with some salient facts. A full statement of the facts and a full discussion of the evidence appear in the Appendix hereto which is to be considered as part of my Report.

First, of the authorization of the expedition. The principal considerations prompting the invitation by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Government of Canada to send reinforcements to Hong Kong (two battalions of infantry with first reinforcements, and by subsequent communication a modified headquarters staff) are set forth in the telegram containing that invitation, dated September 19, 1941. These considerations were largely those which influenced the Canadian Government in accepting the invitation. I have been unable to obtain the consent of the Government of the United Kingdom to the textual reproduction of this telegram.

The Chief of the General Staff having expressed to the Government his opinion that there was no military objection to the acceptance of the proposal and that the reinforcements ought to be despatched, the view of the War Committee, as disclosed in the evidence of three Ministers of the Crown, the Min-

ister of National Defence, the Associate Minister of National Defence, and the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, was that in the circumstances the only possible answer to the invitation was an affirmative one. The invitation was accordingly accepted and the expedition left Canada on the 27th of October.

The evidence discloses various reasons which appear to have actuated the War Committee. In view of what other Dominions had done in Abyssinia and Libya it was Canada's turn to help; Canada ought to share in the responsibility for garrisoning the Pacific area, just as Australia was assisting in Malaya; the military value of the reinforcement would be out of all proportion to the numbers involved; the arrival of the contingency in Hong Kong would have a great moral effect in the whole of the Far East and would reassure the Chinese as to the British intention to hold Hong Kong; the moral effect of the expedition might operate as a sensible influence for the preservation of peace there; at that juncture, in September, to gain time was beyond measure important; such an appeal from the predominant partner in the common cause could not be rejected.

I am permitted to reproduce a telegram from the War Office, of October 30, after the expedition had left:—

We are very grateful to you for despatching your contingent to Hong Kong at such short notice. We fully realize the difficulties of mobilization and of distance which have had to be overcome. The moral effect of their arrival in November will be much greater than it would have been two months later.

The terms of this telegram assist us in forming an idea of the hopes and expectations with which the request of September was sent.

It would perhaps be a possible view that the propriety of this decision by the Government is exclusively matter for consideration and discussion by Parliament. Since, however, I am required to pass upon the question, it is my duty to say that I have no doubt the course taken by the Government was the only course open to them in the circumstances.

It was urged by Mr. Drew that the change of Government in Japan on October 16, by which a cabinet notoriously sympathetic with the Axis powers came into office, ought to have led the Canadian Government to re-examine the question of policy raised by the invitation of the United Kingdom. I had the advantage of reading a number of despatches from the Government of the United Kingdom, which I am not at liberty to reproduce, as well as a despatch from the Canadian military authorities in England, which is reproduced in part, dealing with the probabilities concerning war with Japan, and my conclusion is that, having regard to the information of which the Government was in possession, derived from the best sources of information open to them, nothing emerged before the departure of the expeditionary force on the 27th of October which could have been considered to be a justification for the withdrawal by Canada from the responsibility she had undertaken. On the contrary, the reasons which prompted the acceptance of the proposal continued to operate with possibly increasing force up to the sailing of the expedition.

Second, of the selection of the units for the expeditionary force. The responsibility for advising the Minister of National Defence with respect to the composition of the expeditionary force devolved upon General Crerar, the Chief of the General Staff. In a communication to the Minister, in which his reasons for his recommendation are stated at large, he recommended that the Royal Rifles of Canada from Quebec and the Winnipeg Grenadiers from Manitoba should be designated. In this communication he said that a primary consideration in making the selection was "that the units selected should be efficient, well-trained battalions, capable of upholding the credit of the Dominion

in any circumstances." He adds, "both" battalions designated "are units of proven efficiency."

So long as the Minister's confidence in the Chief of the General Staff remained unimpaired, the Minister would not overrule such a recommendation upon a purely military matter; and he cannot be justly criticized for acting upon it.

It is my duty, however, to consider whether there was any error of judgment in General Crerar's recommendation. Nobody, of course, was in as good a position as General Crerar for arriving at a sound judgment upon the selection of the units. His decision, moreover, was not a mere expression of opinion; it was the basis of his recommendation, made upon his responsibility as the professional adviser of the Minister, upon which he expected the Minister to act and knew almost at once that he was acting. The evidence, which is discussed in the Appendix, satisfies me that General Crerar's recommendation was made upon sound grounds and that he is not chargeable with any error in judgment, still less with any dereliction of duty in relation to it.

The principal criticism directed against this selection concerns certain platoon weapons which are included in the establishment of a Canadian infantry battalion, but which, before October, 1941, were not available generally for training purposes to the Canadian Active Army. General Crerar says:—

There were, however, in Canada at the time in question a number of battalions (among which were Royal Rifles and Winnipeg Grenadiers) which, although somewhat handicapped by lack of supplies of certain platoon weapons (mortars and anti-tank rifles), in my opinion were generally adequately trained to undertake defensive responsibilities such as those in prospect in Hong Kong.

He adds:—

The short supply of mortars and anti-tank rifles was general in all units of the Canadian Army and not peculiar to the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers.

This, he adds, is the natural and inevitable handicap of a country which is unprepared for war and has war brought upon it.

If this handicap, as General Crerar describes it, from the "short supply of mortars and anti-tank rifles", was to be a reason for exclusion from the expeditionary force in the case of the two battalions in question, then that reason was based upon a condition that, to repeat General Crerar's words, "was general in all units of the Canadian Army and not peculiar to the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers" and must have applied equally to all such units; with the logical result of excluding all.

This ground of exclusion indeed, if a proper one, was (as is fully explained in the Appendix) applicable with still greater force to Canadian battalions generally than to the two battalions in question. In point of fact, these battalions were in a more advantageous position in respect of these weapons than the units of the army generally. The Royal Rifles had the three-inch mortar for training purposes at least as early as April, 1941. Although they had no ammunition, the mortar platoon was trained in its mechanism and use, tactically as well as otherwise. The mortar platoon of the Winnipeg Grenadiers was also trained in the mechanism and use of the same weapon; and further enjoyed the advantage of having, even before leaving for the West Indies, a number of anti-tank rifles (without ammunition) for training.

There were, moreover, solid reasons for believing that any deficiencies in training in such platoon weapons (with which General Crerar declares he was fully acquainted) could be made good before any encounter with the enemy. The evidence lends support to the expressed conviction of General Crerar and General Stuart (the present Chief of the General Staff) that this was done.

General Crerar adds:—

With information at my disposal concerning units of Force "C" and knowing professional ability and character of Commanding Officer, Brigadier Lawson, I would say that Force "C" was certainly fit to meet an attacking force, even in superior numbers, and to give a fine account of itself by December 8.

General Crerar says:—

Information at my disposal during latter part of September, 1941, indicated that outbreak of hostilities with Japan was not imminent and that time would, in all probability, be available to carry out intensive, adequate and possible extensive training of Canadian forces at Hong Kong after their arrival.

General Stuart agrees with this.

The evidence relating to the training, equipment and personnel of the two battalions is fully examined in the Appendix. For reasons which there appear, I am satisfied that in respect of weapon training, as in respect of other matters, this selection cannot be justly impeached as affected by any error in judgment.

Third, of the steps taken to bring the units up to strength, including first reinforcements. The selection of the units made, it became necessary to provide "first reinforcements" for both battalions and to bring the Winnipeg Grenadiers up to strength. Both battalions were warned for service on October 9th and the ship which had been provided by the British Government to take the expedition to Hong Kong was to sail before the end of the month. In an interval of not more than two weeks it was necessary to obtain the required additions, as well as to attend to the multifarious tasks involved in equipping the expedition. It must be remembered that all these preparations had to go forward, not only with urgency, but also with extreme secrecy. It was decided to obtain the men needed for the Royal Rifles in Military District No. 2, with Headquarters in Toronto, and those for the Winnipeg Grenadiers in Military District No. 10, with Headquarters in Winnipeg.

All men who were added to the two battalions prior to the departure for Hong Kong volunteered for service overseas with the battalion to which they went. They were, in the case of each battalion, accepted as satisfactory by the Officer Commanding, or by officers designated by him. The steps taken by the battalion and district officers were taken under the direction of and were approved by National Defence Headquarters at Ottawa and, in particular, of and by Colonel P. Hennessy, the Director of Organization in the Adjutant-General's Department, upon whom devolved the immediate direction and responsibility for the task of bringing the units up to strength and providing first reinforcements, and who became the Senior Administrative Officer of the Expeditionary Force.

There were added to the Royal Rifles 154 men from Military District No. 2, of whom 52 came from the Midland Regiment and 102 came from Advanced Training Centres at Camp Borden. There were added to the Winnipeg Grenadiers, 282 men and 12 officers from Military District No. 10. In the Appendix I have examined in detail the training and qualifications of each group of the men added.

A period of sixteen weeks has been laid down as the standard period to be devoted to the training of an infantry recruit before sending him overseas. In individual cases and by reason of the exigencies of shipping, this standard has on occasion not been enforced. Of the men added to the strength of the Hong Kong expedition, all but about six per cent had undergone more than sixteen weeks military training after enlistment in the active army. As I have already said, all these men volunteered for service with the expedition and all were accepted as suitable by officers of the battalion to which they were going.

A number of officers gave evidence of the great value of the personal selection of men for a unit by competent officers of that unit. For example, Lieutenant-General McNaughton said (and with him General Crerar and General Stuart agreed): —

If I were the Commanding Officer and had had the chance to select the men and know them individually—see that they were all right—I would not have worried very much whether they had completed the basic training or not, because character is the thing we lay most stress on, and, if they were people who were suitable in my judgment to incorporate in the battalion, I would have been perfectly happy to have had them. . . . I would not have worried from the point of view of military efficiency one iota, because, if they are the right type of men, even on the voyage over I would have completed their individual training.

I accept this evidence of Generals McNaughton, Crerar and Stuart and of other officers to the like effect as of great weight in deciding upon the propriety of the steps taken to bring the force up to strength and to provide it with first reinforcements.

A considerable amount of evidence was directed to show the effect of adding to two well-trained battalions groups of lesser trained men numbering about six per cent of the strength of the two units. That evidence conclusively establishes that an efficient battalion is, and must be, capable of absorbing recruits, who have not fully completed their training, up to a much greater proportion of its strength than six per cent, without at all detracting from the efficiency of the battalion as a whole.

From the whole of the evidence (which is fully discussed in the Appendix) I have reached the conclusion that there was no unfairness either to the battalions, or to the expedition, as a whole, from the addition of this small percentage of men who had not fully completed the standard period of training at the time they were accepted by the battalion officers. Nor have I any doubt that these men who volunteered for the expedition in order to enter upon active service would be quickly absorbed into their new units, or that in accepting them there was not any unfairness to the men themselves; and I am satisfied that the acceptance of these men had no detrimental effect upon the efficiency of either battalion. I have found no dereliction of duty or error in judgment in connection with the additions made to the strength of the two units.

In the course of my examination of the evidence I found that the inclusion of this small percentage of men was not the result of any shortage of fully trained men in Canada. It arose from the necessity of obtaining the men with great speed and secrecy and the impracticability in the time available of selecting them from a larger number of training centres.

Four, of the general organization and dispatch of the force, apart from the subject of mechanical transport. The facts are stated in the Appendix and they require no comment here.

Five, of mechanical transport. With regard to the mechanical transport of the force, consisting of 212 vehicles, the troopship, the *Awatea*, provided by the British authorities had not sufficient cargo space to take them. The War Office was most anxious that the troops should go on this ship, as another opportunity to sail was not likely to occur for two months. Shortly before the expedition sailed, space for the vehicles unexpectedly became available in an American ship and that ship sailed with the vehicles on November 4, but did not reach its destination before the outbreak of hostilities, as she was diverted by the United States naval authorities. Had she been allowed to follow her normal route, she would have reached Hong Kong before the Japanese attack opened. This miscarriage was not in any way due to any fault, or mistake, of any officer of the Canadian forces, or of any official of the Canadian Government.

There was a small amount of free cargo space in the ship carrying the force and some twenty vehicles were sent to Vancouver to fill it. These, however, did not arrive before the ship sailed. Had more energy and initiative been shown by the Quartermaster General's Branch, charged with the movement of the equipment for the force, the availability of this space would have been ascertained earlier and the vehicles would have arrived in time for loading on October 24; and there is, in my opinion, no good reason for thinking that, had they arrived at that time, they would not have been taken on board. There is no evidence, however, that the troops suffered through the lack of them, or that they were not supplied at Hong Kong. The facts are fully examined in the Appendix.

After an exhaustive inquiry at the hearings and a lengthy study of the evidence in the Appendix of this Report, I am able to add a general conclusion about the Hong Kong expedition as a whole.

In October, 1941, the Canadian military authorities undertook a task of considerable difficulty. Subject only to my observation concerning twenty of the two hundred and twelve vehicles of the mechanical transport, they performed that task well. Canada sent forward, in response to the British request, an expedition that was well-trained and (subject as aforesaid, in so far as shipping facilities allowed) well provided with equipment. In spite of the disaster that overtook it soon after its arrival in Hong Kong, it was an expedition of which Canada can and should be proud.

The war came upon us when we were unprepared for it. In such circumstances, recalling military history, one would perhaps not be greatly surprised to discover that even two years after its commencement some military enterprise had been undertaken which had proved to be ill-conceived, or badly managed. The Hong Kong expedition falls under neither description.

All of which is most humbly submitted by

Your Excellency's most humble obedient servant,

(Sgd.) L. P. DUFF.

His Excellency
The Governor General in Council,
Ottawa.

OTTAWA, June 4, 1942.

Copy

P.C. 1160

AT THE GOVERNMENT HOUSE AT OTTAWA

THURSDAY, the 12th day of February, 1942.

PRESENT:

HIS EXCELLENCY

THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL:

Whereas at the request of the Government of the United Kingdom a Canadian Expeditionary Force was dispatched to the Crown Colony of Hong Kong;

And Whereas the Prime Minister reports that in his opinion it now seems expedient in the public interest that a full, complete and impartial inquiry be made into the circumstances surrounding the dispatch of the said force from Canada.

Now, Therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, the Prime Minister, is pleased to appoint and doth hereby appoint the Right Honourable Sir Lyman Poore Duff, P.C., G.C.M.G., Chief Justice of Canada, a Commissioner under Part 1 of the Inquiries Act, Chapter 99 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927, to enquire into and report upon the organization, authorization and dispatch of the Canadian Expeditionary Force and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, the selection and composition of the Force and the training of the personnel thereof; the provision and maintenance of supplies, equipment and ammunition and of the transportation therefor; and as to whether there occurred any dereliction of duty or error in judgment on the part of any of the personnel of any of the departments of the Government whose duty it was to arrange for the authorization, organization and dispatch of the said Expeditionary Force resulting in detriment or injury to the expedition or to the troops comprising the Expeditionary Force and if so what such dereliction or error was and who was responsible therefor.

His Excellency in Council, on the same recommendation and under and by virtue of the powers vested in the Governor in Council by the War Measures Act, Chapter 206 of the Revised Statutes of Canada 1927, is further pleased to order and doth hereby order that section 13 of the said Inquiries Act shall have no application to the conduct of the proceedings herein.

His Excellency in Council is further pleased, hereby, to authorize the Commissioner to engage the services of such counsel and of such technical officers or other experienced clerks, reporters and assistants as he may deem necessary and advisable.

A. D. P. HEENEY,
Clerk of the Privy Council.

APPENDIX

In the Report proper I have set forth my principal conclusions on the matters referred to me by the Order of His Excellency the Governor General in Council, P.C. 1160. A full statement of the facts and a full discussion of the evidence and conclusions appear in the following Appendix to my Report.

This is the Appendix to my Report, made pursuant to the order of His Excellency, the Governor General in Council, P.C. 1160.

OTTAWA, June 4, 1942.

SECTION I.—INTRODUCTION

It should be noticed at the outset that the inquiry as defined by the Order in Council does not embrace within its scope all matters which may have had some connection with the military defeat at Hong Kong. My duty is to determine whether there occurred any dereliction of duty or error in judgment "on the part of any of the personnel or of any of the departments of the Government whose duty it was to arrange for the authorization, organization and dispatch of the Expeditionary Force" and whether, if such dereliction or error occurred, there resulted detriment or injury to the expedition or the troops comprising it. We do not know the whole story of the defeat at Hong Kong, or the causes of it. It is not within my province to consider the adequacy of the preparations of the United Nations in the Pacific late in 1941. This inquiry is concerned solely with the decisions and the acts of Canadian statesmen and military and administrative officers who were responsible for the authorization, organization and despatch of the Canadian expedition to Hong Kong.

Unhappily, as a result of the Japanese attack, the Hong Kong Expeditionary Force suffered disaster. That attack began on December 8th and continued until the surrender of the garrison on December 25. In resisting attack, Canadian soldiers were killed and wounded; in the surrender, the rest of the Canadian force became prisoners of war. No detailed and complete lists of casualties and prisoners have yet been received by the Department of National Defence. Certain information was contained in a message from the Canadian Minister for the Argentine, dated February 24, 1942, which states that the Japanese Government officially communicates that 1,689 Canadians were taken prisoners of war at Hong Kong. As the expedition comprised 1,985 officers and men, it would appear that 296 members of the force were killed or are missing.

The Order in Council directed me to engage the services of such counsel as I might deem necessary and advisable. I appointed Mr. R. L. Kellock, K.C., and Mr. R. M. Fowler to act as Counsel for the Commission, with instructions to prepare and present all evidence relevant to the matters under investigation. I also invited the Government of Canada and the Hon. R. B. Hanson, K.C., the Leader of His Majesty's Opposition, to nominate counsel to assist in the inquiry. On the nomination of the Government I appointed, as counsel for the Commission, Mr. Geo. A. Campbell, K.C., and Mr. Geo. A. Drew, K.C., on the nomination of Mr. Hanson. In this way, I had at the hearings the benefit of examination and cross-examination of witnesses and the presentation in argument before me of divergent opinions and points of view.

I appointed Mr. W. Kenneth Campbell as Secretary of the Commission, and secured the services of excellent reporters who provided with speed and accuracy daily copy of the evidence for my use and the use of counsel.

While I have had, as I have stated, the advantage of the presence of Mr. Geo. A. Campbell, K.C., whose duty it was to call attention to aspects of the facts and evidence from the point of view of the Government, and of Mr. Geo. A. Drew, K.C., whose duty it was to present the point of view of the Hon. R. B. Hanson, K.C., who asked for a Parliamentary investigation, nevertheless, the responsibility for the conduct of the inquiry rested upon myself and these gentlemen were present merely to assist me. Counsel for the Commission, therefore, felt it their duty, as it was their duty, to probe in every direction for the purpose of getting the facts; and in this process a mass of oral evidence and of documents was placed before me. This resulted in lengthy hearings, but it was unavoidable and indispensable to a thorough investigation.

It was obvious from the outset, having regard to the subject matter of the inquiry and the nature of the evidence that would be adduced, that the public could not be admitted to the hearings of the Commission.

Because of the fact that the hearings were held in camera, the evidence adduced is stated with greater particularity than otherwise would have been necessary.

In this connection it should be stated that certain secret messages passing between His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and His Majesty's Government in Canada were disclosed to me with the consent of the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in Great Britain. This consent was given at the request of the Government of Canada. The Government of the United Kingdom has not consented to publication of any of these messages.

The hearing of the evidence occupied twenty-two days between March 2 and March 31, 1941, while the evidence of General Crerar was placed before myself and counsel on April 13. During the hearing, General Crerar was in England and I was advised by General McNaughton that his presence there was from a military point of view indispensable. Accordingly, he did not attend before the Commission to testify, but gave evidence in answer to a series of questions addressed to him. The evidence extended to 2,288 typewritten pages and 300 exhibits were filed. It was agreed for the convenience of counsel that argument should be presented in writing. I had originally fixed April 20 as the date for the filing of the opening written argument. Owing to the illness of counsel, this time had to be extended and the written arguments were actually presented on the 18th of May, and the final oral argument was heard on the 22nd of May. The commencement of the hearings was delayed for the same reason.

SECTION II.—AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXPEDITION

It was the receipt of a telegram, dated September 19, 1941, from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, which first presented to the Government of Canada for its consideration as a military measure the dispatch of an expeditionary force to the Far East. The telegram invited the Canadian Government to send two battalions of infantry as reinforcements for the garrison at Hong Kong.

This telegram came before the War Committee of the Cabinet on September 23, 1941. The Minister of National Defence, Hon. J. L. Ralston, was in Los Angeles at the time, and the Associate Minister, Hon. C. G. Power, was Acting Minister. On September 23, the War Committee, upon the recommendation of the Acting Minister, decided that the proposal of the Government of the United Kingdom should be accepted, subject to consultation with Colonel Ralston and the Chief of the General Staff. It should, perhaps, be stated that the evidence of what took place at meetings of the War Committee of the Cabinet was given by Ministers of the Crown after they had first obtained from His Excellency the Governor General permission to testify concerning matters within their oaths of secrecy as members of the Privy Council for Canada.

The telegram was put before Colonel Ralston in Los Angeles on September 24, by Major Drury, the Assistant Military Attache at Washington, who presented him with an aide memoire from Colonel Gibson, in which it was stated, referring to the telegram of September 19:—

- (a) To this important proposal, the C.G.S. (Chief of the General Staff, General Crerar) sees no objection, if the Minister approves.
- (b) The War Committee of Cabinet are quite prepared to accept the proposal but want the reaction of the Minister.
- (c) If the Minister desires more time for consideration the Committee are not pressing for an immediate answer.

Colonel Ralston telephoned that evening to General Crerar and during the conversation General Crerar, according to a memorandum made by him at the time, informed the Minister "that I had definitely recommended that the Canadian Army should take this on." General Crerar's memorandum proceeds:—

He said that on that basis he approved, in principle, acceptance by Canada of the responsibility.

Colonel Ralston's recollection agrees with this record of the conversation between himself and General Crerar. Colonel Ralston discussed the subject with the Hon. C. D. Howe, who was with him on holiday in Los Angeles.

On September 29 the Associate Minister, Major Power, advised the Government of the United Kingdom of the Canadian Government's acceptance of its proposal in the telegram of the 19th.

The matters falling within the scope of this investigation were initiated, so to speak, by this telegram, which outlines the principal reasons prompting the request of the Government of the United Kingdom and some of the most important considerations upon which the Canadian Government acted in acceding to it.

I was unable to obtain the consent of the Government of the United Kingdom to the publication of this telegram.

Before the receipt of this telegram, in July or August, General Crerar, the Chief of the General Staff, had met the General-Officer-Commanding at Hong Kong, Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Grasett, who was in Canada,

and had discussed with him at large the situation there. General Crerar was, in consequence, already aware, when the telegram of September 19, was received, that in the opinion of that officer the reinforcement of the garrison by two battalions would enable them to hold Hong Kong for an extended period against any force the Japanese could bring to bear in an attack. I quote General Crerar's words:—

So far as general military situation at Hong Kong and prospective problem of its defence against attack were concerned, I had had long discussions in Ottawa, in July or August, 1941, with Major-General Grasett, who was passing through Canada on returning to the United Kingdom and who, until that time, had been Commander-in-Chief, China Command (Hong Kong). Major-General Grasett had filled the appointment of Commander-in-Chief at Hong Kong for some two years, and until his departure for the United Kingdom had been responsible for the organization of the defences. In his verbal appreciation of the military situation confronting the Hong Kong garrison in the event of war with Japan, Major-General Grasett informed me during our conversation that the addition of two or more battalions to the forces then at Hong Kong would render the garrison strong enough to withstand for an extensive period of siege an attack by such forces as the Japanese could bring to bear against it.

General Crerar proceeds:—

It is evident that Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Grasett presented the same views to the War Office and to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on his return to London, that this appreciation of the situation at Hong Kong, with the need for two additional battalions, was accepted in London and that the request to Canada for the provision of these additional troops immediately followed.

It was with minds actuated by a deep sense of the obligations of Canada in relation to the common cause that the members of the War Committee (The Prime Minister, Hon. T. A. Crerar, Major Power, Mr. Macdonald), as well as the Chief of the General Staff, gave their attention to the proposal of the British Government; and the evidence of Colonel Ralston, Major Power and Mr. Macdonald shows explicitly that to them, and to the War Committee as a whole, the proposal summarizes what they regarded as reasons of great weight which, taken together with the broader considerations that are mentioned by them in their evidence, dictated an affirmative answer. They all had in mind, to use Colonel Ralston's phrase, that "it seemed as if it was Canada's turn to help." Colonel Ralston says:—

That is to say, Australia had been doing a great deal in Libya and elsewhere; the New Zealanders had been in Crete; and the South Africans had been in Abyssinia. I am not sure whether I knew that the Australians had gone to Singapore or not. Then the United States had strengthened their garrisons in the Philippines and that also influenced us in connection with it.

Major Power says, referring to his consultation with General Crerar:—

And I do not think there was ever any question really or any discussion as between General Crerar and myself as to any reason why we should not take it on. It struck me as being the only thing to do, and I suppose it struck General Crerar that way too; at least I took it for granted that it did.

And again:—

Well, I thought the United Kingdom authorities had made a pretty good case in their cable and I thought their argument was pretty strong and there was not very much to be said about it. I do not know that I

need go over it, except that I should say this, that what did influence me to some extent was: Here were our partners in a great enterprise in the war, saying: 'If you have any men to spare we would be glad to have them'; and in my opinion we had certain unallotted battalions in Canada which could be spared, and I did not see any reason why they should not have them.

Mr. Macdonald says:—

I might put it this way, my Lord. I do not think anyone would contemplate in the circumstances of the time a negative answer to the request. I do not think it was thinkable for this country to offer a negative answer to the request of the United Kingdom.

Colonel Ralston explains the specific impression made upon his mind by the reading of the telegram:—

I, of course, went over the telegram carefully which was really the basis of the proposal and contained many of the factors which it seemed to me would influence us in acting on it. I noted also that 'The Chief of the General Staff sees no objection if the Minister approves'; and I noted that my colleagues of the War Committee of the Cabinet were prepared to accede to the proposal but would like my reaction I appreciated my colleagues showing me the courtesy of referring the matter to me, and took it immediately into consideration. After reading the telegram I did feel it was a matter that justified attention at once. I noted that they suggested that I should have more time, if I desired, but it seemed to me that the implications of the telegram were that the sooner this matter was decided perhaps the better, having regard to the situation which the expedition was purporting to deal with, and I immediately took it into consideration. . . . Without labouring it, the considerations set out in the telegram were very largely the factors which influenced me in connection with it. . . . I had at the end of the consideration of the telegram this in mind, that the furnishing of one or two battalions would do a great deal more than a force of that size would usually do. It seemed to me from what I knew generally that above all things we needed time, and I had very definitely in my mind, rightly or wrongly, that if Japan did come into the war the United States would be in, too; and I had it definitely in my mind that the United States were none too ready to come in, and anything which would either defer or deter Japan from coming in would be highly desirable from our point of view It seemed to me that we had an opportunity to make a contribution, perhaps not large in numbers but certainly effective in its results, which we should not disregard."

Mr. Macdonald says:—

We were influenced largely by the statements set out in the cable, which were merely a confirmation or repetition, to a very large extent, at any rate, of matters which we were already aware of. We knew, for instance, that it was the desire of the Americans to gain as much time as possible before there should be an outbreak of war with Japan. I knew that the Naval position in the Far East was likely to be strengthened, or was in the process of being strengthened at that time.

Q. Likely to be strengthened?—A. A. Likely to be and perhaps even at that time was in the process of being strengthened.

Q. Was in the course of being strengthened?—A. Yes, at that time.

Q. Yes.—A. We knew that a good deal of stress was laid in all dealings with Japan on the element of a show of strength, and, generally, I think all matters set out in the cable had already been within our knowl-

edge; and on these considerations which are summarized and repeated in the cable, we came to the conclusion that we should accede to the suggestion of the United Kingdom authorities.

Q. And that was the basis of the decision made, was it?—A. That was a large element, I think; a large element in prompting us to come to the decision; that, and the desire to be of help to the common cause wherever we felt we could be of help.

The Canadian Government, having no sources of its own of military information in the Far East, naturally and necessarily relied upon the Government of the United Kingdom for advice as to the military and diplomatic situation there. In September and October, 1941, it was the accepted view, both in England and in Canada, that war with Japan was not imminent, although it was recognized that, to use the words of Major Power, "if war broke out with Japan the Canadian forces in Hong Kong would be in a very difficult position."

Mr. Drew urged that from the report of Mr. Justice Roberts touching the occurrences at Pearl Harbour, it is evident the American Government in October had in its possession information pointing unequivocally to an early outbreak of hostilities with Japan, and he argued that such information ought to have been in the possession of the Canadian Government. The evidence establishes in point of fact that the Canadian Government had no such information. I repeat that the Canadian Government relied and necessarily relied upon the British Government for confidential information as to the military situation in the Far East.

General Crerar says:—

Information at my disposal during latter part of September, 1941, indicated that outbreak of hostilities with Japan was not imminent and that time would, in all probability, be available to carry out intensive, adequate and possibly extensive training of Canadian forces at Hong Kong after their arrival.

General Stuart (now Chief of the General Staff) says:—

"Q. And you say that is quite a different situation than existed in September and October?—A. That was an entirely different situation. It must be remembered that at the time of the inception of this force we were at peace with Japan; we had no information from London, official information, or from any other source to the effect that war with Japan was imminent. In fact, we had been explicitly informed that the situation had improved.

* * * * *

Q. Did you keep in touch with the situation from September 19 until the despatch of the force, I mean the Hong Kong situation and the Pacific situation?—A. Yes, and there were no wires received by us during that period from the United Kingdom that indicated any change in the situation. The last wire got before the force sailed was on October 26.

The telegram of October 26 mentioned by General Stuart contains the following:—"Consensus opinion that war in Far East unlikely at present."

There were, moreover, solid military grounds for a conclusion that even in the event of hostilities the situation of the expeditionary force would not be a hopeless one. The discussion of the military situation at Hong Kong between General Crerar and General Grasett in the late summer of 1941 has already been mentioned. In the third week of September the information thus gained by General Crerar as to the actual military situation in Hong Kong was, excepting the information conveyed in the telegram of September 19, the latest and most authoritative information on that subject available. It was

confidently expected that, in the event of war, the British Commonwealth would have both the United States and China as active allies. The American Pacific fleet was concentrated at Honolulu and British naval forces in the Far East had recently been strengthened by the addition of the battleships the "Prince of Wales" and the "Repulse". Japanese forces operating along the Chinese coast adjacent to Hong Kong were constantly harassed by Chinese troops. In the event of a Japanese attack on Hong Kong it was considered reasonable to expect that the garrison could be relieved or evacuated from the sea by use of combined British and American naval forces. It was also not unreasonable to expect some assistance from the landward side by the Chinese forces. A telegram from Canadian military headquarters in London, dated October 26, 1941, stated that the Chinese Government had undertaken to attack the Japanese in the rear of Canton if the Japanese attacked Hong Kong, and were prepared to use ten divisions for this effort. Canadian troops would not, therefore, be placed beyond any possible hope of succour. The losses subsequently suffered by the American fleet at Pearl Harbour on December 7, and the loss of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse* on December 8 radically altered the situation and gave to the Japanese, for the time being, command of the China seas. The possibility of early relief or evacuation of Hong Kong by sea disappeared.

But these events of December cannot, of course, invalidate the grounds of the decision of the Canadian Government in September to accept a share of the responsibility for strengthening the garrisons of the Pacific, as Australia had accepted a share in strengthening the forces at Singapore: that the despatch to Hong Kong of a reinforcement of one or two battalions would increase the strength of the garrison out of all proportion to the numbers of the reinforcements; that it would have a powerful moral influence on the whole of the Far East and thereby might have a sensible effect in maintaining peace; would reassure the Chinese as to the British intention to hold Hong Kong; would give fresh evidence of the solidarity of the British Commonwealth; that to gain time was all important.

There was a good deal of discussion at the hearings touching political changes in Japan which occurred a little more than a week before the expedition sailed. On October 16, Matsuoka left office and Tojo became Premier. It was known that Tojo was sympathetic with the Axis Powers and there was an impression in Ottawa that his accession to power might increase the risk of war in the Pacific. However, shortly after the Japanese cabinet change information reached Ottawa to the effect that the Japanese policy of maintaining peace in the Pacific was likely to be maintained. This view was confirmed on October 26, the day before the expedition sailed, in the message from Canadian Military Headquarters in London already quoted. These expectations were falsified by the events of December, but the messages would tend to quiet any apprehension that might have arisen. I am satisfied that nothing occurred between September 29 and October 27 that would have furnished any cogent reason for the withdrawal by Canada of the responsibility she had accepted.

Some communications between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United Kingdom were placed in my hands for my personal perusal. I am at liberty to say that there is nothing in these communications which in my opinion invalidates this view.

It was urged by Mr. Drew that the change of Government in Japan on October 16 ought to have led the Canadian Government to reconsider its decision. I am satisfied that the Canadian Government did not overlook the significance of events in Japan and that they acted under the conviction that, having regard to the situation as they were acquainted with it, there was nothing in these events which would justify a departure from the course they had decided upon.

It is, moreover, apparent that the considerations which in September actuated the decision to send the expedition continued to operate with equal,

and possibly increased, force up to the moment the expedition sailed on October 27. A telegram from the War Office in England to National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, dated October 30, 1941, which, by the consent of the War Office, I am enabled to publish, reads as follows:—

We are very grateful to you for despatching your contingent to Hong Kong at such short notice. We fully realize the difficulties of mobilization and of distance which have had to be overcome. The moral effect of their arrival in November will be much greater than it would have been two months later.

The rapidity with which events proceeded in the closing months of the year 1941 must not be overlooked in assessing the responsibilities of statesmen and soldiers in respect of measures taken in the light of information available in September and October, and with reference to the probabilities as suggested by such information. Statesmen and soldiers can properly be held accountable for a reasonably capable practical judgment as to such probabilities, but not on the assumption that they must have had anterior knowledge of subsequent events.

Thus, after examining all the evidence bearing on the question of the authorization of the expedition, I can find no dereliction of duty or error in judgment either on the part of the Government of Canada or of its military advisers, in the decision to accept the proposal of the United Kingdom to send a Canadian force to Hong Kong, and the despatch of the force pursuant to that decision.

SECTION III—SELECTION OF THE BATTALIONS FOR THE EXPEDITION

The Government of Canada having decided to comply with the request of the United Kingdom, it became necessary to select the units that should comprise the expeditionary force, which was officially known as Force "C". This selection was made in accordance with the recommendation of the Chief of the General Staff, General Crerar, on September 30, 1941, which received the approval of the Minister of National Defence on October 9. General Crerar recommended the designation of the Royal Rifles of Canada, from Quebec, and the Winnipeg Grenadiers, from Manitoba. General Crerar accepted the sole responsibility for advising the Government in respect of this recommendation, although his conclusion was reached after full discussion with officers of the General Staff, the General-Officer-Commanding the 4th Division, and with other officers. He says that the reasons upon which he acted were those given by him in the document in which he presented his recommendation to the Minister. I reproduce this document textually.

It should be stated that there were at the time in Canada 26 battalions of infantry. These battalions had been mobilized at different times and had reached various stages of training. Nine of them constituted the 4th Division of the Canadian Active Army which was destined for service in Great Britain—had been "earmarked" for service in the Canadian Corps, to use the expression of General McNaughton.

General Crerar's recommendation is as follows:—

Sept. 30, 1941.

The Minister

1. Pursuant to the recent decision of the Government to despatch two rifle battalions to Hong Kong, I have given consideration to the selection of the units for this duty.

2. As these units are going to a distant and important garrison where they will be detached from other Canadian forces, a primary consideration is that they should be efficient, well-trained battalions, capable of upholding the credit of the Dominion in any circumstances.

3. Further, in order to adhere to the principle of territorial representation, I consider it most desirable that one unit should come from Western Canada and the other from Eastern Canada.

4. It would be possible to choose two battalions from the 4th Division which would meet the above requirements. But I do not recommend this course. The 4th Division has been constituted as a formation for some considerable time. On purely military grounds it would be unsound to disrupt it, if this can be avoided.

5. Further, I feel that anything which might be construed in the minds of the public, or in the Army itself, as the beginning of a break-up of this division would be certain to have an adverse reaction. I may add that these are also the views of the G.O.C. 4th Division.

6. Therefore, I consider the selection of units for Hong Kong should be made from those not forming part of the order-of-battle of the 4th Division.

7. This leaves for consideration the Infantry (Rifle) Battalions now responsible for coast defence and those forming the three Brigades of the 6th Division, certain of which latter are only now mobilizing, are not trained and must, therefore, be ruled out.

8. While I do not recommend that the total number of Infantry Battalions now allocated to coast defence duties should be reduced, it will be satisfactory, from both the operational and training points of view, if the responsibilities of two of these coast defence battalions were to be undertaken, successively, by infantry units from the 4th Division and the Brigade Groups of the 6th Division. This would reduce the number of battalions now held in general (mobile) reserve from 13 battalions (4th Division plus one Infantry Brigade of 6th Division) to 11 battalions, but this number, in my opinion, should be ample to meet any contingency which may arise in Canada within the next six or more months.

9. After examining the problem from various aspects, I have come to the conclusion that the most suitable selections from amongst the battalions now on coast defence or in the 3 Infantry Brigade Groups of the 6th Division would be:—

(a) The Royal Rifles of Canada—Quebec

(b) The Winnipeg Grenadiers—Winnipeg

10. As you know, these units returned not long ago from duty in Newfoundland and the West Indies respectively. The duties which they there carried out were not in many respects unlike the task which awaits the units to be sent to Hong Kong. The experience they have had will therefore be of no small value to them in their new role. Both are units of proven efficiency.

11. In my opinion, the balance of argument favours the selection of these two battalions. I would be very reluctant to allot them indefinitely to a home defence role as the effect on their morale, following a period of "semi-overseas" responsibilities would be bound to be adverse. The selection represents both Eastern and Western Canada. In the case of the Royal Rifles, there is also the fact that this battalion, while nominally English-speaking, is actually drawn from a region overwhelmingly French-speaking in character and contains an important proportion of Canadians of French descent.

12. I have spoken to the Adjutant-General and there are no administrative difficulties which should prevent the early movement of these two battalions.

(Sgd.) H.D.G.C.

Major-General,
C.G.S.

It is convenient to quote here from the evidence given by General Crerar:—

In the light of situation in the Far East obtaining at that time, I selected those particular battalions for the reason stated in my memorandum dated September 30th.

And further:—

I have already referred to training and service which these two units had undergone, and in their cases it was a few weeks refresher only which was indicated.

General Crerar was better qualified than anyone else to advise the Government in respect to the composition of Force "C". He had at his command all available sources of information as to the history, the training, and the character of all ranks of the battalions available. He had complete knowledge of the claims (and their relative value) arising out of the necessities of home defence and commitments overseas. He fully understood the military considerations affecting the relative importance, for example, of maintaining and strengthening our forces in Great Britain and maintaining sufficient reserves for them. It is clear from the evidence of General McNaughton that he would

have opposed, on military grounds, of course, with the utmost of his influence, any withdrawal, for the expedition to Hong Kong, of any of the battalions already "earmarked" for the Canadian Corps in Great Britain. It would be the duty of the Chief of the General Staff to weigh all the considerations affecting the advisability of taking any unit from the 4th Division. Nobody was in a better position to weigh such considerations. No one could be better capable for forming an estimate of the effect of any given choice upon the morale of the army as a whole, or of any particular part of it. While war with Japan was not, he thought, imminent, he realized that it was a contingency which must be taken into account. He had, as we have seen, recent and authoritative information respecting the situation in Hong Kong. In these circumstances he said in his recommendation:—

2. As these units are going to a distant and important garrison where they will be detached from any other Canadian forces, a primary consideration is that they should be efficient, well-trained battalions, capable of upholding the credit of the Dominion in any circumstances.

* * *

10. As you know, these units returned not long ago from duty in Newfoundland and the West Indies respectively. The duties which they there carried out were not in many respects unlike the task which awaits the units to be sent to Hong Kong. The experience they have had will therefore be of no small value to them in their new role. Both are units of proven efficiency.

The Minister of National Defence received this recommendation from General Crerar and discussed it with him. Colonel Ralston stated in evidence that he discussed only one point with General Crerar. As all units are anxious to have an opportunity to serve outside Canada, and as the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers had already had assignments to Newfoundland and the West Indies, respectively, he asked for the opinion of General Crerar whether the selection of these two battalions for a second turn of overseas duty would give other units in Canada a feeling that there was discrimination against them and in favour of these two battalions. General Crerar thought, Colonel Ralston says, that there were two sides to this question and "that these units, having done duty abroad and having served well, were entitled to have this assignment, and that it would make for the morale of the army that it be given to them rather than that other units be selected and these two units re-assigned to coast defence duty in Canada". The Minister of National Defence gave his approval to the selection made by the Chief of the General Staff. I am quite unable to understand on what principle the Minister of National Defence is chargeable with error in judgment in acting on the recommendation of the Chief of the General Staff. I can perceive no ground upon which the propriety of his decision to accept the advice of his professional adviser can be justly criticized.

It is not without interest to mention that, in discussing the selection of these units with Colonel (now Brigadier) Macklin, of the General Staff, before the formal recommendation was made, General Crerar observed to Colonel Macklin, with regard to them, "they have been half-way to the war already".

It is well to emphasize that General Crerar laid it down as the fundamental condition of the selection of the units for this force that "they should be efficient, well-trained battalions, capable of upholding the credit of the Dominion in any circumstances"; and his decision that they fulfilled that condition is the basis of his recommendation. General Crerar was not merely giving an opinion; he was deciding upon a matter of fact, which it was his duty as Chief of the General Staff to decide, for the purpose of making recommendation concerning the composition of this force, upon which he expected the

Minister to act and, in the result, knew he was acting. Having regard to General Crerar's special knowledge of all the considerations to be taken into account, and his special qualifications for forming a judgment thereon, there is a most powerful presumption in favour of the correctness of his determination given in good faith and in the course of duty, to which it would be proper to give effect in the absence of clear evidence of error. It is, however, as I conceive it, my duty to examine the question of the propriety of the selections and to consider the oral evidence and the documents produced.

I proceed, as required by the Order in Council, to examine in detail the history, composition and training of the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers. A very large part of the evidence was directed to this subject. Much of the best evidence was not available, as the officers and men were all, unhappily, lost at Hong Kong. We are fortunately, however, in the position of having sources of information which enable us to pronounce upon these matters with confidence. There are the written records of the personnel and their training, the reports of Inspectors-General, the evidence of officers who had served with them and of others who had enjoyed opportunities of observing them in the course of military duty. As regards the Royal Rifles, we have the evidence of Brigadier Earnshaw, of Lieutenant-Colonel Berteau, and of Lieutenant-Colonel Lamb, all of whom speak of this battalion from first hand intimate knowledge. I shall refer to the testimony of General Crerar himself who inspected the unit in the autumn of 1940 and the early summer of 1941, and from personal inspection formed his own opinion of it.

As regards the Winnipeg Grenadiers, we have the evidence of Brigadier Kay, who commanded the battalion from its mobilization in 1939 until June, 1941. There is the evidence of Brigadier Riley, the D.O.C. M.D. 10, and of Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, as well as the evidence of General Browne. There is, further, the appreciation of General Crerar derived not only from an examination of the training reports but also from a full and "detailed" report to him upon the regiment by Brigadier Kay.

Before discussing the battalions in detail, it seems desirable to make a few general remarks on the subject of military training in Canada. General supervision of military training in the Canadian army is vested in the Directorate of Military Training at National Defence Headquarters. In September and October, 1941, Colonel J. K. Lawson was Director of Military Training until his appointment to command the expedition to Hong Kong with the rank of Brigadier. His chief assistant in the Directorate was Lieutenant-Colonel Sparling, an officer who has served at Headquarters in Ottawa and with the Second Division in England during the present war.

When an infantry battalion is mobilized, it proceeds to train as a unit. The officers of the battalion, directly and through their non-commissioned officers, train the men under their command with the assistance of training pamphlets and syllabi issued by National Defence Headquarters. Training memoranda are issued to all officers each month to supplement the training pamphlets and keep them up to date. Cadres of officers, warrant officers, and N.C.O.'s are first given refresher courses and guidance in the instruction of their men. These officers and N.C.O.'s are then assigned to sub-units and are charged with the instruction of the enlisted personnel within those sub-units. The first period of training for the enlisted infantryman is mainly individual training designed to prepare a soldier to take his place in a platoon or other unit, and embraces such subjects as drill, physical training, first aid, marching, the mechanism, use and care of the various weapons provided for infantry units, field-craft, map reading, protection against gas, etc., etc., etc. By systematic and concentrated training the subjects laid down in the syllabi for this course should be completed in a period of sixteen weeks. During this period the men are organized in sections and are trained in section operations and individually at

the same time. Training then proceeds at the platoon level for six weeks and includes platoon operations in daylight and darkness, both of attack and defence. The welding of several platoons into a company follows and the prescribed training of a company as such extends over four weeks. A further period of four weeks is laid down for the training of the battalion as a unit. During the entire period of collective training it is sought to give the battalion training in co-operation with other arms, although the extent of such co-operative training must, of course, depend upon the available opportunities for exercise with other units. The total period prescribed for individual and collective training up to and including training at the battalion level is thus thirty weeks. The working of this prescribed program in practice and the results attained must depend on various factors, such as the skill and experience of the officers, the availability of weapons for training purposes and the nature and extent of the duties assigned to the unit during its training periods.

When a battalion is placed in a division, either in Canada or in England, an establishment for that battalion is created in one of the Training Centres. These Training Centres receive the recruits called out for training under the National Resources Mobilization Act and may also receive men who have enlisted for active service with a unit already mobilized. Each man who enlists for active service in the Canadian army becomes on enlistment a member of a unit that has been mobilized. When a recruit enlists for active service in a unit that is still in the process of recruiting and below its war establishment, he immediately joins his unit and receives his training with it. When a recruit enlists for active service with a unit that is already recruited to its full establishment, as a rule he proceeds to a Basic Training Centre and thence to an Advanced Training Centre for his individual training. On completion of his individual training, he is sent in a draft of reinforcements to his unit wherever it may then be stationed. Courses of training at the Basic and Advanced Training Centres are prescribed to cover items of individual training similar to those laid down and already described for the training of a battalion. The syllabus of training for a Basic Training Centre is designed to be completed in eight weeks and that for an Advanced Training Centre in a further period of eight weeks. The periods as prescribed are not, however, rigidly adhered to. An individual soldier may, because of illness or other delays, require longer than eight weeks to complete his training at either of the Training Centres. On the other hand, periods of training may be shortened where the recruit has had service with the reserve army, or with other armed forces.

As to the training of recruits in the Royal Rifles, Lt.-Col. Lamb says:—

Q. What training did they get?—A. The procedure in the regiment was this: When replacements arrived, irrespective of what training they ever had or where they came from, they were put into what we call a recruit squad. This squad was under supervision, apart from the C.O., of the Adjutant and one junior officer and the Regimental Sergeant Major for training, and they carried out a period of six weeks' intensive training, being relieved from all duties during that period. After that six weeks' period they were posted to their respective companies.

Q. In that six weeks' period—you are familiar with this basic training course?—A. No, I am not; we do not get that in the army.

Q. You are not familiar with it at all?—A. No.

Q. Then you cannot say to what extent the recruits in that six weeks' course had covered the ground set out in Exhibit No. 95?—A. Yes.

Q. You can?—A. Yes, I can, by comparison, because I have seen men who have had anything from four weeks' to six weeks' training in the Basic Training Centre, and I would like to say that one week or two at the most of the training these men got in our own recruit squad would be equivalent to four or six weeks' training at the Basic Training Centres.

A general rule has been in force since August 18, 1940, relating to the sending of reinforcements to units overseas. This rule requires the District Officer Commanding to "ensure that reinforcements from C.A.S.F. Training Centres are not sent overseas unless they have completed the full period of training laid down, without obtaining prior authority from N.D.H.Q." In practice the exigencies of shipping and other considerations have at times made it necessary to authorize the despatch of reinforcements overseas before the prescribed training has been completed. The particular application of the above rule to the Hong Kong force will be examined at a later stage in this Appendix.

Another matter of general procedure should be mentioned. When a battalion has been moved from its district of origin to perform coast defence duties in Canada, or garrison duties in Newfoundland or the West Indies, it may happen that it has not been posted to one of the Canadian divisions. Such a non-divisional unit has no establishment in any of the training centres from which drafts of replacements can be supplied. In such a case the unit, on leaving its own district, leaves behind at the district depot a recruiting wing. Men are enlisted in the battalion by this recruiting wing and are sent on to the unit from time to time. Certain forms of elementary training may be given at the district depot but this varies with the weapons that may be available in particular districts.

Some evidence was given as to the relative merits of the training received in Training Centres and that received by a trainee with his unit. Training in the Training Centres has some advantages; it can be planned on regular lines, can be more easily supervised and recorded, and can proceed with fewer interruptions from guard, fatigue and other duties. On the other hand, training with an organized unit with competent officers and non-commissioned officers is better calculated to develop in the soldier of any rank certain essential qualities. The individual training of the soldier in a battalion may proceed concurrently with the collective training of sections, platoons and companies. All ranks have an opportunity of knowing each other and from this knowledge acquiring mutual confidence against the time of encountering an enemy. Several of the officers who gave evidence spoke in emphatic terms of the supreme value of developing in all ranks the qualities of reciprocal loyalty and confidence and of a spirit of solidarity without which no battalion can reach the highest degree of efficiency as a fighting unit. Where a man trains only with his battalion, his training may be interrupted and delayed by the duties assigned to the battalion, but, where these duties involve the protection of important outposts—such as Newfoundland and the West Indies—against possible enemy attacks, the experience in performing such duties and the consciousness of possible exposure to enemy activities provide in themselves valuable training both for the individual and the unit. Referring to the experience of the Royal Rifles in Newfoundland, Lt.-Col. Lamb says:—

It was an unusual experience for training men, because we had quite a number of alarms and scares down there, and the men began to realize that anything might happen; they showed a keen interest in their work and it was easy to train them and a pleasure. They did up to 20-mile route marches, bivouacking two or three days away, when they did their own cooking and catering; and by the time we left Newfoundland at the end of August, 1941, I do not think I have seen a fitter bunch of men, taking them all round.

With these preliminary general remarks as to the military training in Canada, we may now consider the two battalions in question.

The Royal Rifles of Canada

The Royal Rifles of Canada were mobilized July 8, 1940, at Quebec. Before that the regiment was a reserve unit in the Non-Permanent Active Militia. After mobilization the unit trained in the Quebec district and at Sussex, N.B. In November and December, 1940, the battalion went to Newfoundland as part of the Island's garrison. It returned to Canada in two parties on August 18 and 28, 1941, and late in September, 1941, took up coast defence duties at St. John, N.B., where it remained until it was warned for duty with the expedition to Hong Kong on October 9, 1941.

The battalion was commanded throughout its active service by Lieutenant-Colonel W. J. Home, M.C., an experienced officer who served with distinction in the war of 1914-18 and afterwards in the Permanent Force, and had extensive experience in the training of troops in peace-time, as well as in war-time. The second-in-command, Major Price, is also an able, as well as an experienced officer. All but six of the officers who went to Hong Kong had been with the battalion since mobilization. General Crerar's testimony to his confidence in Colonel Home and Major Price, as well as in the other officers of the battalion, is quoted verbatim hereafter.

It was the settled practice in the battalion not to accept recruits unless they had been inspected and accepted by the officer commanding, or some officer delegated for that purpose by him.

Officers who had either served with the Royal Rifles, or under whose observation the battalion had come in the course of military duty, gave evidence as to its efficiency and training. The effect of their evidence can perhaps best be summarized by quoting from a report written by the Acting Officer Commanding at Quebec (Lieutenant-Colonel Berteau) on September 15, 1941, after the unit had returned from Newfoundland and before it was assigned to the Hong Kong force. The report strongly recommended that the Royal Rifles should be included in an overseas formation and stated that "the unit is one of the most efficient ever mobilized in this district, with a splendid type of men, excellent N.C.O's, and well-trained and most efficient officers".

The training of the battalion began shortly after mobilization. Probably because of the military experience of many of the officers and N.C.O's, the unit was quickly organized and made rapid progress through the earlier stages of training. Before leaving for Newfoundland its basic individual training had been completed. The training in Newfoundland is described in the written training reports on file at Ottawa and in the evidence of the Officer Commanding in Newfoundland in 1941 (Brigadier Earnshaw), but principally by Lt.-Col. Lamb, who commanded a company during the entire stay of the battalion in Newfoundland, with the exception of five weeks when he was taking a course at Kingston.

As was very clearly explained by Colonel Lamb, Canadian troops in Newfoundland are not engaged in mere guard duties; they are serving in a potential theatre of war and their training is more intensive and varied than that usually received in a training camp in Canada. On arrival in Newfoundland two companies of the battalion were assigned to duties at the Airport and two companies performed duties at the harbour and airplane base. At the Airport one company was engaged in manning the outposts; the other in training; the two companies taking these duties from week to week alternately. At the harbour and airplane base the duties consisted in protecting the harbour and examining all incoming ships. At both these stations individual training of the men continued in alternate weeks and the training done, usually by small groups, gave to both officers and men experience valuable in modern warfare. Several witnesses mentioned the changing conditions of war; in this war often small groups of men commanded by a junior officer operate in an isolated position where the enemy is likely to appear from any direction. In this type of warfare

it was suggested in evidence that the experience gained in manning outposts in Newfoundland against possible enemy attack, by day or by night, would be peculiarly valuable.

It may be observed that the supreme importance of having well-trained platoon commanders was fully recognized in the last war. On July 29, 1918, a little more than a week before he launched his final offensive, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig entered in his diary: "This is a platoon commander's war".

In the spring of 1941 the battalion moved to St. John's, Newfoundland, and was there concentrated as a unit. To it, seven defence localities were assigned and defence schemes often involving the whole battalion were devised for each locality. Several of these defence schemes required in their execution co-operation with units of the Newfoundland militia. The training reports give evidence of the variety of training manoeuvres, which included tactical exercises by two or more companies, night exercises, field exercises, training in fieldcraft and section leading, stand-to alarms, etc., etc.

The evidence establishes that the training received by the Royal Rifles in Newfoundland was vigorously carried out and resulted in the creation of a unit at least as well-trained as other units in Canada in September, 1941. Individual training of the men was far advanced and their duties in Newfoundland improved their health and physical stamina. Their collective training up to and including the battalion level was also well advanced. I quote the evidence of Brigadier Earnshaw, the General-Officer-Commanding in Newfoundland, but first I give this observation with regard to the Royal Rifles by General Crerar:—

As regards state of training of Royal Rifles, apart from observations of Commanders under whom this unit served (General Elkins, Brigadier Earnshaw), I had advantage of personal visits and general inspection of this unit at Sussex Camp, New Brunswick, in autumn of 1940, and at St. John's (Newfoundland) in early summer of 1941. These personal inspections and contacts gave me confidence in qualities and abilities of O. C. (Lieutenant-Colonel Home), the Second-in-Command (Major Price) and generally in officers and men who comprised it.

Brigadier Earnshaw says:—

The Battalion was moved from that portion of Newfoundland to Saint John's, Newfoundland, I think from memory in April, and from then until the time it left the battalion was concentrated together as a unit and had with it its full war-time scale of mechanical equipment, and during that period it had very few indeed what I class garrison duties, and was entirely free to carry out its operational role, which was in fact to be prepared to meet an enemy landing or a move at St. John's from any direction. The training and preparation to fulfil that operational role was what it spent most of its time on almost entirely training during that period.

Q. You said that the battalion had its full mechanical equipment. What about other equipment, weapons?—A. Well, it had its full scale to the extent to which they were available.

Q. Can we put it this way, that it was fully equipped as a battalion in all respects?—A. Yes, except, of course, that it did not have certain weapons, but neither did any other battalion.

I proceed to discuss the weapon training the Royal Rifles had received at the time of their designation as part of Force "C", that is to say, October 9th, 1941.

The Royal Rifles had at all times their full share of rifles and bayonets, an adequate supply of light machine guns (both Bren and Lewis) and pistols, and their full scale of transport vehicles. They had one 2" mortar for instructional purposes; but with this exception, they had no 2" mortars, or anti-tank rifles. In this respect they were in the same case as Canadian battalions generally, although,

as we shall see, the Winnipeg Grenadiers had available for instruction in training while in Jamaica a number of anti-tank rifles. The unit had from April, 1941 its full complement of 3" mortars, according to the scale which governed at the time, that is to say, two for the battalion, which were in the hands of the mortar platoon of the headquarters company, the commander and sergeant of which had taken a special course at the Long Branch School. They had, therefore, opportunities for training in this arm not possessed by Canadian battalions generally. The 3" mortar was included in all the defence schemes and counter-attack schemes in the 7 defence districts in the vicinity of St. John's. The full issue of 2" mortars was received by the unit when being equipped for the Hong Kong expedition. Four Thompson sub-machine guns (the Tommy-gun, so-called) reached the battalion at St. John's, one month before its departure from Newfoundland. The officers and non-commissioned officers were fully instructed in the mechanism and use of it. One gun was given to each company. Ammunition both for the 3" mortars, as well as for the tommy-gun, was lacking. There were no live grenades in Newfoundland for practice purposes and training in grenade throwing was done with dummy grenades.

It is convenient here to quote textually some passages of the evidence of Lt.-Col. Sparling, of the Directorate of Military Training, an officer competent to speak upon this subject and whose evidence I accept:—

Q. And you went on to explain that there were certain weapons they did not have, but you said also, I understood, and I wondered if I correctly understood you there, that other units had not these weapons?—A. No, my lord. For example, none of them had 2" mortars, and neither did these two units.

Q. I merely want to understand you. None of them had 2" mortars and none of them had the Boys anti-tank guns?—A. There were very few of those, my lord. For instance, the Winnipeg Grenadiers at that time had 4; the Royal Rifles had none. There was one issued as a pool weapon in Newfoundland for passing around amongst the units in Newfoundland.

Q. I wonder if it would not be more convenient if you took the units individually instead of dealing with them both together..... Or perhaps you were dealing with them in that way?..... The situation is not identical?—A. It is not quite identical in that the Royal Rifles had been able to carry out their annual classification during 1941, whereas the Winnipeg Grenadiers up to the time they arrived back had not been able actually to carry out their firing practice; but in so far as such things as tests of elementary training are concerned they had full opportunity for that because the test for elementary training does not include range practice. And there is one minor point there, namely, that the Winnipeg Grenadiers did not have dummy grenades, whereas the Royal Rifles and other units had dummy grenades.

Q. Does that properly describe the situation as regard these two battalions?—A. Yes. In my opinion those two were up to the standard of the other units in the country.

Q. As well trained as any other unit?—A. Yes.

These passages apply to the Winnipeg Grenadiers as well as to the Royal Rifles. They show that the Royal Rifles were privileged in comparison with other Canadian battalions in respect of 3" mortars and, as already mentioned, had opportunities of training in that weapon denied to Canadian battalions generally, while the Winnipeg Grenadiers were privileged in like manner in respect of the Boys anti-tank rifle.

There are 867 rifles and 50 Bren guns prescribed for issue to an infantry battalion, the ammunition for the Bren gun being the same as that for the rifle. This would in fact and practice be the normal equipment of such a battalion in Canada. The Royal Rifles were fully equipped with Bren guns, rifles and

bayonets prior to their departure for Newfoundland. I accept the evidence of Colonel Lamb that the regiment was fully trained and practised (including range practice) in the use of these weapons.

Practice in firing the Tommy-gun was not possible to Canadian battalions before October, 1941, as they have only recently been equipped with them. There are 42 Tommy-guns in the establishment of a battalion. This gun is a useful weapon for close fighting. It is simple to understand and use.

The anti-tank rifle is a high velocity, single shot rifle capable of firing armour-piercing bullets. In general, in its mechanism and use, it is similar to an ordinary rifle. There are now 25 anti-tank rifles in the establishment of a battalion; these are carried and intended to be used by the headquarters personnel of each platoon and by various platoons of the headquarters company. Until recently, this weapon and its ammunition have not been available to Canadian units.

As to the grenade, or Mills bomb, I am satisfied, on the evidence, that a soldier practised in the use of "dummy" bombs (which are similar in all respects to "live" bombs, except that they contain no charge of high explosive) would be capable of effectively using "live" bombs in actual operations. Training both in Canada and in England in fact is given with the "dummy" bomb and "live" bombs are reserved for use against the enemy.

Speaking generally, the Royal Rifles had no firing practice with the Tommy-gun, nor had they been trained in the mechanism and use of the anti-tank rifle, but the evidence satisfies me that soldiers completely trained and practised in the rifle and Bren gun could quickly master both the anti-tank rifle and the Tommy-gun. They were fully trained in the mechanism and use (tactical and otherwise) of the 3" mortar. They had only one 2" mortar for one month for instructional purposes, but again I am satisfied, from the evidence, that from their knowledge and training in other weapons they could quickly master the 2" mortar.

The Winnipeg Grenadiers were mobilized as a machine gun battalion at Winnipeg on September 1, 1939, at the outbreak of the present war. Before mobilization the regiment was a reserve unit in the Non-Permanent Active Militia. The regiment trained in Winnipeg during the autumn and winter of 1939-40. In the spring of 1940 it was assigned to garrison duties in the West Indies, relieving an Imperial Army battalion stationed there. The battalion reached the West Indies late in May and early in June, 1940, and remained there on duty for more than a year. It returned to Canada in three flights on the 9th of September, 1941, 21st September, 1941, and 8th October, 1941. Almost immediately it was warned for duty overseas.

At the time of mobilization and until June, 1941, the battalion was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel O. M. M. Kay, who is now attached to National Defence Headquarters at Ottawa with the rank of Brigadier. Lt.-Col. Kay was succeeded in command of the regiment in June, 1941, by Lieutenant-Colonel J. L. R. Sutcliffe, who had been second-in-command from the date of mobilization. Colonel Sutcliffe, who went with his regiment to Hong Kong, was an experienced officer who served in several theatres of war in the last World War. I had the advantage of hearing the evidence of Brigadier Kay, who was able to give a full description of the character and training of the Winnipeg Grenadiers while they were under his command prior to June, 1941. Brigadier Kay says:—

The officers all knew one another and had known one another and worked together for a period of not one year but three or four years. The N.C.O.'s were known by all of the officers and were old reliable trained N.C.O.'s. Working in a garrison where you worked in small groups, the men are in constant contact with the N.C.O.'s, and the N.C.O. and the officer knows the capability of every man he has. Individually if they worked and were known well together, and they worked in small groups well they would work well in a mass.

He said, speaking from his knowledge of the training and state of efficiency at which the battalion had arrived in the summer of 1941, that it was fit for duty at Hong Kong.

All of the officers, save one, had been peace-time officers, and a number of them had seen service overseas in the last war. A large percentage of the N.C.O.'s had been in the battalion when it was a reserve unit and had come into the active service battalion on mobilization. Brigadier Kay says his officers were capable and that they and the N.C.O.'s were well-trained. Over fifty per cent of the rank and file had been in the reserve battalion and enlisted on mobilization and many of the men came from the northern mining districts of Manitoba.

General Crerar says:—

As regards Winnipeg Grenadiers, I had studied the periodic training reports on this unit while in the West Indies, forwarded by its O.C., which indicated that within the pre-occupation of its garrison duties, it was successfully progressing in its tactical and weapons training. I also had first hand information furnished by its O.C., Lieutenant-Colonel Kay, who reported to Ottawa in the summer of 1941 to take up appointment as D.A.G. Lieutenant-Colonel Kay then informed me that his unit was ready and restless for more active service, and expressed the hope that it would not be brought back to Canada in the meantime. I advised Lieutenant-Colonel Kay at that time that my reason for return of Winnipeg Grenadiers to Canada was that while it was probably quite fit for garrison responsibilities it would be desirable to give it a short period of unit and refresher training before embodying it in field formations, destined for overseas. As this unit had been mobilized for two years, had experienced and successfully undertaken more independent responsibilities than any other unit in Canada, had been favourably reported upon to me in some detail by its late C.O., Brigadier Kay, its general fitness for active service after a short period of refresher training was specially indicated.

The evidence leaves no doubt in my mind that the confidence of the Chief of the General Staff in the personnel of officers, N.C.O.'s and men was well founded.

This battalion having been mobilized as a machine gun battalion, its establishment differed from that of an infantry battalion. During the autumn and winter of 1939-40 it trained as a machine gun battalion using the Vickers machine gun as its principal weapon. The training was carried out in a progressive manner on a syllabus of training prepared by the General Staff Officer of Military District No. 10, and under his observation. By May, 1940, the battalion had done its individual, section, platoon and company training. During that period also the anti-aircraft platoon of the headquarters company trained with the Lewis machine gun. The battalion also had two anti-tank rifles for training purposes and was equipped with rifles and revolvers. Individual training with rifles had been completed. Prior to May, 1940, the training with these weapons did not include firing at outdoor ranges.

On May 13, 1940, the battalion was inspected by an Inspector-General, who reported that at that time the senior officers were all good, with one exception, who was said to be fair. The junior officers "are of good type—good education—all qualified and reported as satisfactory". The non-commissioned officers were "all of good type—well qualified and reported on as efficient—above average". The rank and file were "good class—excellent physique—have made very good progress in training".

With regard to musketry, this report states that all the battalion had fired Part I on the miniature range but had not fired their classification with service rifles. The anti-aircraft platoon had fired its 25-yard classification, with the light machine gun and about 600 men had fired Parts 3 to 5 with the Vickers gun, 400 qualifying as 1st and 2nd class shots. With regard to this, the report

shows that the battalion had been issued approximately 18,000 rounds of 1910 ammunition. The poor quality of the ammunition accounted, in the opinion of the commanding officer, for the fact that more did not qualify. The report goes on to state that three machine gun schools had been conducted, with good results, and, amongst other things, good progress had been made in map reading, field work and bayonet fighting. The Inspector-General's report concludes with these words: "This unit is well organized, well disciplined and has made a good advance in training. A very good unit".

The report on training made by the commanding officer and referred to in the Inspector-General's report states: "All personnel have been taught to use the rifle and carried out T.O.E.T. (Tests of Elementary Training). All of effective personnel have fired Part I (a) and (b) Miniature Range instruction with the .22 rifle. No actual classification with the .303 has been done yet." With regard to the light machine gun, the commanding officer reports: "The A.A. (anti-aircraft) platoon have been thoroughly trained with the Lewis gun. All ranks have fired the 25-yard classification. An additional 8 men per company are now being trained in the use of the Lewis gun as an A.A. weapon". With regard to the Bren gun, it is stated that: "These guns not being available, training in accordance with S.A.T. Vol. I, Pamphlet 4, could not be carried out, but lectures in mechanism have been given with the aid of charts". With regard to bayonet training, the report states: "All effective ranks in H.Q. and Machine Gun Companies have been thoroughly trained in the use of the bayonet". As to the anti-tank rifle: "All personnel required to be trained in the use of the Anti-Tank Rifle have been trained up and including T.O.E.T. As there is no ammunition for this weapon, no actual firing of the gun has been possible". The commanding officer states, among other things, that: "The interest and enthusiasm of the troops is high The degree of efficiency re machine gun training is very satisfactory." Before the battalion left for the West Indies 380 of the men had fired Parts I and II of the rifle classification at the St. Charles Ranges at Winnipeg.

In May, 1940, the unit was changed from a machine gun to a rifle battalion and was warned for duty in the West Indies. This involved a reduction in strength to that of a garrison battalion. On leaving for the West Indies the battalion was fully equipped with rifles and bayonets; it had 16 Lewis guns, 4 Bren guns, and 4 anti-tank rifles. On arrival in the West Indies it received 5 additional Bren guns. In the spring of 1941 two 3-inch mortars were received and one Thompson sub-machine gun was obtained on loan from the Imperial forces. The battalion remained on the reduced establishment until the spring of 1941. It was then advanced to the higher infantry establishment and some—but not all—of the additional men required by the higher establishment were sent to the West Indies from Canada.

The West Indies island (where the battalion was stationed has been an Imperial garrison post for more than one hundred years. It is a mountainous island, having two military stations—one at and the other at The Winnipeg Grenadiers made up practically the entire garrison of the island and were charged with the duty of providing internal security, aid to the civil authorities, and the protection of the island against attack from outside. One company was stationed at all times at, and had very little in the way of garrison duties to perform. It was therefore able to spend practically all its time in training. Because of the mountainous terrain, the training was mainly individual, section, and platoon training and the time was spent in practising mountain warfare. The troops also carried out platoon and company tactical schemes.

At the battalion had heavy garrison duties to perform. These comprised the staffing and guarding of an internment camp, the guarding of detention barracks, and the providing of ship guards on incoming and outgoing vessels in the harbour. The personnel not occupied in guard or regi-

mental duties were given individual training in bayonet fighting, the mechanism and employment of the Bren and Lewis light machine guns and the anti-tank rifle, stalking, the use of cover, fighting patrols and the building of road blocks. In addition to its defence duties, the garrison at was required to have one company available at all times on 30 minutes' notice, under the defence scheme of the island as laid down by the War Office.

According to the evidence of Brigadier Kay, the battalion, while in the West Indies acquired a thorough knowledge of the use of rifles, bayonets, Bren guns, Lewis guns and the anti-tank rifle, and this applies to all ranks. All were trained in bayonet fighting and practised constantly. During Brigadier Kay's tenure, ammunition was not available for firing practice, but only for use against an enemy, but 70 additional men had fired Parts I and II classification while in the West Indies, before the battalion returned to Winnipeg. On the battalion's return to Winnipeg in October, 1941, and after it had been warned for duty at Hong Kong, the St. Charles Ranges were set aside for the unit for one week and some 600 fired a course with rifles at various ranges using various types of targets.

According to a report made by Colonel Sutcliffe on October 6, 1941, all elementary training in musketry had been completed and refresher courses taken. With regard to the Bren and Lewis guns, the mechanism, drill and tactical handling of the guns had been thoroughly covered by the rifle companies and the anti-aircraft platoon, while the remainder of the personnel had been given elementary training. No range practice had been done with these weapons. The mechanism, drill and a limited amount of "tactical handling" of the Thompson sub-machine gun had been taught, only one of these guns, according to Colonel Sutcliffe, being available to the battalion in the West Indies.

Colonel Sutcliffe also says that no training was done with either the 2-inch or 3-inch mortar, as 2-inch mortars were not available and the 3-inch mortars were only received just prior to leaving the West Indies. Colonel Sutcliffe appears to be mistaken with regard to the 3-inch mortars, as two of these weapons were issued to the battalion in February, 1941, and Brigadier Kay says that the battalion had these mortars and that a large percentage of the men were trained in the stripping, assembling and tactical handling of the mortar, but not in its actual firing.

Colonel Sutcliffe also appears to be mistaken in his statement that only one Thompson sub-machine gun was available, as in a report signed by him and dated July 14, 1941, he says: "Arrangements were made to borrow two Thompson sub-machine guns from Ordnance. These are now on hand and instruction has commenced." In a report by Colonel Sutcliffe a week later he says: "Classes on the Thompson sub-machine gun have commenced (in spare time) and are being enthusiastically attended."

With regard to the anti-tank rifle, Colonel Sutcliffe says the mechanism, drill and tactical handling had been completed, but no range work had been done, and that there had been no training with grenades.

He also says that most of the rifle company personnel and portions of the headquarters company had been instructed in field-craft and had carried out practical training, and that anti-gas training had been carried out regularly and thoroughly.

With regard to the seventy-five recruits who had joined the battalion in the West Indies, Colonel Sutcliffe reports that at that time they had received no basic training at all. He also appears to have been mistaken with regard to this, as the records of the men concerned show that they spent five weeks at a Basic Training Centre before going to the West Indies. He says, however, these men in the West Indies had been given a full basic training course, having reached their sixth week before embarkation for Canada, and training was to be continued.

With regard to the anti-aircraft platoon, he says it had been fully instructed in mechanism, drill and tactical handling of both the Lewis and Bren guns, but no firing had been done.

These are the main features of Colonel Sutcliffe's report. In concluding he says, in speaking of his battalion:—

Their many and varied duties did, however, furnish both the Officers and O.R's with a far more extensive general training than this report would indicate. In the matter of drill and general deportment their standard is high, and in spite of the many months (15½ in all) of monotonous duties, during which time they had no leave, the morale, discipline, and esprit de corps have been maintained at a very high level.

To such a body of men which had been mobilized for practically two years, one can apply with confidence the evidence of General Stuart, the present Chief of the General Staff:

A. That is a point that has been concerning me with respect to most of the evidence I have heard. I feel that the evidence I have heard so far has been trying to bring out just the condition of the battalions, and chiefly the Winnipeg Grenadiers in respect to their individual and sub-unit training.

Q. Undoubtedly the emphasis has been placed on that?—A. All the way through, sir. Now, that is only part of the training of a unit, my lord; that is superficial. What takes a lengthy time in training a unit is giving the unit something like character, and perhaps the best way I can explain it is this

Q. Individuality and character?—A. Collective character. The training is broken up into three components; the first component is the moral component; the second component is the mental component; and the third component is the physical component. And of those three I put far and away the greatest weight on the moral component.

As to the moral component, it is true it is an indirect approach, but nevertheless there are certain characteristics that we try to develop in the individual: First of all, loyalty; secondly, confidence. By loyalty I mean loyalty to those working with him, to those under him, and to those above him. As to confidence, the same: determination, sense of duty, moral courage. Give me a unit that has got those attributes, and I could whack it into shape in no time.

Q. There was a favourite phrase years ago that seems to have gone out of fashion, namely, esprit de corps?—A. Absolutely; I am coming to that, sir. You may say that the summation of those moral characteristics is what is commonly referred to as morale.

Q. Yes.—A. Now, on the mental side you have got judgment, constant mental alertness, readiness to accept responsibility.

Q. Yes.—A. Then on the physical side you have the need to develop a healthy body that can give effect to the great demands on the spirit and on the mind. Every single thing that a unit does is an indirect approach to the development of those various characteristics. I do not care what it is. That is why I, in the early days of the war used to lose patience with people who would come into my office and complain: "What can we do when we have not got equipment?" Even if they have no equipment they can get the really hard and difficult part of the training done without it. Those are the most difficult things to accomplish, and take the greatest length of time. I maintain that if they are brought out on the moral side and the mental side, these alleged shortcomings that we have heard about, which are all very simple and do not take very long to adjust, can be adjusted; and I am quite convinced they could have been adjusted in this particular case in the time that was available to them.

Now, what are the requirements. In respect to those two units, they had experienced commanders; they were well officered; as far as I knew they did the job that they were on thoroughly and well. All right, if they did their job well and there were no complaints about it, those characteristics that I have been talking about must have been developed. In other words, they were good units, well tried units, and if that is so it is more than 75 per cent of the battle.

Q. Then your opinion is, from what you have said, that any weapon training or anything of that sort that these units may have been short in as laid down in the books, could have been made up prior to the 8th December?—A. I not only think it, I know it.

For some considerable time since the outbreak of war in 1939 Canada has been sending troops to England, and since June, 1940, England has been under direct threat of invasion. In October, 1941, there was no war in the Pacific. Speaking of the troops sent to England from June to September, 1940, Lt.-Col. Sparling, Staff Officer in the Directorate of Military Training at National Defence Headquarters who had gone overseas with the Second Canadian Division, said that in his opinion the training of both the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers was far ahead of the units of the Second Division at the time they proceeded overseas. In speaking of the two battalions in question in comparison with other battalions in Canada in September, 1941, Colonel Sparling said that, from an examination of the training reports, they were the equal of any other unit. It is to be borne in mind that these battalions had an advantage over other battalions in Canada in the experience which they respectively had in Newfoundland and the West Indies, not enjoyed by battalions which had not been out of the country; and it seems proper to call attention to the fact that both these battalions had enjoyed the advantage of having virtually the same men, trained by the same officers and N.C.O's for a long period overseas.

General Crerar had knowledge of the equipment and state of training of the units in the Canadian army. He says:—

Detailed statement of supplies and issues of weapons and equipment to units of Canadian army, and also of state of their training, were prepared monthly under the direction of the Vice Chief of the General Staff, copies of which came to me.

He further says, as regards these units:—

To the best of my knowledge and experience, however, no battalions of any army, even if fully equipped, can ever be regarded as completely trained. Training is an unceasing process. There were, however, in Canada at the time in question a number of battalions (among which were Royal Rifles and Winnipeg Grenadiers) which, although somewhat handicapped by lack of supplies of certain platoon weapons (mortars and anti-tank rifles) in my opinion were generally adequately trained to undertake defensive responsibilities such those in prospect in Hong Kong.

It should be recalled that General Crerar had personal knowledge of the Royal Rifles as the result of two inspections, one in the autumn of 1940 and one in the early summer of 1941, as he mentions in his evidence; and that he had first hand knowledge of the Winnipeg Grenadiers from his interviews with Brigadier Kay, as he also mentions in his evidence. This knowledge led him to believe, as he states in his recommendation, that the experience of these battalions in Newfoundland and the West Indies respectively would be of "no small value" to them in their new role in Hong Kong. It was evidently General Crerar's opinion that these two battalions were specially qualified to adopt themselves to the conditions awaiting them in Hong Kong. He says:—

As I have previously stated, the training of a unit or formation is never completed. For instance neither G.O.C. First Canadian Division, nor myself, would admit that First Canadian Division which has trained vigorously for two years, and elements of which have partaken in actual operations, is as fit to meet enemy as we would wish it. There is always room for improvement. On the other hand, as a general statement, with information at my disposal concerning units of Force "C" and knowing professional ability and character of Commanding Officer, Brigadier Lawson, I would say that Force "C" was certainly fit to meet an attacking force, even in superior numbers, and to give a fine account of itself by December 8, 1941.

A telegram from Colonel Sutcliffe, dated December 22, lends confirmation to General Crerar's judgment. Colonel Sutcliffe, who was at this time evidently in command following the death of Brigadier Lawson and Colonel Hennessy, says:—

"Troops have done magnificent work. Spirit excellent."

After reviewing in light of the evidence the considerations which it was the duty of General Crerar to weigh, I arrive at a clear opinion that I could not justify a declaration that he was wrong in his decision to recommend the selection of these two battalions. Another Chief of the General Staff in the same circumstances might perhaps not unreasonably have taken another view. But I think the balance of practical considerations favoured the course actually taken. There is, therefore, no good ground for imputing to General Crerar, in the matter of the selection of the battalions to compose the expeditionary force, any error in judgment, much less any dereliction of duty.

SECTION IV—ADDITIONS TO THE STRENGTH OF THE TWO BATTALIONS

The higher rifle establishment for a Canadian infantry battalion provides for 34 officers and 773 other ranks—a total of 807 for all ranks. The “first reinforcements” for a battalion consist of 6 officers and 150 other ranks—a total of 156 for all ranks. Thus, a battalion with its “first reinforcements” comprises 40 officers and 923 other ranks—a total complement of 963.

“First reinforcements” for a battalion in the field are usually left at the battalion depot behind the lines, and do not immediately become part of the fighting strength of the unit. They are intended to be available to make good the losses that the battalion may suffer from casualties and illness. When a battalion proceeds overseas, particularly to a station as far distant as Hong Kong, it frequently happens that the “first reinforcements” accompany the unit. Early in the preparation of the Hong Kong expedition, the question arose whether “first reinforcements” should accompany the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers to Hong Kong. An inquiry was directed, through Canadian Military Headquarters in London, to the War Office, and the advice was received that the Canadian battalions should take with them their “first reinforcements.” It was accordingly necessary to add a number of officers and men to both units.

A further inquiry was sent by National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa to the War Office respecting medical categories. The War Office replied that men could be taken down to and including the Canadian medical category C2. In fact, the medical rating of those included in the force did not go below B1 and may not have included any men even in that category. But the statement of acceptable medical categories from the War Office is not without significance as indicating the view of the War Office as to the nature of the task that was being undertaken. This statement points to an expectation at the War Office that the Canadian reinforcements would be employed in garrison duties.

At the time of selection, the Royal Rifles were slightly over strength. The Winnipeg Grenadiers, who had just returned from the West Indies, were under full strength by more than 100 men. To bring both battalions up to strength 136 men were required, in addition to 300 for first reinforcements. In obtaining these men there were two conditioning factors—rapidity and secrecy. Between the time the battalions were warned for service overseas (on October 9) and the time the expedition sailed (on October 27) there was an interval of only eighteen days, less embarkation leave, in which every one of these volunteers must be recruited, medically examined, completely re-outfitted and transported to Vancouver. The necessity for maintaining the most complete secrecy strictly limited the field of recruiting. Only the officers commanding the two battalions knew that their destination was Hong Kong. To aid in preserving this secrecy, it was necessary to obtain recruits from as few localities as possible.

The men added to the strength of the two battalions volunteers for service, knowing only that the units had been selected for active service overseas in a semi-tropical country. The policy of taking only volunteers was deliberately adopted. Although all men in the active army had enlisted for service overseas and the Government, accordingly, had legal power to send them overseas without asking their consent, yet, as has already been explained, when a man enlists in the Canadian army he enlists in a particular unit and there is a convention that he is not transferred to another without his consent, in the

absence, at all events, of some over-riding necessity. This convention is so well recognized that disregard of it might possibly be considered as in the nature of a breach of faith.

The responsibility of securing the necessary replacements, as well as the "first reinforcements," belonged to the Adjutant-General's Department. The task was in the hands of Colonel P. Hennessy, the Director of Organization in the Adjutant-General's Department, who afterwards became the senior administrative officer of the Hong Kong expeditionary force. Under his immediate direction additions to the Royal Rifles were obtained from Military District No. 2, with headquarters in Toronto, and additions to the Winnipeg Grenadiers were obtained from Military District No. 10, with headquarters in Winnipeg. Colonel Hennessy was an officer of great experience and he was, of course, most anxious to obtain the best men possible for the expedition of which he was to be second-in-command.

There were added (150 as first reinforcements) to the Royal Rifles 154 men from Military District No. 2, of whom 52 came from the Midland Regiment, 15 from Advanced Training Centre No. 10 at Camp Borden, and 87 from Advanced Training Centre No. 11, also at Camp Borden. To the Winnipeg Grenadiers were added (156 as first reinforcements) 282 men and 12 officers; of these the 12 officers and 189 men came from Advanced Training Centre No. 15 at Winnipeg, 30 men from the Advanced (Machine Gun) Training Centre at Dundern, Saskatchewan, 40 from the No. 10 District Depot at Winnipeg (including 23 men formerly on the strength of the 18th Reconnaissance Battalion), and 23 men from the Basic Training Centre at Portage la Prairie.

Additions to the Royal Rifles

On October 16, Colonel Hennessy spoke by long distance telephone to the Commandant at Camp Borden (Brigadier-General McCuaig) and asked him to obtain, if possible, 150 volunteers from A10 and A11 Infantry (Advanced) Training Centres for transfer to the Royal Rifles of Canada which was proceeding to service outside Canada. General McCuaig instructed the officers commanding the training centres to ascertain what volunteers could be obtained at their several centres. Fifteen men volunteered from A10 and A11. General McCuaig then advised the Officer Commanding Military District No. 2 at Toronto (Major-General C. F. Constantine) that approximately 100 volunteers were available from the centres at Camp Borden. General Constantine then made arrangements to obtain 52 volunteers from the Midland Regiment, which was then stationed at Niagara and was over strength. A few hours later, General Constantine was advised that the desired number of men from the Midland Regiment had volunteered, and he so advised Colonel Hennessy.

In this way 154 men—102 from Camp Borden and 52 from the Midland Regiment—were transferred to the Royal Rifles and proceeded with that unit to Hong Kong. These men were sent to the District Depot at Toronto on October 18th and were there medically examined, inoculated and re-equipped with new uniforms and personal equipment. They were granted leave until October 23rd when they entrained at Toronto and joined the Royal Rifles while en route to Vancouver. The details of the procedure followed in obtaining these men were discussed with Colonel Hennessy.

Colonel Hennessy reported to Major-General Browne, the Adjutant-General, that he was obtaining 52 men from the Midland Regiment and 102 from Camp Borden, and both General Browne and Colonel Hennessy expressed themselves as gratified in their good fortune in obtaining these men from these sources, and took steps to assure that places were made for them in the expeditionary force.

On October 22 two officers and three sergeants from the Royal Rifles, representing Lt.-Col. Home, the officer commanding the regiment, came to Toronto and checked over the documents of each of the 154 men. These documents disclosed the particulars of service of each of the men. On October 23, the men were paraded and all details were finally checked. The two officers from the Royal Rifles expressed themselves as well satisfied with the volunteers provided by Military District No. 2.

The Midland Regiment was organized in July, 1940, and was recruited in the counties of Northumberland, Durham, Victoria and Haliburton in Ontario. The several companies of the regiment were stationed in various towns and cities of eastern Ontario until January, 1941, when the regiment moved to barracks in Ottawa where it remained until April, 1941. It then undertook duties in the defence of coastal and other vital points within Canada.

All the 52 men from the Midland Regiment who volunteered for the Hong Kong expedition had joined that regiment prior to March, 1941. All these men, therefore, had at least six months training with their unit before embarking for Hong Kong, while a great many of them had probably a full year's training. Accordingly, some idea of their state of training may be formed by a reference to the training and qualifications of this regiment as a whole. On this topic, I had the evidence of the officer who has commanded this unit since October, 1940, and also the evidence of the officer in charge of training in Military District No. 3 (Colonel Grant), who had the regiment under his observation from October, 1940, until April, 1941. There was also produced an inspection report, dated February 20, 1940, dealing with the Midland Regiment, by an Inspector-General, and the evidence of General Browne of the result of his observation, as Adjutant-General, of the unit covering the period in 1941 when it was stationed at Ottawa.

From this evidence, I have reached the conclusion that the Midland Regiment is and was in October, 1941, an efficient, well-trained unit. The Officer Commanding (Lieutenant-Colonel Gamey) impressed me with his own competence, and was described by others as an officer who placed exceptional emphasis on training and exacted a high standard from his unit. The other officers were reported as satisfactory and acceptable by the Inspector-General. General Browne stated that he was particularly pleased with the sergeants of the Midland Regiment. Perhaps some general notion of the calibre of the men in the Midland Regiment may be drawn from the fact that when, in October, 1941, a request for approximately 50 volunteers was made, practically every man in the regiment offered his services.

The men in the Midland Regiment did not pass through a training centre, but obtained all their training with the unit. A regular program of training was, however, followed and records of this training were available in Military District No. 3 for the period between October, 1940, and April, 1941. The District Officer in charge of Training (Colonel Grant) compared these records of actual training with the lengths of time prescribed for each of the items of training in the syllabi used in the training centres. It is unnecessary to set forth this comparison in detail. The regiment was far ahead of the prescribed syllabi in drill, marching, rifle training, and bayonet training. It had been fully instructed in the mechanism of the light machine gun, to the extent that the men were handling the gun while blindfolded; they were, in April, 1941, well advanced in their firing practice at the ranges, although they had not completed the full period of time set forth in the syllabi. They had spent more than double the time prescribed in their practice with dummy grenades. They had spent a total of 127 periods (of 45 minutes each) in platoon and section training, and a total of 78 periods in company and battalion training. The reports of training and of the observations of officers indicate that the men of the Midland Regiment were hardworking and interested in their training and, moreover, that they "possessed initiative and self-reliance beyond the average".

It is true that after April, 1941, the Midland Regiment was engaged in defence duties within Canada which interfered with the regular course of their training. At the same time, as I have already indicated, the assumption of coast defence and other duties had peculiar value in developing in the individual soldier the special qualities required for the type of task that they might be expected to perform in Hong Kong.

The records of the individual training of the 52 volunteers for the Hong Kong expedition indicate that these men were well advanced in their individual training. It is true that the records of their firing tests at the ranges indicate that some were first and second class shots, while others were third class shots or had failed. It was stated to me in evidence that these records of practice at a rifle range do not necessarily afford a reliable criterion of the usefulness of a soldier in actual combat. It was also clear that some of these men, while fully trained in the theory and mechanism of the light machine gun, had not actually fired the machine gun at the ranges. This deficiency in their individual training is one which could quickly be rectified and would, under efficient officers, be quickly rectified after their arrival in Hong Kong. Notwithstanding these shortcomings in the matter of range practice and tests, I am satisfied that the Commanding Officer (Colonel Gamey) is correct in stating that the 52 volunteers from the Midland Regiment were, as a group, well trained, according to the standard of training prevailing in Canada.

Accordingly, I find that in accepting these 52 men from the Midland Regiment for inclusion in the expedition to Hong Kong there was no dereliction of duty or error in judgment on the part of anyone.

Fifteen men were added to the strength of the Royal Rifles from Advanced Training Centre No. 10 at Camp Borden. The procedure adopted to obtain these men has already been described. They were all volunteers; all were medically fit and all had received their full basic training covering the subjects prescribed in the syllabus for basic training. Of the 15 men, ten had completed their full advanced training and several had served with the army for more than a year. The remaining five had completed their basic training and had received three weeks of the advanced training course. The officer in command of the Advanced Training Centre No. 10, speaking from personal observation, said that, although these five men had not received their complete advanced training, "they were young men, full of enthusiasm to get into a fighting unit and had received training in rifle, light machine gun and gas". In these circumstances, I cannot believe that there was any error in including in the group from this training centre this small number of enthusiastic volunteers, even though they had not received the full period of training prescribed in the syllabus. I have in mind, of course, the fact that opportunities for further training were anticipated, and did in fact arise, in the period of approximately six weeks between the date of embarkation and the attack on Hong Kong.

Eighty-seven men were added to the strength of the Royal Rifles from Advanced Training Centre No. 11 at Camp Borden. The general remarks made in the preceding section apply equally to these men. They were all enthusiastic volunteers. Of this group, 38 had completed their full basic and advanced training. Three had completed their full basic training and seven weeks of advanced training; one had basic training and four weeks of advanced training; forty-three had basic training and three weeks of advanced training; and two had basic training and two and one-half weeks of advanced training. These men were inspected by the officer commanding the training centres who stated they were "good-looking soldiers", who appeared to be "likely recruits" for the reinforcement of any battalion.

My conclusion as to these men is the same as for the group discussed in the preceding section. I find that there was no dereliction of duty or error in judgment in including these men in the additions to the strength of the Royal Rifles.

Additions to the Winnipeg Grenadiers

At the time of their selection for service in Hong Kong, the Winnipeg Grenadiers were in the course of transfer from the West Indies to Canada. On October 10th, Colonel Hennessy spoke on the telephone to the District Officer Commanding at Winnipeg (Brigadier Riley) and told him that the battalion would have to be brought up to strength and, for that purpose, volunteers should be sought at the infantry training centre. Brigadier Riley discussed the matter with Lieutenant-Colonel Sutcliffe (the officer commanding the Winnipeg Grenadiers) and Lieutenant-Colonel Graham (the officer commanding the Advanced Training Centre No. 15 at Winnipeg). There was some uncertainty as to the exact number of additional men required, but Colonel Sutcliffe estimated on October 10th that between 150 and 200 additional men would be required.

Colonel Sutcliffe saw Colonel Graham on the 10th or 11th of October and asked particularly for signallers and other specialists. From the Advanced Training Centre No. 15, thirty fully trained signallers, all of whom had completed courses at Barriefield signal school, were provided. In addition the following trained specialists were provided from the Training Centre:—three men trained in the use of the 3" mortar, twelve driver mechanics, three or four men trained in the use of Bren gun carriers, and a number of N.C.O's who had received special courses as instructors and who were willing to revert to the ranks in order to join the expedition. On the first request for volunteers Colonel Graham obtained 150 men for the expedition, which was described merely as special duty overseas. Subsequently Colonel Sutcliffe visited the Training Centre and spoke to a parade of the men and 39 additional volunteers were obtained. In this way 189 men were provided from Advanced Training Centre No. 15.

In addition, this Training Centre provided 12 officers for the Winnipeg Grenadiers, all of whom were fully trained; they had qualified at an Officers' Training Centre and had assisted in the training at the Advanced Infantry Training Centre for periods, in some cases, of more than a year. Colonel Graham stated that all these officers were known personally to him and all of them had completed their training. In general, this opinion was confirmed by Mr. T. C. Douglas, M.P., who knew five of these officers and saw them shortly before they left for Hong Kong. He stated that they were overjoyed at the prospect of going into more active service and they were satisfied with their training courses as regards the handling of men and general instruction, although they had some uncertainty about their experience in operational manoeuvres. This was a natural diffidence in an officer of limited experience with a unit, but Colonel Graham's evidence satisfies me these officers were competent and suitable for acceptance as voluntary transfers to the Winnipeg Grenadiers. In addition, two officers were transferred to the unit from the training staff of the Basic Training Centre at Portage la Prairie. As to these there can be no question of their fitness or competence.

After obtaining from the Advanced Training Centre No. 15 the number of new men originally estimated to be necessary by Colonel Sutcliffe, he found the estimate had been too low and that more would be needed. Brigadier Riley obtained permission from Colonel Hennessy to ask for 30 volunteers from the Advanced Machine Gun Training Centre at Dundurn, Sask. These volunteers were obtained without difficulty. Still later—at a time about ten days before the expedition sailed—Colonel Sutcliffe found that there would be some loss in the strength of his unit consequent upon the medical re-examination of the men and because of transfers of a number of men to the Air Force. Brigadier Riley, in this situation, felt that further volunteers could not be obtained from the Advanced Training Centre at Winnipeg, or from Dundurn, and, with the sanction of Colonel Hennessy, he sought volunteers in the District Depot at Winnipeg and at the Basic Training Centre at Portage la Prairie. Colonel Sutcliffe

saw a number of men from both the District Depot and the Basic Training Centre and from these personally selected the necessary number to complete his establishment. In this way 40 men from the District Depot and 23 men from the Basic Training Centre—all of whom were volunteers—were added to the strength of the Winnipeg Grenadiers.

Before examining in detail the qualifications and training of the men added, one further general comment should be made. It was decided that the Winnipeg Grenadiers should be brought up to the required strength by volunteers from mid-western Canada, through Military District No. 10. This decision appears reasonable in view of the fact that this regiment had originally been mobilized in this district. The primary responsibility for the additions to the strength rested on the Adjutant-General's Department and its execution was committed to Colonel Hennessy, the Director of Organization. Brigadier Riley (the officer commanding Military District No. 10) took steps to provide the necessary number of volunteers for the consideration and acceptance of Colonel Sutcliffe (the officer commanding the Winnipeg Grenadiers). In all such steps Brigadier Riley conferred with and obtained the approval of Colonel Hennessy, who relied, and properly relied, upon the decision of the local officers as to the acceptance or rejection of available volunteers. In fact, Colonel Hennessy, as Director of Organization, approved all steps taken to obtain additions to the strength of the Winnipeg Grenadiers; the District provided the necessary number of volunteers; and either Colonel Sutcliffe, or his second-in-command, Major Trist, personally interviewed every man who came from the District Depot and the Basic Training Centre. The men from the Advanced Training Centre at Dundurn were accepted on the report from that centre that they were all fully trained. The men from Advanced Training Centre No. 15 at Winnipeg were accepted on the recommendation of Colonel Graham, who was in command of that centre and was, therefore, in the best position to know of their qualifications.

A number of senior officers gave evidence as to the great value of the personal selection of men by a competent commanding officer. Lieutenant-General McNaughton said in evidence:—

If I were the Commanding Officer and had had the chance to select the men and know them individually—see that they were all right—I would not have worried very much whether they had completed the basic training or not, because character is the thing we lay most stress on, and, if they were people who were suitable in my judgment to incorporate in the battalion, I would have been perfectly satisfied to have had them I would not have worried from the point of view of military efficiency one iota, because, if they are the right type of men, even on the voyage over I would have completed their individual training.

These opinions were confirmed by both General Crerar and General Stuart and are, of course, of the greatest weight in considering the fitness of these additions to the strength of the Winnipeg Grenadiers.

With regard to the 189 men from Advanced Training Centre No. 15, while they had been at the Training Centre for periods ranging from two weeks to over a year, and while 42 of them had been in the active army for less than sixteenth weeks, the Commandant of the Training Centre, Colonel Graham, says they had all fired their courses at the ranges with rifles, light machine guns, anti-aircraft rifles and anti-aircraft guns.

With regard to the 42 men mentioned above, all with one exception (a man who enlisted on August 1, 1941), had had military experience, either with a militia regiment, a unit of the permanent forces, or in a Basic or Advanced Training Centre prior to enlistment in the active army. As illustrations the following may be noted: One man who enlisted on July 16, 1941 had served with the Royal Irish Constabulary and for two years with the Seaforth Highlanders; one who enlisted on July 17, 1941, had had one year with the Dragoons;

one who enlisted July 24, 1941, had also had one year with the Dragoons; one who enlisted on July 16, 1941 had had six years in the Gloucester Regiment; one who enlisted on July 10, 1941 had had nine years in a militia regiment; one who enlisted on August 28, 1941 had previously been at a Basic Training Centre for nine weeks; one who enlisted August 28, 1941 had had two months previous service at a Basic Training Centre; one who enlisted on the same day had previously had twelve weeks at a Basic and an Advanced Training Centre. Of these 42 men, the latest enlistments were three men who enlisted respectively on September 5 and 11. One of these had previously been with the Forestry Corps as a fitter; one had been with the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps, and one had been in the Forestry Corps and had had ten weeks at a Basic Training Centre.

In the period immediately prior to October, 1941, the Advanced Training Centre No. 15, from which these men came, had, for training purposes, an adequate supply of rifles, bayonets, light machine guns, anti-tank rifles, Tommy-guns and dummy grenades. This Centre, in common with other Training Centres and units in Canada, was at that time without 2" and 3" mortars for training purposes.

Thirty men were added to the Winnipeg Grenadiers from the Advanced (Machine Gun) Training Centre at Dundern, Sask. All these men had completed their advanced training and twelve of them were trained specialists. In some respects this group were trained beyond the standard laid down in the syllabi for training centres, as they had received instruction in field engineering and pistol training that was not prescribed in the syllabi.

Forty men were transferred to the Winnipeg Grenadiers from No. 10 District Depot at Winnipeg. It will be recalled that these men were obtained after it appeared that further additions would be required than had been originally anticipated at the time the unit was selected for service in Hong Kong. Permission was accordingly obtained from headquarters in Ottawa to seek volunteers at the district depot. The district depot receives all men when they are recruited and also men who are being transferred from one unit to another. It was described as a "manning pool" for the district. At the time that volunteers for the Winnipeg Grenadiers were being sought, there were 23 men at the district depot who had been left behind by the 18th Reconnaissance Battalion when that unit left the district. These men had had considerable training with their unit, but had been left behind because they were thought not suitable for the specialized work of a reconnaissance battalion. The time served by the men from the 18th Reconnaissance Battalion was as follows: One had served four weeks; one, five weeks; one, six weeks; three, twelve weeks; four, thirteen weeks; one fourteen weeks; one, fifteen weeks; eight for sixteen weeks; one for eighteen weeks; one for nineteen weeks, and one for twenty weeks. Of the remaining seventeen men from the District Depot, one had already served twenty-four weeks at a Machine Gun Training Centre before being attached to the Depot; in the same way one had served twenty weeks at a Basic Training Centre; one had served five weeks in a Basic Training Centre and prior to that had been in a Reserve Battalion from August 13, 1940 to the date of his enlistment on April 10, 1941; one had had two periods of thirty days and eight weeks at Basic Training Centres; one had had eight weeks in a militia regiment; one had trained with the Grenadiers themselves for one year from September 18, 1939; one had had thirty days at a Basic Training Centre; one had had the same experience, followed by eight weeks in a Divisional Supply unit; one had sixteen weeks with a militia regiment; one had had eight weeks with a Divisional Supply unit; one had had eight weeks at a Basic Training Centre; one had had six months with a militia regiment; one had been in a Reserve Signallers Battalion for thirty-seven weeks; one had formerly been with the battalion for thirty weeks, having returned from the West Indies in April, 1941. Of the remaining three men, one had

enlisted June 20, 1941, and one on June 10, 1941, both having been on the strength of the Depot until attached to the Grenadiers. The third man had a total of twenty-four weeks at the Depot having been in and out of the army for three periods since his original enlistment in November, 1939.

No detailed information as to the individual training of these 43 men in the Depot itself was available and a conclusion as to their suitability for acceptance into the Winnipeg Grenadiers must be based on the record of their lengths of service in the army, as above mentioned, and on the fact that they were personally inspected and accepted by either Colonel Sutcliffe, or the second-in-command, Major Trist.

The evidence as to the 23 men who joined the Grenadiers from the Basic Training Centre at Portage la Prairie is as follows: One had been in a Reserve Battalion for one year, being attached to the Training Centre; one enlisted November 24, 1939, and had been a staff clerk receiving some training until his transfer to the Training Centre on October 3, 1941; one had been in a militia regiment for nine months; one had been called out in September, 1940, and was attached to a Militia Training Centre until his enlistment on June 17, 1941, when he went to the Basic Training Centre; two were qualified instructors attached to the Training Centre; one had been a member of the King's Own Scottish Borderers from 1915 to 1919; one had been in a Reserve Battalion from August, 1940, to May, 1941, when he was called out and attached to the Basic Training Centre. The remaining fifteen men without previous military experience served in the Basic Training Centre for periods varying from three to eleven weeks—two served three weeks; three served five weeks; eight served six weeks, and two had served eleven weeks. All these men also were personally accepted by Colonel Sutcliffe, or his second-in-command, after inspection.

In the preceding paragraphs there has been given a detailed description of the steps taken to bring the two battalions up to full establishment, including "first reinforcements". These steps were taken with speed and secrecy after the receipt of advice from England on October 9th giving detailed plans for the expedition. The necessary number of volunteers were obtained and the whole personnel of the two battalions were examined and re-equipped ready to sail from Vancouver on October 27. It is now possible, in light of what has been said, to consider the effect, on the expedition as a whole, of the addition of the comparatively small number of men who had not completed the full period of training.

I was most anxious to discover what was the effect of adding to two such battalions, small groups of lesser trained men constituting not more than five or six per cent of the strength of two units, comprising exclusively men who had volunteered for service and who had been approved by the officers of the battalions as suitable additions. A great many witnesses, with experience in this war and with battle experience in the war of 1914-18, assisted me with their opinions on this question. The opinion of these officers was to the effect that a well-trained battalion will quickly absorb such a small percentage of under-trained men, who, in a few weeks, will become indistinguishable in efficiency from the other men in the battalion. An efficient commanding officer would not keep the under-trained men segregated in a group, but would distribute them among various platoons containing his experienced and well-trained soldiers. It was pointed out by General Browne (an officer of great experience in the last war, in the peace-time army, and in this war) that in a Training Centre there may be 500 or 1,000 men for whom there are some 25 or 30 instructors, whereas when a new man is added to a platoon he has 29 or 30 instructors in the experienced men of the platoon. From opinions of the officers who gave evidence, I have reached the conclusion that there was no unfairness

either to the battalions, or to the expedition as a whole, from the addition of the men I have referred to who had not fully completed their prescribed training. I am sure that the addition of this number of volunteers, who were willing to transfer from their own units in order to proceed upon active service, did not detrimentally affect the fighting efficiency of the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers.

For similar reasons, I am satisfied that there was no unfairness to these men themselves in adding them to the expedition. I believe that these enthusiastic volunteers would be quickly absorbed into their battalions and would speedily make good any deficiency in their training. The opinion of the witnesses was that before many days had passed these men would have absorbed the spirit of their battalion and would have become useful and competent members thereof and General McNaughton in his evidence says:—

Q. With regard to your answers to questions by my friend Mr. Campbell, he gave to you the figures 43 and 62 of men who had less than sixteen weeks in connection with these two battalions respectively. Could those numbers, in your opinion, be increased without affecting the answer which you gave to his Lordship to any extent?—A. Well, I think I would like to answer it this way, saying that I took the First Canadian Division overseas, well on towards 18,000, and not one of them had had that training; not that I was happy, but—

Q. You are speaking of the First Division as now constituted?—A. Yes.

Q. I was thinking of the First Division in the last war?—A. And the same thing was true in the last war, my lord. We had nothing like that training that is indicated here for these oddments that were added.

Q. Then could those numbers be reasonably increased without affecting the efficiency of a battalion which had otherwise been fairly well trained?—A. Oh, to absorb, say, ten to fifteen per cent, is no difficulty.

Q. Then the presence of men who had not had the same degree of training as what I might call the main body of the battalion while you say that their presence creates no difficulty, would you be good enough to answer that from the standpoint of the men who themselves are trained? That is, is there any effect of the presence of somewhat untrained men on the trained men? Does it give the trained men any feeling of insecurity or lack of confidence or anything of that kind by reason of the presence of somewhat lesser trained men in their battalion?—A. Not provided one has a period of a few weeks to assimilate them and make sure they are brought up level with the rest. That is a thing that any combatant unit has got to be trained to do. It is part of our ordinary routine, because when we go into battle we are certain to have casualties, anything up to twenty-five per cent, and a good battalion must be able to take that quota of comparatively untrained people into their organization and in a matter of days rather than weeks incorporate them thoroughly into the unit.

Q. What I am thinking of is this, General McNaughton: you have this force going to Hong Kong, two battalions; assume ten per cent of them had less than sixteen weeks, of varying amounts; it was anticipated we will say they were going there on garrison duty, but we will say that expectation was disappointed and it became a combatant area; then would you be good enough to answer the question?—A. I personally would not have given it one anxiety, subject to the condition that I knew the men, that I did not have a lot of rotters put on my hands, that I had a chance to select them. I would have taken almost raw men of my own selection rather than have had a lot of fellows dumped on me that I did not know anything about.

I have already observed that the selection of these men was the duty of the Adjutant General's Department, and the execution of that duty fell upon Colonel Hennessy, the Director of Organization. Colonel Hennessy fully understood the

procedure that was adopted and it is a fair presumption that he was not ignorant of the character of the additions he was getting. He relied, no doubt, very largely and properly upon the acceptance of these additions by the officers of the Royal Rifles in the one case and by Colonel Sutcliffe and his second-in-command in the other case. I accept the view of General McNaughton in the statement already quoted that, if the inspection was judiciously made and if the men accepted were men of character, there is no reason to doubt that when the time came they would prove to be competent soldiers.

At an earlier stage of this Report, I mentioned the general rule that was circulated among a number of the District Officers Commanding under date of 18th August, 1940, respecting the sending of reinforcements overseas from Canadian Training Centres. The notification of this rule bears the signature of Colonel J. K. Lawson, who later took command of the Canadian Expedition to Hong Kong. As the notice is short it may be quoted in full:—

OTTAWA, ONTARIO,

August 18, 1940.

Training—Reinforcements C.A.S.F.

1. I am directed to request that you will ensure that reinforcements from C.A.S.F. Training Centres are not sent overseas unless they have completed the full period of training laid down, without obtaining prior authority from N.D.H.Q.

2. In the event of such authority being granted, I am to request that you will ensure that a complete record of the stage of training reached by each man accompanies him, as indicated in H.Q.S. 3498-5 of 26th January, 1940, paragraph 5.

(Sgd) J. K. LAWSON,
Colonel, for Chief of the General Staff.

Strictly, it is doubtful if this rule had any application to the men added to the strength of the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers in October, 1941. The rule applies literally to those men who enlist in battalions which are already overseas, and for which trained reinforcements are provided from the Training Centres. The two battalions that went to Hong Kong were non-divisional units and had no establishments at any training centres from which reinforcements could be drawn. The transfers made in October, 1941, were not reinforcements being sent overseas from Training Centres, within the terms of the general order of August 18, 1940; and, therefore, that order is technically inapplicable.

Nevertheless, the order of August 18, 1940, is based on the view that Canadian soldiers should not leave Canada on service until their training has been completed, without special authority from N.D.H.Q. I understood from several of the witnesses that this was the approved military practice, although in fact it had been necessary on occasions—mainly because of the shipping situation—to deviate from the rule. In the cases of the men added to the strength of the Royal Rifles and Winnipeg Grenadiers, such authority from N.D.H.Q. was, of course, obtained. The officers in charge in both Military District No. 2 and Military District No. 10 were in constant communication with Colonel Hennessy, who was the officer in charge of this phase of the preparations at N.D.H.Q., and who gave full permission for all the steps taken to obtain volunteers for the two battalions.

General Crerar, who, as Chief of the General Staff, had been responsible for the general policy expressed in the order of August 18, 1940, was absent from Ottawa during the period when steps were taken to bring the two battalions up to strength. He cannot, therefore, have any personal responsibility with this phase of the organization of the expedition. Nevertheless, he stated, in response

to a question sent to him, "that if the formation commander and the officers commanding units were content to accept as volunteers, following personal inspection, a proportion of reinforcements who had not completed certain elements of their advanced training, and if this question had been referred to me at the time, I am satisfied that I would have concurred in this deviation from my stated general policy."

General Stuart says:—

Therefore the problem is this: I admit that I wanted to give those unit refresher training. What were we to do? To make use of the shipping that we were told would be available on the 17th, remembering the conditions as they were at the time, my lord: we were at peace; war, according to the best information we had was not imminent; therefore why should not that refresher training be carried out at the other end, namely, at Hong Kong, and let us make use of that shipping that was placed at our disposal for that purpose? And again, in view of the stress, the importance that the British authorities placed upon our taking advantage of that shipping in order to get those people there just as early as possible, we chose that alternative, and I submit that there was not a second choice.

Q. There was no alternative?—A. There was no alternative, my lord.

Q. I understand you to say that there was no practicable alternative?—A. No practicable alternative, my lord.

On the whole matter I find that there was no dereliction of duty or error in judgment from the mere fact that approximately 120 men were included in the expedition before they had completed their prescribed periods of training.

I have already found that the addition of these men did not impair the efficiency of the expedition nor did it constitute an injustice to these men themselves. I have also found that there was no breach of any general order relating to reinforcements in the addition to the Hong Kong force. It is beyond question that it is better practice to send fully trained men overseas than it is to send men who are only partly trained. I believe however that, in the circumstances existing in October, 1941, the course taken to bring the units up to strength was fully justified, even though it resulted in the incorporation of a small number of men who were incompletely trained. However it would be most unfortunate if, from these findings, it was inferred that Canada did not have, in October, 1941, sufficient fully trained men in the country to provide the numbers required by the two battalions. I investigated this question but, for obvious reasons, I cannot give the exact figures of trained men in Canada at that time. I can state, however, that in the training centres alone — despite very large numbers going forward to England early in October, 1941, and also in November, 1941 — there were many hundreds of fully trained men available. And outside the training centres, in other battalions stationed in Canada, there were tens of thousands of men who had received more than six months' training.

In these circumstances, it may seem a little strange that any men who had not completed their training were included in the expedition. The explanation is to be found in the speed and secrecy with which preparations had to go forward. Between the date of the definite advice from England as to the details of the proposed expedition (October 9) and the date of sailing from Vancouver (October 27) only eighteen days intervened. Accordingly it was necessary to concentrate efforts in one or two localities to obtain the required number of volunteers. In seeking these volunteers the need of secrecy prevented any disclosure of the specific nature and destination of the expedition, and the number of volunteers was undoubtedly restricted by this inability to give any information of the type

of service being offered. In the result, the methods adopted were those I have already described, and I have expressed my opinion on that.

In considering the character of these additions, as well as in considering the question of the selection of the units, we should remind ourselves once again that in October, 1941, there were no hostilities in the Pacific and the best informed opinion available to the Canadian authorities was that hostilities would not arise in the near future. The telegram of the 26th of October stating that the consensus of opinion that war in the Far East was unlikely at present has already been quoted textually. The evidence of General Crerar and General Stuart, already quoted textually, was to the effect that the information at their disposal in September justified the belief that there would be sufficient time after the arrival at Hong Kong to carry out the necessary training to bring the recruits who had not gone through their full period up to the required level of training in weapons, as well as otherwise. In truth, the evidence as a whole, and especially the evidence of General McNaughton, General Crerar and General Stuart satisfies me that opportunity for this training was available and General Crerar's conclusion is justified that on the 8th of December the expeditionary force was in fact fit to meet an attacking force in superior numbers. Nor in this connection can we properly overlook General Grasett's confident assurance, conveyed to General Crerar, that with two additional battalions the Hong Kong garrison could withstand any attack the Japanese could bring to bear against it for an extended period. Nor can we overlook the telegram of October 30th, which as already observed, seemed implicitly to suggest that the advent of Canadian reinforcements would assist in maintaining peace. General Crerar's view is that there were grounds for thinking that the arrival of the Canadian force in Hong Kong might influence the situation in the Far East in favour of the maintaining of peace.

One further matter relating to the training of the expedition should be mentioned. The expedition sailed from Vancouver on October 27th and reached Hong Kong on November 16th; hostilities with Japan did not break out until December 8th. There was thus a total of six weeks in which training of the expedition as a whole could go forward — approximately three weeks on the ship and three weeks in Hong Kong. Brigadier J. K. Lawson, Colonel Home and Colonel Sutcliffe were all officers who had great experience and placed great stress upon training. It is inconceivable that they would not have made full use of this interval of six weeks to repair any deficiencies in training.

There is considerable evidence to suggest that training was in fact vigorously carried on between October 27 and December 8. Before leaving Ottawa, Brigadier Lawson asked for information about weapons in which the two battalions were not practised so that he could make arrangements for training in those weapons on shipboard.

In his report written shortly before arrival in Hong Kong Brigadier Lawson reports as follows:—

Training has been carried out regularly since October 30. . . . Emphasis has been laid on physical training, weapon training, P.A.G. (protection against gas) and such specialist training as could be carried out. Special classes have been organized for officers and N.C.O's, including a special P.T. class for the more senior officers. A series of lectures for officers and warrant officers was commenced after leaving our first port of all, dealing with conditions likely to be met in the Far East, races and religion, military geography, health in the tropics, characteristics of Indian Army troops likely to be met and the Japanese Army. . . . Lectures were also given to all troops on sanitation and hygiene in the tropics and on security

This report is confirmed by an extract from a letter written by one of the junior officers on November 9, in which is described the activities on board ship.

This officer stated he was up at 6.30 a.m. and attended the officers' lecture from 7.15 to 8.15 a.m.; parades took place between 9.00 and 11.30 a.m., and between 2.00 and 4.30 p.m.; he delivered two lectures each day; at 4.45 p.m. attended an officers' P.T. class for half an hour, and spent the evening in study and at a lecture at 10.00 p.m.

Weekly reports sent by cable from Hong Kong indicate that training continued vigorously after the arrival of the expedition. These messages report specifically that weapon training was carried on and that operational exercises were undertaken.

SECTION V—THE HEADQUARTERS STAFF

The original request from Great Britain asked for two battalions to go forward to join four Imperial and Indian battalions already stationed there. Subsequently, on October 11, 1941, an additional request was made that Canada should, if possible, supply a modified headquarters force, consisting of approximately eighty officers and men. This request made it clear that if Canada could not provide any or all of this force by the time of sailing, the War Office in Great Britain would do so, and that the dispatch of the two battalions should not be delayed on that account.

On receipt of this cablegram, the Acting Chief of the General Staff (Lieutenant-General Stuart) conferred by telephone with Colonel Ralston and General Crerar, who were then on their way to England. General Stuart recommended that Colonel J. K. Lawson should be given command of the force and that Colonel P. Hennessy should be made its senior administrative officer. Colonel Ralston consulted with General Crerar and obtained his recommendation that this additional responsibility should be assumed by Canada. He ascertained that Colonel Lawson's position as Director of Training could be filled without interfering with military training in Canada. Thereupon Colonel Ralston gave his assent to the proposal and recommended its adoption. The matter was then referred to the Associate Minister of National Defence, who also gave his approval, and this was subsequently confirmed by the War Committee of the Cabinet. Great Britain was advised that the headquarters force would be provided and that the dispatch of the two battalions would not thereby be delayed.

Colonel Lawson was appointed to command the Canadian force with the rank of Brigadier and Colonel Hennessy was appointed senior administrative officer of the force. The other personnel of the headquarters staff was selected and sailed with the Royal Rifles and the Winnipeg Grenadiers to Hong Kong. Certain special Canadian details were added to those requested by Great Britain, with the result that a total headquarters personnel of 97 sailed to Hong Kong on October 27.

The members of the headquarters staff are, of course, more concerned with administrative duties than with actual combat against the enemy. It is desirable, however, that all such personnel should be sufficiently trained to take part in the fighting if need arises. All of the officers on the headquarters staff were fully trained. All of the men, except four, had served in the active army for upwards of sixteen weeks. Of these four, one was a tradesman in the Ordnance Corps who had only 13 weeks service, two were provosts in the military police who had fourteen weeks service each, and one was a signaller with fourteen weeks' service. I am of the opinion that these deficiencies in time spent in the army are of no significance.

SECTION VI—DETAILS OF ORGANIZATION OF THE FORCE

By the Order in Council directing this Inquiry, I was required to examine into the organization of the Canadian expedition to Hong Kong and particularly to investigate "the provision and maintenance of supplies, equipment and ammunition and of the transportation therefor". This required a lengthy and somewhat wearisome examination of the multitudinous details relating to the preparation and dispatch of the force. It was a matter of some surprise to me to learn how complicated were the preparations necessary for such an expedition, and how much was accomplished by those in charge of the organization of the force in a very brief period.

After thus examining in detail the steps taken to make ready the expedition, I concluded that only one matter required exhaustive discussion in this Report—namely, the provision and dispatch of mechanical transport for the Canadian force. This subject will be discussed in the next section. I feel that no useful purpose will be served in giving, in wearisome detail, all the other matters concerning the organization and dispatch of the expedition—all of which were successfully handled and concerning which no possible question arises. It is sufficient to state a conclusion in general terms as to the organization of the force.

The provisioning of such a force falls under three divisions—general stores, technical stores and mechanical transport—each of which is administered by a Director in the Department of the Master-General of the Ordnance. General stores include all supplies except weapons, ammunition and mechanical transport. All required general stores were provided for the expedition to Hong Kong and accompanied the troops on the ship carrying them to their destination.

Technical stores include weapons and ammunition and the necessary supplies of reserves, spare parts, tools, etc. A list of technical stores supplied to the Hong Kong force was filed, together with a list showing in what respect the technical stores provided fell short of the prescribed establishment. These deficiencies were the subject of communications between Canadian and British Military Headquarters. There were no available Boys anti-tank rifles in Canada in October, 1941. Nor was there ammunition for 2" and 3" mortars available in Canada at the time. These facts were reported to the British authorities. Their reply expressed gratification respecting the equipment the Canadian units would take to Hong Kong, and stated that the deficiencies in the Boys anti-tank rifles would be made up when possible by release and delivery of such weapons direct to Hong Kong from British sources. As to the mortar ammunition, the War Office arranged to provide a supply for weekly release in Hong Kong and stated that some mortar ammunition would be available immediately from stocks already in Hong Kong. Subject to these deficiencies, the full establishment of technical stores, together with large reserves, was provided by Canada and proceeded with the expedition to Hong Kong.

Leaving aside for the moment the question of mechanical transport, I am satisfied that the expedition to Hong Kong was fully and properly equipped. It was stated by one of the senior officers at National Defence Headquarters that he believed that the "two battalions went out of this country better equipped than any units ever left the shores of this country".

SECTION VII—MECHANICAL TRANSPORT

It may be said in general that mechanical transport is provided by the Master-General of the Ordnance and that "the movement of troops, animals and stores by sea, land and air" belongs to the functions of the Quarter-Master-General. The Controller of Transport is a civilian, an officer of the Department of Transport, first appointed on November 16, 1939. More extended reference will be made to his duties later.

The cable of the 9th October asked National Defence Headquarters whether all or part of the Canadian force would be ready to embark on a vessel called the *Awatea*, which could sail from Vancouver between October 20th and the end of that month. The cable stated another opportunity for direct sailing was unlikely to occur within two months and observed upon the importance of taking advantage of the *Awatea*, if at all possible. It was suggested that the battalions should be on the higher establishment for infantry battalions, but with possibly a reduce scale of transport vehicles, but that the General Officer Commanding at Hong Kong was being asked for suggestions as to both the scale of equipment and transport, including carriers, which should be provided. It was also stated that Canadian Military Headquarters in London must be advised by October 15th whether or not arrangements could be completed in Canada in time for the sailing of the *Awatea*.

At the meeting of the Directors held the same day, namely, October 9th at 3.00 p.m., it was settled that the expedition should be made ready to sail October 27th. This was dictated by the fact that there were other troop movements which had to be made between the dates already mentioned (October 20 to 31) and rolling stock was not available to enable all these movements to proceed concurrently. It was also decided that preparation should be made to send first reinforcements with the troops, and that, pending further word from London in regard to transport, full scale transport, boxed, should be provided. Captain (later Major) James, of the Directorate of Mechanization in the Branch of the Master-General of the Ordnance, undertook to proceed with arrangements to provide the transport. This transport, amounting to 212 vehicles in all, consisted of the following:—

- 45 motorcycles
- 6 light Ford cars
- 57 Universal carriers
- 63 fifteen-cwt. trucks
- 2 fifteen-cwt. water tanks
- 39 three-ton trucks

On October 11, Canadian Military Headquarters in London cabled details of the equipment and transport to be provided. The cable asked that, in order to effect economy in time and shipping, as much as possible of the weapons, transport and ammunition should be taken with the troops.

Only two water tanks of the desired type were obtainable in Canada at this time and arrangements were made to substitute 15-cwt. for 8-cwt. trucks.

A further meeting of the Directors concerned with the preparations was held on October 14, at which it was reported by Major James that he had made arrangements for the 212 vehicles. At this meeting it was arranged that the various Directors in the Branch of the Master-General of the Ordnance should co-ordinate their work with the officer in the Quartermaster-General's Branch in charge of movement of troops and supplies (Colonel Spearing), as well as with the officer in charge of administration of the force itself (Colonel Hennessy).

It may be stated at once that, although this information was not available at that time, the *Awatea* did not have the capacity to take the necessary ships' stores, the troops, their baggage, weapons, ammunition and equipment, as well as the mechanical transport. Whether or not the British authorities were aware of this is not perfectly clear, but there is reason to think that they so surmised, as the cable of October 11, as already pointed out, requested that "as much of above weapons, transport, ammunition to be taken with units". I assume this means as much as was possible, having regard to the capacity of the ship.

The *Awatea* was built as a passenger vessel, designed to carry some five hundred passengers. She had undergone refitting to enable her to carry some 2,000 troops. After the ship had taken on her stores, the weapons, equipment, ammunition and the troops' baggage, there remained from 10,000 to 12,000 cubic feet only. The mechanical transport alone amounted to about fifty carloads requiring some 125,000 cubic feet. The total cargo space of the *Awatea* was only 45,000 cubic feet.

No other vessel was available, nor became available until later in October, namely, October 28, when a freighter of American registry, the *Don Jose*, reached Vancouver and space was obtained for the vehicles in her. If the expedition was to sail on the *Awatea* as planned, the importance of which was stressed by the War Office on October 9, the great bulk of this mechanical transport had to be left behind, and, as was known to the War Office and stated in the cable of October 9, an opportunity for it to go forward was unlikely.

On or about October 21, the probability of the second vessel becoming available emerged and, in fact, all the vehicles with the exception of one carload of spare parts, which was not despatched from Oshawa until October 28, were loaded upon this second vessel, which sailed from Vancouver on November 4.

This vessel had other cargo to load, but space was obtained in her. To do so her agents were induced to shut out some 75,000 feet of lumber which she had arranged to carry to Hong Kong. The *Don Jose* was originally routed for Shanghai, Hong Kong and Manila in that order, but, due to instructions received by the Master on November 1 from United States Naval authorities, the ship proceeded first to Honolulu and from thence to Manila, where she arrived December 12 and where, war having broken out, arrangements were made to turn over to the American Army in the Philippines the vehicles which she carried. Had it not been for this deviation, under instructions from superior authority, the *Don Jose* would, under normal conditions, have reached Hong Kong about December 6. Her normal speed was from $11\frac{1}{2}$ to 12 knots and on the voyage from Vancouver to Honolulu she actually averaged $10\frac{1}{2}$ knots. This miscarriage was, of course, not in any sense due to the fault of any Canadian official concerned with the shipping of these vehicles.

As already mentioned, there was some free space of from 10,000 cubic feet to 12,000 cubic feet in the *Awatea* when she sailed and the question which has been much agitated is why she sailed without taking some of these vehicles.

It has already been pointed out that at the meeting of Directors of October 14, Major James reported that provision had been made for the full 212 vehicles. He had in fact arranged with the manufacturers concerned for the boxing and loading by them of this equipment on the railway cars between October 13 and 16. The reason that these shipments did not proceed to Vancouver in accordance with these arrangements was that the shipment was stopped by the Controller of Transport on October 15, because he was aware that the *Awatea* had not the capacity for this cargo and no other vessel was known at that time to be available at Vancouver, either then or in the near future. The Controller, in view of the fact that the vehicles might have to be shipped from an American port and routed over American railway lines, in

which event they would not be forwarded to Vancouver at all, put a stop order on the shipment.

In a letter dated November 15, 1941, written on shipboard, Brigadier Lawson complains that "despite my repeated representations at National Defence Headquarters regarding the necessity for at least a proportion of our transport to accompany us, none of the M.T. (mechanical transport) had apparently arrived at Vancouver by October 27, and it was, therefore, necessary to sail without it, though there were two holds practically empty."

The statement that two holds were practically empty must be accepted with the qualification that in the holds referred to there was in fact considerable cargo, but the reasons as to why the space in these holds, which was undoubtedly free, was not used for some vehicles will have to be examined.

As already mentioned, the Transport Controller had put his stop order in effect on October 15. It appears that he had not been told by the military authorities of the proposed movement of the vehicles until October 14, on which day he, or his assistant, Mr. Connor, had received a telephone call from Major James inquiring why none of the vehicles had left the factory. Major James had learned the fact earlier that day in a conversation with a representative of one of the manufacturers. It is apparent that at this point Major James was assuming that someone else had previously communicated with the Controller of Transport, presumably either the manufacturers concerned or Colonel Spearing. Colonel Spearing, on his part, has said that he did not recognize that he had any duty to perform with regard to the vehicles. Accordingly, it will be useful to examine what had been the procedure laid down prior to this time for the shipment out of the country of boxed mechanical transport and what had been the practice followed, as well as the several functions of the Transport Controller, Movement Control (Colonel Spearing), and the Director of Mechanization.

The office of Transport Controller was created by an Order in Council passed November 15, 1939. It was made the duty of this official to determine the preference or priority of movement to be given on the application of governments or private persons of materials, troops, or naval forces between points in Canada. The orders of the Transport Controller were made binding on all persons concerned in such movements and also upon all owners or charterers of British ships registered in Canada in which cargo space should be required. He was also to co-operate with the British Ministry of Shipping in all matters relating to the transportation of troops, naval forces, materials and supplies required by the British Government in the prosecution of the war. On November 16, 1939, Mr. T. C. Lockwood, was appointed to this office.

As the result of a meeting held February 6, 1940, attended by Colonel H. O. Lawson, Director of Supply and Transport in the Quartermaster-General's Branch, Colonel Spearing, Mr. Lockwood, Mr. Liberty, of the Department of Transport, and Captain Forester, of the Ordnance Corps, Routine Order 318 was passed on February 7, 1940. This is an order of the Quartermaster-General's Branch, but is binding on the Canadian army as a whole. This order applies to the "movement of unaccompanied stores and vehicles" destined for export from Canada. This was explained in evidence to mean stores and vehicles which did not accompany the troops themselves proceeding by road or rail. As the vehicles in the case of the Hong Kong expedition were not intended to accompany the troops on their rail journey, this order would appear on its face to be applicable.

The order requires that before shipment a permit from the Transport Controller be obtained and handed to the railway by "the shipper" and when shipment "is ordered" the shipper is to be instructed to notify Movement Control the full description of the shipment, route and car numbers. Shipments are to be consigned to the Ordnance Transit Officer at the port. On receipt by Movement Control of the above information, that officer is required to notify, among others, the Controller of Transport of the information he has received.

The Ordnance Transit Officer at the port is to see that all consignments are "made ready for shipment", i.e., I suppose, loading, and the materials remain in his care until placed on board ship. Paragraph 7 of the Order reads: "Movement Control is responsible for arrangements being completed to provide shipping space. This is to be effected through the Controller of Transport."

Although, as already mentioned, this Order would apply to boxed mechanical transport destined for overseas, the evidence is that shortly after it was passed it was found to be unworkable as applied to this type of equipment which was flowing in regular shipments to such a place as England. The practice then adopted in such case was:—

- (1) The general staff was to advise the Director of Mechanization that vehicles according to a certain scale for various troops were required.
- (2) The Director thereupon was to translate this scale into vehicles according to number and kind and give to the Department of Munitions and Supply an order to purchase from the manufacturer.
- (3) The Transport Controller received the production schedule, showing the number, types and destination, and he was to issue the shipping permits and direct the manufacturers as to when to ship, and the Controller has to arrange with the British Ministry of Shipping for the necessary shipping space.
- (4) The consignee of these shipments was the Ordnance Transit Officer at the port of shipment or an officer called the Military Forwarding Officer, who, in conjunction with the steamship company, arranged for the actual loading on board the ship.

With such shipments it is common ground that Movement Control has nothing to do, and that the function of the Directorate of Mechanization ceased once the order was given to the Department of Munitions and Supply, except with respect to matters of accounting.

With regard to isolated shipments of boxed vehicles to such places as the West Indies, Iceland or Newfoundland, however, there is a conflict on the evidence as to the practice followed.

On the one hand, Major James stated that in such cases his directorate furnished to Movement Control particulars of the vehicles concerned which had already been ordered through the Department of Munitions and Supply, that Department being responsible for getting the vehicles on the cars. The Directorate of Mechanization also advised Movement Control of the car numbers and their destination. In the case of vehicles stored by the Ordnance Branch itself, Major James gave a memorandum to Movement Control of the quantities and types and asked the latter to make arrangements for space.

Mr. Connor stated that upon receiving from Movement Control the number, type and destination of the vehicles, he would issue shipping permits and order the traffic forward to the port by the manufacturer, after assuring himself that shipping space was available.

It will be seen that this procedure is in general compliance with Routine Order No. 318. Major James said he followed this order in the case of such shipments.

Colonel Spearing, on the other hand, says that since March, 1940, he has had nothing to do with the movement of boxed vehicles and that, in fact, no boxed vehicles have been sent to such places as the West Indies, Iceland or Newfoundland.

This conflict of evidence may throw some light on what actually happened with regard to the handling of some twenty vehicles designed for the *Awatea*, after it was thought there would be some free space aboard that ship. It is necessary to consider in some detail the part played by various officials who gave evidence with regard to this matter.

It will be remembered that on the evening of October 15 the Transport Controller had held up the shipment of the vehicles owing to lack of space on the *Awatea*. It will also be remembered that the Controller first heard of the shipment of these vehicles from Major James on the 14th, who, in turn, had learned from the motor companies that they were not moving.

Although Major James says that in the case of specific shipments of boxed mechanical vehicles to such places as the West Indies, Iceland, or Newfoundland, his directorate would furnish Movement Control with particulars of the vehicles, the car numbers and their destination, he had not done so in the case of the vehicles destined for Hong Kong. Major Gwynne, Colonel Spearing's assistant, however, had received from Major James a list of the vehicles on October 13, but neither Major Gwynne nor Colonel Spearing was furnished with the car numbers. If Order 318 were being strictly followed, the Director of Mechanization, if he were "the shipper," would have done so, or, if he were not, he would have instructed "the shipper," presumably the manufacturer, to do so. Major James, in his evidence, said he thought his duty was discharged when he had made arrangements for the vehicles to be boxed and loaded on the cars. Order 318 was, in this respect, imperfectly followed by him, or his assistants. It was, however, not observed at all by Movement Control, who, although furnished on October 13 with the particulars of the vehicles, did nothing to communicate with the Transport Controller. There was thus a breakdown at this point and up to this time, namely October 14, between these two branches of National Defence Headquarters. This, however, does not alter the fact that there was no room for all the vehicles in the *Awatea*, nor that they would not have been permitted by the Transport Controller to go forward until shipping space for them became available. It may have some bearing, however, on the twenty vehicles, as to which an attempt was later made to forward for loading in the *Awatea*.

There is, moreover, other evidence bearing on the question as to where the responsibility for the rail movement of the mechanical transport, as a whole, lay. The meeting of the directors of October 14, already referred to, had arranged that the directorates of the Ordnance Branch would co-ordinate with Movement Control and Colonel Hennessy as to this movement. At this meeting Colonel Spearing reported that it looked as though the *Awatea* could not take all the vehicles. He was to ascertain what, if any, space would be available for some vehicles and the means by which the remainder could be sent. It was fully recognized at this meeting that the stores, equipment and weapons must have priority. There was a discussion following this meeting at which Major James was not, but Colonel Spearing was, present, when it was agreed that the ship should take everything she could.

It was in the morning of October 14, and prior to the meeting of that date, which was held in the afternoon, that Major James had learned from the motor companies that, while they were loading the vehicles on the cars, they had not received permits from the Transport Controller, as a result of which he had called Mr. Connor, and Mr. Connor in turn had discussed with Colonel Spearing the proposed movement. Colonel Spearing was to send to Mr. Connor, in code, the steamer's name, so that Mr. Connor might ascertain its cargo capacity.

Before attending the meeting of October 14, Colonel Spearing also spoke to Commander German at Naval Headquarters, asking him to ascertain whether the *Awatea* would have capacity for "40 odd carloads of mechanical vehicles in cases and at least 10 carloads of other stores." Colonel Spearing made a memorandum of this conversation at the time. It contains this: "Also told him that I was arranging for the M.T. to arrive on the 25th and the other stores on the 26th for loading." The information as to the vehicles given by Colonel Spearing to Commander German in this conversation, he had obtained from the list handed to his assistant, Major Gwynne, by Major James on the preceding day.

At the meeting of the Directors held in the afternoon of the 14th, Major James handed to Colonel Spearing a more detailed list of the 212 vehicles containing information in addition to that contained in the list handed to Major Gwynne, including the name of the consignee, which was "the Officer Commanding Force 'C', c/o Ordnance Officer, Vancouver". Although both Colonel Spearing and Major James came to this meeting with the knowledge that the movement of the vehicles had not commenced, because the Transport Controller had not been applied to for permits, neither mentioned it at that time. The procedure for seeing that the vehicles were sent and delivered in time ought, of course, to have been clearly settled between these two officers; and the minutes of the meeting state that these officers, along with others, were to co-ordinate their efforts. Major James came away from the meeting thinking the matter from then on was entirely for Colonel Spearing and the Transport Controller. Colonel Spearing, however, says he was to have nothing to do with the movement of the vehicles. He says that not only had he had nothing to do with the movement of boxed mechanical transport in the past, but that he had understood from a memorandum dated October 11, received by him from the Directorate of Mechanization, that no mechanical transport at all would be taken with the Force. I have read this memorandum. It states merely that the battalions when proceeding from their respective Military Districts would take no mechanical transport with them. This refers, of course, to the mechanical transport previously in the possession of these units and not to the new vehicles coming from the factories, which were intended for the expedition. In any event, on October 13, Colonel Spearing's assistant had the list of what was going and Colonel Spearing himself had full particulars at and prior to the meeting of October 14th. Any misapprehension he may have had as to what was going with the troops in the way of mechanical transport was completely dispelled by that time; and he was charged at that time with the duty of ascertaining whether any vehicles could go on the *Awatea*, and what ship would be available for the remainder.

On October 15 Colonel Spearing wrote to the Transport Controller giving him particulars of the movement, including 50 carloads of vehicles and spare parts. This was not received by the Controller until October 17. In the meantime, the shipment of all the vehicles had been held up.

In his conversation with Mr. Connor on the morning of October 14, Colonel Spearing had then advised Mr. Connor that the traffic to Vancouver should be consigned to the Ordnance Transit Officer there. Colonel Spearing said he did not know whether there would be such an officer there, but, if there were not, "somebody" would be acting in that capacity to handle this particular movement. No Ordnance Transit Officer was, in fact, appointed and in the particulars of the shipment given to Colonel Spearing by Major James at the meeting of October 14 it was clearly set out that the consignee was the Officer Commanding Force "C", in care of the "Ordnance Officer", Vancouver. This officer is permanently located at Vancouver. If there was to be an "Ordnance Transit Officer" he would have had to be specially designated from Ottawa for this particular movement. The address given also contained the words "In Transit". This meant, of course, that the material was sent in care of the Ordnance Officer at Vancouver for a further destination. It did not mean the "Ordnance Transit Officer."

Colonel Spearing did not correct the information given Mr. Connor, and a letter was sent at a later date by Mr. Connor addressed to the "Ordnance Transit Officer". After some travels, it reached Lieutenant Winter, who had been sent out from Ottawa to assist in superintending the loading of the ship. Perhaps any delay in the delivery of the letter may not have produced any result so far as the getting of any of the vehicles on the *Awatea* is concerned, but the incident is one which a little more care would have prevented.

Following the discussion at or after the meeting of October 14 as to the desirability of placing aboard the *Awatea* as many vehicles as possible, Brigadier Macklin had certain discussions with Brigadier Lawson as to settling the types and quantities of the vehicles to be placed aboard, pending the determination by Colonel Spearing as to the amount of space available. Brigadier Macklin kept constantly in touch with Colonel Spearing following October 14, but it was not until October 18 that Brigadier Macklin was advised by Colonel Spearing that possibly from 10,000 cubic feet to 12,000 cubic feet would be available on the *Awatea* for vehicles.

On receipt of this information, Brigadier Macklin settled with Brigadier Lawson a tentative list of vehicles to go and gave to Major James this list over the telephone stating that there was a possibility that the above amount of space would be available and that further word would come from himself or Colonel Spearing. Major James constantly, between October 14 and 18, kept in touch with Colonel Spearing to ascertain if the vehicles had been released by the Transport Controller, as some were already on the cars and demurrage charges were in prospect. Colonel Spearing was to advise Major James as soon as he got a second boat. Major James left instructions for his assistant, Lieut. Findley, to expect this further word and then to communicate with Mr. Connor. On October 20, Lieut. Findlay heard from Brigadier Macklin himself with a final list. It was, therefore, not until the 20th that Major James, or his assistant, was given the necessary information as to the particular vehicles to be loaded. Before Major James had left his office on the 18th, he had ascertained from the manufacturers the contents of the loaded cars and their car numbers, so that on receiving further word, as indicated by Brigadier Macklin, he, or Lieut. Findlay, would be in a position to specify particular cars. There was thus the greatest attention to these details on the part of Major James.

On hearing from Brigadier Macklin, Lieut. Findlay immediately spoke to Mr. Connor, giving him the list of vehicles and informing him that there was some 12,000 cubic feet of free space and that it was urgent that the twenty vehicles be released and forwarded. Not having heard from Mr. Connor as to what he had done, Lieut. Findlay reported to Brigadier Macklin on October 21st. Up to this time the latter had not been told, or did not appreciate, that the shipment of mechanical transport had been held up at all. He says that he thought they were on their way to Vancouver. On learning the facts from Lieut. Findlay, he then called Colonel Spearing, who informed him that so far as the twenty vehicles were concerned there was no embargo and that they were on their way to Vancouver. At Colonel Spearing's suggestion, Brigadier Macklin called Mr. Connor and confirmed this. Colonel Spearing had called Mr. Connor on the 20th advising him of the estimated free space. Mr. Connor, in advising Brigadier Macklin that these vehicles were on their way, had told him that, while it was the intention to load as many of the twenty as possible on the *Awatea*, the military authorities would have to deal with any priority that might arise in case all could not be loaded. Brigadier Macklin undertook to take care of the question of priority. He did so by acquainting both the commander of the force (Brigadier Lawson) and the staff captain (Captain Bush) with the situation and handed to both of them, on October 22nd, before they left Ottawa, a memorandum setting out these facts. From that time forward no one at National Defence Headquarters did anything further in connection with these twenty vehicles. This was left in the hands of the Transport Controller.

It is clear on the evidence that the amount of free space in the *Awatea* was at this time merely an estimate. In a cable sent by Brigadier Macklin on October 20 to the British commander at Hong Kong, it is stated:—

Because of cargo limitations of transport *Awatea* only very limited M.T., probably twelve to eighteen vehicles, can be shipped with troops. Remainder must be shipped another vessel concerning which no information available.

Colonel Spearing did not know the shape of the space and the number of boxes which might fit into the space had to be estimated. Colonel Spearing gave evidence that as early as October 10 he had come to the conclusion that the mechanical transport required by the battalions could not be carried on the ship with the troops, but that he did nothing about it until the 14th, because of his idea that the troops were not taking any vehicles. It was on that day he made his estimate as to what free space there would be for vehicles. On the 16th he received confirmation from the navy as to the total cargo capacity of the ship, and it was on the 18th, as already mentioned, before Brigadier Macklin, as the result of his conferences with Colonel Spearing and Brigadier Lawson, was able to prepare his first tentative list, which has already been referred to.

Returning to Mr. Connor, he on October 20, having heard from Lieutenant Findlay and Colonel Spearing, before releasing the twenty vehicles telegraphed to the ship's agent, Mr. P. B. Cooke, at Vancouver, to check as to whether or not the space said to be available was so in fact. The reply he received did not answer his question, but Mr. Connor decided to let the vehicles go anyway. He accordingly telephoned the manufacturers with instructions to ship and issued the necessary permits. The following day Mr. Connor telegraphed Mr. Cooke, advising him the twenty vehicles had been shipped and giving him a description of the quantities, types and weight, advising him that the numbers of the cars containing these vehicles would follow.

These cars were sent by manifest freight, which is the speediest freight service. Unless sent by special train, there was no faster means of forwarding this shipment. The evidence is that, had these cars left Toronto (which is the assembly point for this traffic) at 8.00 A.M. on the 21st, they should have arrived in Vancouver by 9.00 P.M. on October 27, one-half hour before the *Awatea* actually sailed. Mr. Connor ordered the cars out from Oshawa and Windsor respectively, on the afternoon of the 20th. The three cars from Oshawa left Toronto at 8.00 A.M. on October 21, but the one car from Windsor did not arrive at Toronto in time and, consequently, did not leave until 8.00 A.M. on the 22nd. The three cars reached Vancouver on the morning of the 28th, some nine hours behind schedule. They lost time between Moose Jaw and Vancouver, owing to large numbers of freight trains moving east and extra passenger trains going west. The fourth car developed a hot box at Winnipeg, where it lost a complete day, arriving in Vancouver on October 29.

During the progress of these cars across the country, Mr. Connor kept in touch with the railways and impressed upon them the urgency of the shipment. On October 25 it became apparent to him that the cars would not arrive in time, although he emphasizes that neither he nor Mr. Lockwood were informed of the sailing date, but only of the loading dates, namely, the 24th, 25th and 26th. From Mr. Connor's letter to Mr. Cooke, written October 21st, it is apparent that he was never sure that these vehicles would arrive in time and that he was doubtful as to whether in fact there would be found to be any free space in the ship suitable for loading these heavy boxes of vehicles. On October 21, Mr. Connor had learned from the British shipping authorities in Montreal that another ship would likely be available in Vancouver for loading on October 28 and he thereupon issued permits and instructed the motor companies to forward the whole balance of the 212 vehicles that day. The second ship was definitely confirmed to Mr. Connor on the following day.

In Vancouver, in addition to Mr. Cooke, Mr. Clendenning, representative there of the British Ministry of War Transport, knew that the twenty vehicles were en route. Also Lieutenant Winter, who was assisting Lieutenant Colonel Henderson, Inspector of Ordnance Services at Vancouver, in superintending the loading, was advised on October 25 and 26 by the railway agent at Vancouver as to the progress of the four cars.

On October 26, Colonel Henderson reported to Colonel Switzer, at Ottawa, that no mechanical transport had arrived. Colonel Switzer informed Major James, who then said there was a second ship, but took no action. There is no doubt in my mind that what was known to Lieutenant Winter was known to Colonel Henderson.

On October 25 Major Gwynne had informed Captain Bush, the Staff Captain of Force "C", that the vehicles would not arrive before sailing time. Unquestionably this would have been reported to Brigadier Lawson. Also on that day the ships' master told Major Gwynne that even if the vehicles did arrive, he could not take them, giving as his reason that the ship was going on a long journey, that he would probably go in a roundabout way and needed extra fuel oil. On the evening of October 27 before the ship sailed the ship's Captain again said to Major Gwynne and Mr. Cooke, the manager of the ship's agents, that even if the vehicles arrived he could not take them unless he pumped out some 100 tons of oil. While Mr. Cooke says this is so he goes on to say that had the vehicles arrived before the ship sailed this oil would have been pumped out and the vehicles loaded. This seems inconsistent with the Captain's view that he needed this extra fuel oil and I do not understand Major Gwynne's evidence to be that Captain Martin was agreeable to dispensing with this fuel.

Had Colonel Spearing, when he realized as early as October 10 that the *Awatea* could not take all the mechanical transport, taken immediate steps then to ascertain the capacity of the ship and, with his knowledge from past experience as to the space required to carry the other equipment and stores, formulated what space would remain, the twenty vehicles could have been despatched in plenty of time to have reached the *Awatea* in time for loading on October 24. Had this been done I am of opinion on all the evidence that it is highly probable they could have been loaded. I have in mind not only this feature of Colonel Spearing's activity but his whole evidence, to which I have made reference at some length, and I do not think that he was as alert as he ought to have been. In his post he has undoubtedly moved hundreds of thousands of troops and their equipment and, I have no reason to doubt, done it very efficiently, but I think on this occasion, whatever may have been the cause there was some lack of energy. In war, energy is, perhaps, the cardinal virtue. It must of course be guided by knowledge and judgment, but without energy, knowledge and judgment are fruitless.

There remains the question whether the 20 vehicles, despatched when they were, would have been loaded if they had arrived before the vessel sailed assuming Captain Martin would have been willing at that late hour to take them, the ship at that time having fully loaded its cargo and fuel oil.

I shall deal first with the question of suitable space. It will be seen, from what has already been stated, that it was the result of an estimate by Colonel Spearing as to there being some unoccupied space in the *Awatea* that the Transport Controller permitted the twenty vehicles to proceed toward the coast. What the shape of the space would be, and whether or not it could accommodate large boxes containing these heavy motor vehicles, no one in N.D.H.Q. knew, nor did the Controller of Transport. The *Awatea* was a passenger vessel, not designed for such cargo.

The unfilled space existed in holds numbers 1 and 2 which were filled in part only. The other two holds were entirely taken up with other stores.

The cases containing the vehicles measured:

12' 8" x 7' 5" x 5' 2"

14' 8" x 7' 9" x 5' 3"

14' 9" x 7' 6" x 7'

and they weighed 9,550 lbs., 8,700 lbs., and 9,500 lbs., respectively. The openings to numbers 1 and 2 holds measured 20' 8" x 18' and 13' 6" x 12' respectively and these openings were boxed in between "A" and "C" decks.

The statements made by the stevedores on the one hand and the wharf superintendent and a marine surveyor on the other are at variance as to the possibility of loading any of the vehicles in No. 1 hold, the opening to which is only 10" wider than the length of the smallest case. They are also in disagreement as to the fitness of the vessel's equipment for loading. These statements were not subject to cross-examination, and one of the stevedores made a later statement changing his earlier one. In these circumstances no finding can be made upon them.

There is however the evidence of Mr. Cooke and Mr. Lockwood the Controller of Transport. Mr. Lockwood is a man of immense experience in the shipping business before the war as well as in his present office. Mr. Lockwood says:—

With every study I am trying to improve as far as I can and to ascertain exactly how many we could have squeezed in, and as near as I can figure now we could have carried the six universal carriers.

Q. Where?—A. With some difficulty.

Q. Where?—A. In No. 1 hold.

Q. That is, if you could have got them down there?—A. Yes.

Q. What do you say you could have got down?—A. Six universal carriers in No. 1 hold, my lord; I think there was sufficient space if we had met with no difficulties arising out of obstructions in the hatch-way.

Q. Yes?—A. And seven trucks and two water tanks in No. 2 hold. That would have been approximately three carlots out of the four.

Q. With regard to the six universal carriers in No. 1 hold, are you leaving the practicability out of that estimate and merely taking the size of the hatch and the size of the boxes and saying you could measure the two and see that they would go down? Are you leaving the practical element out of that estimate?—A. Yes, and taking it from the size of the hatch and the size of the space in the hold.

Q. That is to say, you are really leaving out of account the risks of passage owing to, let us say, carelessness on the part of the stevedores?—A. Yes.

Q. You are leaving all that kind of thing out?—A. Yes.

Q. It would have been a close bit of work, I understand you to say?—A. The stevedores call it "tight"; it would be a tight fit. I thought perhaps it would be of interest to show how they are slung. This is not the exact box we are using, but it is an example of how they are slung on board ship.

Q. You are producing a pamphlet which shows a box containing mechanical transport and shows the loading by the use of a boom from which the box is suspended by ropes, and I suppose your point, Mr. Lockwood, is that as that box is dropped into a hold there is a certain amount of oscillation and canting which might cause jamming?—A. Yes, and for that purpose there are marks on the sides of the cases where the wire sling must be put in order to keep it perfectly level; otherwise you get jamming and lots of trouble.

Q. Have you any experience which would enable you to say as to whether the getting such a box into a hold of that character is more difficult or less difficult than getting it out?—A. More difficult in getting it out?

Q. So that as to whether or not, apart from measurements, those universal carriers could have been loaded into No. 1 hold you would leave that for the shipping authorities or the stevedores?—A. Yes, you would have to leave it to them.

Q. I do not know that I quite understand the question, and I am not sure that I understand your answer. I suppose you have had a great deal more practical experience in regard to the shipping of mechanical

transport than most. Very few people can have had anything like your experience except perhaps the stevedores at Atlantic ports?—A. Yes, my lord. We found so much trouble with the various steamship lines in handling mechanical transport all over the Atlantic coast that we finally appointed an expert stevedore to do nothing else but go up and down the coast and show the local stevedores how to handle these cases.

Q. So you are not supposed to leave it to the ordinary stevedore?—A. No, not to the ordinary stevedore, my lord.

Q. But to a stevedore who has had special instruction in regard to loading mechanical transport?—A. Yes, my lord; and also you would have to take into consideration the fact that they had never handled any of these cases at Vancouver.

Q. That is what I have in mind. I do not suppose they knew anything about them. (No response).

Q. In the light of what you have just said what is your opinion as a practical matter of the feasibility of getting these universal carriers into No. 1 hold?—A. I can answer that in two ways. In peace time if I was trying to get business away from another steamship company I would put some special man on and try to handle it in the most careful manner possible, and have the same thing done at the other end; but I think much the same procedure would have to be taken in war time, and perhaps a chance taken on doing the best you could to prevent jamming.

Q. Where does that leave us as to whether or not, in your view, if those six universal carriers had arrived at Vancouver the stevedores at Vancouver, being who they were, would have caused those six universal carriers to find their way into No. 1 hold?—A. I can only answer that under the circumstances I would have taken a chance on it.

Q. But I gather from what you say that there would have been a very considerable risk of jamming?—A. Yes.

Q. Both at Vancouver and at Hong Kong?—A. Particularly at the destination, my lord.

Q. But you yourself in war time would take the chance, if you had not the proper instruments? That is to say, you had no special man at Vancouver?—A. No.

Q. And there would be no special man at Hong Kong, as far as we know?—A. Quite so, my lord.

I accept Mr. Lockwood's evidence. I do not accept Mr. Cook's evidence that it was a simple matter to load these vehicles and that all could have been loaded. The result is that had these vehicles arrived on October 27 before the ship sailed, and had the Captain been willing to accept them about fifteen out of the twenty vehicles might possibly have been loaded. Mr. Lockwood seems to have thought that seven trucks and the two water tanks could have been loaded but the evidence as to whether the Captain would have been willing to take any of these vehicles enables me to form no confident opinion on this point.

There remains the further question as to whether there resulted to the expedition any detriment or injury by reason of the fact that these twenty vehicles did not accompany the troops. In my view it can be said at once that, so far as the twelve 15 cwt. trucks are concerned, there was no such result, and we have it in a cable from Brigadier Lawson at Hong Kong on November 24 that transport was being hired as required. Hong Kong is, or was, a large city and it is apparent that trucks were available and were obtained for the use of the Canadian force. If that was so before hostilities began, I have no doubt it did not cease to be so after hostilities broke out.

The two water tanks are, of course, specially built tanks on a chassis. Whether or not the British garrison had a reserve of these vehicles which were

made available to the Canadian force cannot be known. Equally it cannot be known whether the force was able to use ordinary trucks for the purpose of carrying water in some sort of receptacle. In the absence of evidence, I can make no finding as to whether or not the force suffered from lack of these two vehicles.

With regard to the six carriers, they are simply a means of getting a Bren gun crew, or mortar crew, across country quickly. They are not fighting vehicles in the sense that a tank is. A truck would serve equally well where there are roads. Again it is not known whether the British garrison had carriers with which the force could have been, or was supplied, but, even if that were not the case, it cannot be said that the absence of these six carriers would prevent the force from carrying, or using their Bren guns and mortars. These weapons are designed to be carried by their crews and the "carriers" are for the purpose of quick transportation. The Bren gun weighs $23\frac{1}{2}$ pounds and the tripod 30 pounds, or 53 pounds in all. The 3-inch mortar is carried, including ammunition by a crew of four. The heaviest load for any man is 60 pounds.

On the evidence I cannot find that there was any detriment suffered by the force through the absence of the six carriers. That must remain a matter of speculation.

Copy

Exhibit 44

TELEGRAM

30th OCTOBER, 1941

C.G.S.
M.G.O.
A.G.
Q.M.G.
M.S.

DEFENSOR OTTAWA
M 0 2 B FOR C.G.S.

LONDON, 30th OCT. 1941
FROM C.J.G.S.

WE ARE VERY GRATEFUL TO YOU FOR DESPATCHING YOUR CONTINGENT TO HONG KONG AT SUCH SHORT NOTICE. WE FULLY REALISE THE DIFFICULTIES OF MOBILISATION AND OF DISTANCE WHICH HAVE HAD TO BE OVERCOME. THE MORAL EFFECT OF THEIR ARRIVAL IN NOVEMBER WILL BE MUCH GREATER THAN IT WOULD HAVE BEEN TWO MONTHS LATER.

TROOPER.

Exhibit 45

Copy

LONDON, 26th Oct., 1941.

Extract from Canmilitry G.S. 2332:

Para. nine Consensus opinion that war in Far East unlikely at present.